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The Western Cape is currently experiencing a population explosion alongside rapid 
urbanisation. This places pressure on the provincial departments involved in the 
provision of public education infrastructure to meet the demand for schools created by 
the associated increase in learners. Despite best efforts by the components responsible 
for delivery, demand is not being met due to a combination of chronic lack of internal 
resource capacity and inadequate funding. In recent years the national government has 
taken a keen interest in streamlining infrastructure delivery frameworks. This has led 
the focus to fall squarely on optimising the traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP) 
paradigm, specifically in respect to optimising the mode of delivery of public schools, 
with little being done to similarly optimise alternative procurement models, such as 
public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
In order to investigate the alternative procurement method of PPPs, this research report 
identifies applicable means, modes, critical success factors and regulatory frameworks, 
with specific reference to the both the provision of public schools and the context of the 
Western Cape province. Particular consideration is given to conditions in the local 
public service and construction industry to identify whether the present environment is 
conducive to the effective delivery of public schools via PPPs. The empirical analysis 
involves a combination of case study research, as well as quantitative and qualitative 
data collection of factors critical to the success of the mode in the local context in an 
effort to identify constraints and propose solutions. Data collection involves a 
triangulated study beginning with a review of PPPs in South Africa (a secondary data 
analysis of existing research on local case studies) to identify the contextual factors, 
which is followed by a quantitative survey to measure these factors in the current local 
context and, finally, in-depth interviews to investigate the underlying reasons and 
proposed solutions to address constraints. 
Key findings include a need for PPP-oriented capacity-building amongst public sector 
implementing agencies, addressing the shortage of will and advocacy amongst political 
office bearers due to the perception that PPPs present a significant risk to the public 
sector, and a need to streamline procurement processes by shifting towards a 
programmatic procurement model, i.e. moving away from the traditional PPP mode as 
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a vehicle for singular projects, to the implementation of a public-private variant for the 





Die Wes-Kaap beleef tans ’n bevolkingsontploffing tesame met snelle verstedeliking. 
Dít plaas druk op die provinsiale departemente gemoeid met die lewering van openbare 
onderwysinfrastruktuur om te voorsien in die groter vraag na skole weens die toename 
in leerders. Ten spyte van die beste pogings deur die partye wat vir lewering 
verantwoordelik is, word daar weens ’n kombinasie van ’n chroniese tekort aan interne 
hulpbronvermoë en onvoldoende finansiering nié tans in hierdie vraag voorsien nie. Die 
nasionale regering toon die afgelope paar jaar al hoe meer belangstelling daarin om 
infrastruktuurleweringsraamwerke te stroomlyn. Tog val die klem voluit op die 
optimalisering van die tradisionele infrastruktuurverkrygings- (“TIP-”)paradigma, in 
die besonder die optimalisering van die tradisionele metode vir die lewering van 
openbare skole, en word weinig gedoen om ook alternatiewe verkrygingsmodelle, soos 
openbare-privaat vennootskappe (“PPP’s”), te optimaliseer. 
Om PPP’s as ’n alternatiewe verkrygingsmetode te ondersoek, identifiseer hierdie 
navorsingsverslag gepaste middele, metodes, kernsuksesfaktore en 
reguleringsraamwerke met spesifieke verwysing na die voorsiening van openbare skole 
in die provinsiale konteks van die Wes-Kaap. Omstandighede in die plaaslike 
staatsdiens en die boubedryf word veral bestudeer om te bepaal of die huidige 
omgewing bevorderlik is vir die doeltreffende lewering van openbare skole deur middel 
van PPP’s. Die empiriese ontleding kombineer gevallestudienavorsing met 
kwantitatiewe en kwalitatiewe data-insameling oor deurslaggewende faktore vir die 
sukses van dié metode in plaaslike verband om sodoende beperkings uit te wys en 
oplossings voor te stel. Data-insameling bestaan uit ’n getrianguleerde studie, wat begin 
met ’n oorsig van PPP’s in Suid-Afrika (’n sekondêre dataontleding van bestaande 
navorsing oor plaaslike gevallestudies) om die kontekstuele faktore te identifiseer. 
Daarna volg ’n kwantitatiewe opname om hierdie faktore in die huidige plaaslike 
konteks te meet. Laastens word diepteonderhoude gevoer om die onderliggende redes 
en voorgestelde oplossings vir die beperkings te ondersoek. 
Kernbevindinge sluit in ’n behoefte aan PPP-gerigte vermoëbou onder 
implementeringsagentskappe in die openbare sektor, sowel as aan voorspraak onder 
onwillige politieke ampsdraers om die opvatting teen te werk dat PPP’s ’n beduidende 




stroomlyning van verkrygingsprosesse deur na ’n programmatiese verkrygingsmodel 
oor te slaan, d.w.s. deur weg te beweeg van die tradisionele PPP-metode vir die 
lewering van enkele projekte, na die implementering van ’n ander tipe openbare-privaat 










public-private partnerships, basic education, public-sector education 
infrastructure, public-sector infrastructure procurement, scarce resources, 







This paper is dedicated to my wife, Ruth, as well as my two daughters and my parents, 
Colleen and Barry, all of whom (either knowingly or unknowingly and each in their 
own unique way) provided the means, support and inspiration for this endeavour. 
I would also like to acknowledge the participants in this research process who gave 
their valuable time and opinions willingly, encouragingly and expectantly. It is my hope 
that this project honours their contributions by making a valuable addition to the body 
of knowledge on the subject of PPPs and public infrastructure delivery in the context 











LIST OF FIGURES XIV 
LIST OF TABLES XV 
ABBREVIATIONS XVI 
1: INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.2 POPULATION GROWTH AND RAPID URBANISATION IN THE WESTERN CAPE 1 
1.3 PROVISION OF PUBLIC-SECTOR EDUCATION FACILITIES IN THE WESTERN 
CAPE 2 
1.4 SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC-SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION 7 
1.5 CURRENT DELIVERY ARRANGEMENTS FOR EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
THE WESTERN CAPE 9 
1.6 PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO DATE 12 
1.7 RESEARCH PROPOSAL AND REPORT STRUCTURE 13 
1.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 14 
2: LITERATURE REVIEW – PUBLIC SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY AND 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 16 
2.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 16 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 16 
2.3 PUBLIC-SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY 17 
2.3.1 Traditional Infrastructure Procurement 17 
2.3.2 The Rise of Public-Private Partnerships 21 
2.3.3 Definitions of Public-Private Partnerships 23 
2.3.4 Types of Public-Private Partnerships 24 
2.3.5 Why and When to Use Public-Private Partnerships? 25 
2.3.6 Criticism of Public-Private Partnerships 30 
2.3.7 Public-Private Partnerships in the South African Context 32 
2.4 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 36 




2.4.2 Value for Money 43 
2.4.3 Risk Transfer 45 
2.4.4 Leadership and Political Will 49 
2.4.5 Goal Alignment 50 
2.4.6 Governance 51 
2.5 CONDITIONS IN THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 53 
2.5.1 Learning from the United Kingdom: Private Finance Initiatives 53 
2.5.2 External Conditions: The Local Construction Industry 55 
2.5.3 Internal Conditions: The Public Service 57 
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 60 
3: THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK – PUBLIC SECTOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 62 
3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 62 
3.2 PUBLIC EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION AND MANAGEMENT 
REGULATIONS 63 
3.2.1 Government Immovable Asset Management Act 63 
3.2.2 South African Schools Act 63 
3.2.3 The Construction Industry Development Board 64 
3.2.4 The Infrastructure Delivery Management System 64 
3.2.5 The Standard for Infrastructure Procurement and Delivery Management 65 
3.3 SOUTH AFRICAN PPP PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS 66 
3.3.1 The South African Constitution 66 
3.3.2 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) 67 
3.3.3 South African National Treasury Regulations and Public-Private Partnership Unit 67 
3.3.4 National Budget and an Overview of Exposure to PPPs 71 
3.3.5 Division of Revenue Act 71 
3.4 THE EFFECT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS ON INFRASTRUCTURE 
DELIVERY 72 
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 73 
4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 75 
4.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 75 
4.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 75 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 76 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION 79 
4.5 VALIDITY 81 




4.7 SCOPE AND EXCLUSIONS 83 
4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 85 
5: CASE STUDIES – PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY 87 
5.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 87 
5.2 CASE STUDY 1: CHAPMAN’S PEAK DRIVE 88 
5.2.1 Background 88 
5.2.2 Procurement 89 
5.2.3 Critical Success Factors 90 
5.2.4 Lessons Learnt 94 
5.2.5 Summary 95 
5.3 CASE STUDY 2: GAUTRAIN RAPID RAIL LINK 95 
5.3.1 Background 95 
5.3.2 Procurement 99 
5.3.3 Critical Success Factors 103 
5.3.4 Lessons Learnt 107 
5.3.5 Summary 111 
5.4 CASE STUDY 3: INKOSI ALBERT LUTHULI CENTRAL HOSPITAL 112 
5.4.1 Background 112 
5.4.2 Procurement 112 
5.4.3 Critical Success Factors 113 
5.4.4 Summary 115 
5.5 CASE STUDY 4: UNIVERSITAS TERTIARY AND PELONOMI REGIONAL 
HOSPITALS 116 
5.5.1 Background 116 
5.5.2 Procurement 118 
5.5.3 Critical Success Factors 119 
5.5.4 Lessons Learnt 121 
5.5.5 Summary 121 
5.6 CASE STUDY 5: HUMANSDORP DISTRICT HOSPITAL 122 
5.6.1 Background 122 
5.6.2 Procurement 123 
5.6.3 Critical Success Factors 124 
5.6.4 Lessons Learnt 126 
5.6.5 Summary 127 
5.7 CASE STUDY 6: WESTERN CAPE REHABILITATION CENTRE AND LENTEGEUR 




5.7.1 Background 128 
5.7.2 Procurement 130 
5.7.3 Critical success factors 130 
5.7.4 Summary 133 
5.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND FINDINGS 133 
6: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 137 
6.3 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 137 
6.2 QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 138 
6.2.1 Critical Success Factors – Importance 138 
6.2.2 Presence/Prevalence of Critical Success Factors 139 
6.2.3 Relative Difference between Critical Success Factors’ Importance and Prevalence in the 
Current Context 140 
6.2.4 Public-Private Partner Finance 142 
6.2.5 Public-Private Partner Infrastructure Suitability 143 
6.2.6 Perception of Public-Private Partner Role-Players in the Current Environment 144 
6.3 QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 145 
6.3.1 Public Sector Capacity 146 
6.3.2 Political Will 149 
6.3.3 Economic Stability and Market Competition 150 
6.3.4 Affordability 150 
6.3.5 Value for Money 152 
6.3.6 Transparency 153 
6.3.7 Private Sector Capacity 153 
6.3.8 Risk Transfer 155 
6.3.9 Funding Arrangements 156 
6.3.10 Effectiveness During the Operational Period 158 
6.3.11 Regulatory Framework 158 
6.3.12 Public Schools as a Delivery Objective 160 
6.3.13 Unintended Consequences of PPP Arrangements 162 
6.3.14 Suggestions to Improve the Environment for PPPs 163 
6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 163 
7: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS – WHAT ARE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR A 
PPP FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 165 
7.1 THE WAY FORWARD AND FURTHER RESEARCH 165 
7.2 ADDRESSING THE LIMITING FACTORS: CAPACITY AND POLITICAL WILL 165 




7.4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
 170 
7.5 POTENTIAL PRIVATE PARTNERS 172 
7.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 173 
8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 175 
8.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM SUMMARY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 175 
8.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 176 
8.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 177 
8.3.1 Case Study Findings 177 
8.3.2 Survey and Interview Findings 178 
8.4 CONCLUSION 183 
REFERENCES 185 
ANNEXURES 201 
ANNEXURE A: SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS 201 
ANNEXURE B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 209 






LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Urbanisation in South Africa from 2007 to 2017 ...................................................................... 2 
Figure 2: Learners and schools in the Western Cape province ................................................................. 3 
Figure 3: Distribution of public ordinary schools in the Western Cape province ..................................... 4 
Figure 4: Proposed contracting arrangements and associated risk allocation ......................................... 11 
Figure 5: Diagram of the conceptual framework underpinning the research proposal methodology ..... 17 
Figure 6: Typical client-contractor relationship associated with traditional infrastructure procurement 18 
Figure 7: South African public sector infrastructure delivery options .................................................... 19 
Figure 8: Public-sector infrastructure spending ...................................................................................... 22 
Figure 9: PPP decision tree for stakeholders .......................................................................................... 28 
Figure 10: Public-private partnership projects in South Africa since 2000 ............................................ 33 
Figure 11: What is needed to ensure successful public-private partnerships .......................................... 36 
Figure 12: Excerpt of a public-private partnership project list from the South African National Treasury's 
2017 budget review ................................................................................................................................ 42 
Figure 13: Extract from PPP Quarterly summarising the support role intended by the Unit .................. 68 
Figure 14: Generic public-private partnership project life cycle ............................................................ 69 
Figure 15: Respondents / participants by sector experience ................................................................... 81 
Figure 16: Respondents / participants’ experience in infrastructure delivery ......................................... 82 
Figure 17: Respondents / participants’ experience with public-private partnerships ............................. 82 
Figure 18: Pre-Gautrain concerns in the province .................................................................................. 96 
Figure 19: Gautrain objectives ............................................................................................................... 97 
Figure 20: Gautrain contract structure .................................................................................................. 102 
Figure 21: Project financing ................................................................................................................. 104 
Figure 22: Proposed value hierarchy of foundational vs. optimisational critical success factors ......... 134 
Figure 23: Critical success factors in terms of their relative importance .............................................. 139 
Figure 24: Critical success factors in terms of their relative presence in the current context ............... 140 
Figure 25: Critical success factors in terms of the absolute differences between importance and presence 
in the current environment .................................................................................................................... 141 
Figure 26: Public-private partnership financing option preferences (n = 9) ......................................... 142 
Figure 27: Public-private partnership infrastructure typology preferences (n = 12)............................. 143 
Figure 28: Public-private partnership level of service expected (n = 9) ............................................... 144 
Figure 29: Changes in government expenditure for 2019/20 - 2020/21 ............................................... 168 






LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Learner growth over the past ten years for public ordinary schools ........................................... 5 
Table 2: The culture change need to improve performance.................................................................... 20 
Table 3: List of significant public-private partnerships or publicly financed/guaranteed infrastructure 
projects experiencing cost overruns ........................................................................................................ 35 
Table 4: Closed infrastructure public-private partnerships found suitable for case study review .......... 88 
Table 5: Gautrain feasibility elemental assessment ................................................................................ 98 
Table 6: Funding sources for the Gautrain project ............................................................................... 100 
Table 7: Value for money assessment of Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital ................................ 113 
Table 8: Capital investment in the project by the public and private partners ...................................... 118 
Table 9: Total capital investment ......................................................................................................... 123 
Table 10: Facilities provided by the private partner per institution ...................................................... 129 
Table 11: Table indicating patient-day-equivalent consumer price index adjusted for period 2008-2011
 .............................................................................................................................................................. 131 
Table 12: Average cost per patient-day-equivalent (PDE) for public hospitals in 2010/11 ................. 131 
Table 13: Critical success factors in a review of case studies .............................................................. 135 
Table 14: Optimisation CSFs and their root causes .............................................................................. 137 
Table 15: Building blocks of public-private partnership vs. independent power producers ................. 160 







AO Accounting Officer 









CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CIDB Construction Industry Development Board 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
CSF Critical Success Factor 
CSI Corporate Social Investment  
DBE Department of Basic Education 
DBFO Design-Build-Finance-Operate 
DBSA Development Bank of South Africa 
DCMF Design-Construct-Manage-Finance 
DEA&DP Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning (WCG) 




DFE Department for Education (UK) 
DG Director General 
DOH Department of Health 
DORA Division of Revenue Act 
DTPW Department of Transport and Public Works (WCG) 
ECDOH Eastern Cape Department of Health 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIG Education Infrastructure Grant 
FSDOH Free State Department of Health 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GFIP Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project 
GMA Gautrain Management Agency 
GTAC Government Technical Advisory Centre 
HIA Heritage Impact Assessment 
HOD Head of Department 
IDIP Infrastructure Delivery Improvement Plan 
IDMS Infrastructure Delivery Management System 
IPP Independent Power Producers 
LDO Lease-Develop-Operate 
MTEF Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
NDP National Development Plan 




NT National Treasury 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PFI Private Finance Initiative 
PFMA Public Finance Management Act (RSA) 
PIA Preferred Implementing Agent 
PPP Public-Private Partnership 
PSC Public Sector Comparator 
PSP Professional Service Provider 
PST Province Support Team 
PT Provincial Treasury (WCG) 
RFP Request for Proposals 
RFQ Request for Qualification (or Pre-Qualification, in some cases) 
ROI Return on Investment 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
SCM Supply Chain Management 
SED Socio-Economic Development 
SIPDM Standard for Infrastructure Procurement and Delivery Management 
SMME Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprise(s) 
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle 
TA Transaction Advisor 
TIP Traditional Infrastructure Procurement 




UK United Kingdom 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VFM Value for Money 
WCED Western Cape Education Department 
WCG Western Cape Government 







This research report began as an investigation into how the public sector could upscale 
the implementation of public infrastructure, specifically education infrastructure 
(public schools), through the use of untapped delivery methodologies to meet the 
demand in the Western Cape province. This chapter seeks to place the provision of 
public schools into the current environmental context, while considering the origins of 
the demand for schools in the province and the various methodologies available to the 
public service to meet this demand. 
The chapter concludes with an overview of the existing paradigms of public sector 
infrastructure delivery and an introduction to the scope of private sector involvement in 
public schools to date. The public-private partnership (PPP) model is introduced and 
basically described, ready to be unpacked in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.2 POPULATION GROWTH AND RAPID URBANISATION IN THE 
WESTERN CAPE 
The Western Cape is currently experiencing a population explosion as migrants flock 
to the province with the expectation of better opportunities, greater access to basic 
services and a chance at improved overall quality of life. While South Africa’s (SA’s) 
population is already significantly urbanised, at nearly 66% – well above the global 
average of 54% – the Western Cape province is forecast to increase from a figure of 
69% in 2015 to 76% in 25 years’ time. This major increase is essentially within the 
space of a single generation (Statista, 2018; van Zyl, 2017:12-13). A recent research 
report on population change in the Western Cape conducted by the FuturesCape Project 
of the Western Cape government projects a population expansion from 6.5 million in 
2017 to 7.9 million by 2030 – a 20% increase (Markle & Van Der Lingen, 2018:14). 
The primary reason is cited as migration into the province from regions both within 










This rapid influx places significant pressure on the availability of, and access to, basic 
services (e.g. water, sanitation and electricity), housing, healthcare, transportation and 
education. In light of this population explosion, the FuturesCape report includes a focus 
on the delivery of education infrastructure with estimates that at least “11 schools need 
to be built per annum and R600 million [needs] to be spent on maintenance” (Markle 
& Van Der Lingen, 2018:16-17). 
 
1.3 PROVISION OF PUBLIC-SECTOR EDUCATION FACILITIES IN 
THE WESTERN CAPE 
Section 29 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa declares that “everyone 
has the right to a basic education” (RSA, 1996a:19). As such, it is incumbent on the 
state to provide the means for its citizens to be able to benefit from this constitutional 
imperative and, therefore, the infrastructure necessary to support it (Gnade, 2013:2). 
The national government makes provision for the financial means by way of grant 
allocations to various provincial departments who are, in turn, mandated to carry out 






Figure 2: Learners and schools in the Western Cape province 
 
(Markle & Van Der Lingen, 2018:19) 
 
The Western Cape Education Department (WCED) is therefore mandated to provide, 
coordinate and deliver all operational aspects of basic education in the province, making 
them responsible for the 1.024 million learners in the public ordinary school system and 
the day-to-day management of the 1 508 state facilities (see Figure 2). Added to the 
administration and operation of schools, the WCED is responsible for coordinating the 
provision of infrastructure through the Department of Transport and Public Works 
(DTPW), who takes on the implementing and custodial role for all provincial 
infrastructure facilities. This arrangement is formalised and overseen by the Western 
Cape government’s (WCG’s) Provincial Treasury (PT), with the DTPW being 
designated ‘preferred implementing agent’ (PIA) on behalf of the WCED. The DTPW 
is therefore obliged to implement the infrastructure projects and programmes necessary 
to ensure that all learners in the province have access to basic education. 
Reflecting the urbanisation statistics already mentioned, approximately 50% of the 
province’s public schools are densely concentrated in the City of Cape Town 




Metro South and Metro Central). The remainder of the schools are spread over the 
sparser, more rural regions of the province. 
 
 




The infrastructure requirements of the department are carefully planned to reflect the 
current and forecasted need for public schools in the province. This planning is distilled 
annually in the WCED’s User Asset Management Plan (U-AMP). This document is the 
first in a series of strategic plans prescribed by the Infrastructure Delivery Management 
System or IDMS. The detailed level of budgeting included in the plan is a requirement 
of the treasury regulations and the Division of Revenue Act (DoRA). The U-AMP goes 
into explicit detail regarding the specific education infrastructure needed to expand the 
portfolio of public schools in order to meet the demand for facilities in the various 
districts of the province. This data is based on enrolment figures tracked over a ten-year 
period to establish the trends in the various areas, essentially a rough regression 




province for the period 2009-2017, with the Eastern and Southern Metropolitan districts 
exhibiting the largest percentage increases at 29.7% and 20.6% respectively. 
 
Table 1: Learner growth over the past ten years for public ordinary schools 
 
 
Source: WCED (2018:42) 
 
The WCED is well aware of the impact of the population increase and the effect on 
learner numbers in the province. The provincial Minister of Education notes that the 
consistent influx of people into the province, and especially into the Cape Town 
metropolitan area (the city and surrounds), means that there will be a need to 
considerably increase infrastructure delivery to match the demand (Schafer, 2018). 
 
“In order to accommodate the additional 25 388 learners this year alone, we 
effectively need another 25-30 schools, which cost around R60 million per school. 
This totals between R1,5 and R1,8 billion. Given that we have similar numbers 
every year, we require that kind of budget every year JUST for new schools. Given 
that we still have backlogs in our existing infrastructure requirements, as well as 
that we have to maintain our existing infrastructure, it is quite obvious that the 
amount allocated is insufficient.” 
(Schafer, 2018) 
 


























PROVINCE 970,973 6.0 1,029,249 7.1 1,102,283 13.5
CAPE WINELANDS 143,729 4.7 150,506 4.8 157772 9.8
EDEN AND CENTRAL KAROO 115,600 5.8 122,263 4.2 127412 10.2
METRO CENTRAL 136,714 2.5 140,132 0.8 141244 3.3
METRO EAST 150,898 3.2 155,652 25.8 195766 29.7
METRO NORTH 170,836 11.3 190,067 -5.6 179346 5.0
METRO SOUTH 157,416 6.4 167,528 13.3 189810 20.6
OVERBERG 38,886 6.8 41,526 7.4 44580 14.6
WEST COAST 56,894 8.2 61,575 7.8 66353 16.6




Within this context, and according to the WCED’s 2018/19 UAMP, the Western Cape 
province faces the following major challenges with respect to the provision of education 
infrastructure: 
• An estimated average of between 15 000 and 20 000 additional learners in the 
province annually for the coming years, meaning a need for new facilities and 
extensions to existing facilities across the province; 
• Declining conditions of the existing overall public-school portfolio, requiring 
a shift to maintenance to ensure that infrastructure is adequately maintained; 
• 207 schools (nearly 14% of the portfolio) identified as being constructed from 
inappropriate materials (wood, metal and asbestos), which need to be 
completely replaced; and 
• A general lack of adequate budget provision from the treasury to fund the need 
for effective infrastructure delivery in the province. 
(WCED, 2018:71-88). 
 
To build sufficient new schools, replace inadequately constructed schools and reverse 
the declining conditions of existing schools, it is estimated that a provision of roughly 
R2 billion per annum is required. This is well above the current average annual 
allocation of R1.5 to 1.6 billion for the next three financial years (WCED, 2018:87). 
The shortfall means that not only are current needs not being met, but there is a 
progressive deficit between demand and supply that the government is simply not able 
to address given the fiscal constraints. 
In the absence of new facilities to absorb learners, the present mitigation strategy is to 
allow an increase in the learner-educator ratio, i.e. bigger classes at existing schools, 
which means increasing the density of learners at facilities. The Western Cape is already 
well above the national average in this regard with 37.3 learners to educators versus a 
national average of 33.4 in 2013 (Markle & Van Der Lingen, 2018:17). This has an 
unfortunate side effect of being detrimental to the delivery of quality education: higher 
learner-educator ratios (larger classes) are generally associated with poor quality 




1.4 SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC-SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
“Government invests in infrastructure, such as healthcare facilities, schools, 
housing and roads, in order to provide citizens with access to services and to 
promote social wellbeing. South Africa’s infrastructure challenges are not 
primarily the result of a lack of funding but are caused by institutional failures 
and a lack of appropriate capacity within departments.” 
(RSA National Treasury, 2014:197) 
 
The National Treasury (NT) is aware of the need to rapidly create conditions for 
developmental and sustainable infrastructure delivery. With assistance from the 
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB), the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa (DBSA) and various national departments, it has taken a keen interest in 
providing the framework for the public service to better initiate, plan, develop, procure 
and deliver infrastructure programmes and projects ready to meet and serve the needs 
of a growing, rapidly urbanising population. 
Since 2001, the NT has commissioned, developed and refined policies and strategies to 
address the backlog of infrastructure delivery critical to the developmental goals of the 
Constitution. Originating from the findings of the Infrastructure Delivery Improvement 
Plan (IDIP), the Infrastructure Delivery Management System (IDMS) was launched in 
2004 to create a ‘best practice’ approach to public infrastructure delivery through a 
national standard implemented across the various public works departments at national 
and provincial level (CIDB, 2010). The IDMS seeks to standardise the delivery process 
by aligning the existing norms and standards present within the South African 
construction industry in terms of planning, design, procurement and delivery with the 
relevant national policy frameworks. The secondary objective is to embed the principles 
of good governance into the process, thereby mitigating irregular expenditure and 
corruption – a considerable risk due to the scale of public funds involved in the 





“Slow infrastructure spending has resulted in challenges regarding the delivery 
of new infrastructure and the maintenance of existing assets, and government is 
struggling to attract and retain crucial skills in the built environment. This affects 
the quality of planning and the project management of construction works. One 
of government’s key strategies to address the problem has been the development 
of the Infrastructure Delivery Management System (IDMS). The issuing of the 
SIPDM in support of the IDMS provides an excellent framework within which 
construction projects can be procured, delivered and maintained.” 
(Civilution, 2016:4) 
 
The IDMS has since been supplemented with the Standard for Infrastructure 
Procurement and Delivery Management (SIPDM), effective July 2016 (RSA National 
Treasury, 2015), which focusses on the alignment of procurement, contracting and 
delivery strategies for infrastructure delivery with the delivery goals and good 
governance agenda of the National Development Plan 2030 (NPC, 2012). Although 
meant as enablers, the challenge for the public officials deployed in implementation 
roles is to deliver programmes and projects in compliance with these mandatory policy 
tools in an environment where the South African economy, building industry and public 
service are simultaneously developing, growing, and under-resourced, respectively. 
In terms of external resources, the construction industry in SA is well-developed at a 
medium to large scale, but constrained in terms of adequately skilled contractors at the 
lower end of the spectrum. Medium- to large-scale contractors are readily available to 
fulfil the infrastructure needs of government, but smaller or emerging contractors are 
regularly found to be inadequately skilled in contract management and administration, 
often finding themselves at odds with stringent policy requirements. This deficiency in 
adequately managing and administering contracts is detrimental to success in the 
industry in terms of two aspects: (1) a lack of able contract administration leading to 
late delivery and penalties, which further leads to dire financial consequences for 




track records due to regular poor delivery, limiting these contractors’ ability to procure 
further work. 
 
1.5 CURRENT DELIVERY ARRANGEMENTS FOR EDUCATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE WESTERN CAPE 
As the preferred implementing agent, the DTPW has a mandate to deliver the WCED’s 
infrastructure needs. The DTPW’s Chief Directorate: Education Infrastructure is staffed 
with construction specialists who implement projects on behalf of the WCED according 
to their annual requirements. The WCED holds the budget and is thus responsible for 
providing the funds for each project or delivery programme and ensuring adequate 
spend in line with the Provincial Treasury regulations. As such, positive inter-
departmental coordination is critical to the successful implementation of education 
infrastructure projects. The DTPW contracts with the private sector in order to provide 
the necessary resources to implement projects and programmes. This entails contracting 
professional resources (professional service providers or PSPs) to provide human 
capital to design and manage the detailed implementation of the works, as well as 
contractors who supply the means to provide the work itself. 
As a building type, schools are relatively uncomplicated. Schools do not require 
complex or particularly specialised accommodation requirements, their civil and 
structural engineering design is fairly standard due to their low scale and they do not 
require specialised services, such as complex mechanical ventilation or specialised 
electrical or electronic requirements. When compared to other public infrastructure 
typologies the relatively uncomplicated nature of schools allows resources to be 
stretched across more projects. This creates scope for internal public-sector specialists 
involved in education facilities to work on a considerable number of school projects 
simultaneously. However, considering the growth path of the infrastructure, this 
situation is not sustainable given current provisions and places strain on the public 
sector, where the need for new facilities in the Western Cape extends beyond the 
delivery capacity of the officials available to deliver in the traditional mode. This 
situation requires an urgent rethink to optimise current processes and investigate 




Procurement and implementation of public sector infrastructure in South Africa has 
traditionally been a one-way relationship whereby civil service contracts necessary 
resources from the private sector. Financed by government funds, infrastructure is 
procured, operated and maintained on an owner-supplier basis whereby government 
specifies the works required and supplies necessary finances, while the private sector 
provides the expertise and resources. Once completed, the infrastructure remains the 
property of government in terms of operation, maintenance, repurposing and disposal. 
There are various methods available to government to contract with the private sector, 
with the most common method being what is termed the ‘client-contractor’ model, also 
known as traditional infrastructure procurement or TIP. In this instance the employer 
(the state) contracts PSPs to design the facility required to a point where the 
documentation is of such a quality that these detailed specifications and drawings are 
put out to tender for contractors to bid to provide the works. In terms of procurement, 
this methodology forms the tried and tested manner for the public-sector infrastructure 
agent to achieve best design and value with maximum control and minimum risk. The 
constraint with this method is the intensive resources and time required to plan, promote 
and manage projects on the part of the public-sector implementation agent. Alternative 
delivery methodologies still classified as TIP involve engaging with the contractor at 
an incrementally earlier stage: ‘develop and construct’, ‘design and construct’ and 
‘management contracting’, with each allowing contractor involvement at a 
progressively earlier stage in the process in order to foster collaboration. The aim of 
this is more efficient and effective implementation. However, these variants still rely 
on the public sector to manage, coordinate and ultimately take full risk for procurement 












Since the 1980s, the concept of New Public Management in Britain and the US saw the 
civil service dispense with its traditional ‘master-servant’ relationship and introduce the 
concept of partnering with the private sector. The public-private partnership (PPP) was 
born with the purpose of sharing the role of implementing infrastructure. Critical new 
elements were the introduction of alternate financing arrangements and the re-
allocation of risk, with the government and private sector each taking a share in the 
financial profit and loss of projects, marking a substantial divergence from TIP. SA has, 
since the early 2000s, engaged with the private sector in various PPP arrangements 
(RSA National Treasury, 2007). With the creation of the public-private partnership unit 
within the National Treasury and a regulatory framework in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act (RSA National Treasury, 2005), PPPs have been used to deliver 
various public-sector projects. However, PPPs have yet to be tested in the provision of 
education infrastructure in SA. The challenge under consideration is to investigate the 
applicability of harnessing the private sector in a partnership arrangement (i.e. through 





1.6 PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS TO DATE 
While an education infrastructure PPP remains untested, it would be inaccurate to state 
that private-sector involvement in public education has not yet been considered in some 
manner or form. Public schools have been supported by private sector involvement for 
many years, but these were generally seen as corporate social investment (CSI) 
initiatives, such as the Kagiso Trust in the Free State and Limpopo which has 
implemented the Beyers Naudé Schools Development Programme since 2007 (Guduka, 
2016; Sowetan Live, 2019). These programmes have a far more holistic focus, with the 
provision of infrastructure being just one objective. These partnerships, although often 
cited as ‘public-private partnerships’ by many commentators due to them being funded 
by a combination of public and private finance, miss a key element that this research 
project intends to review: a financial return on investment (ROI) for the private partner. 
As such, these partnerships are only as sustainable as their donors permit. 
Although private-sector involvement in public education is being piloted in the Western 
Cape, at present this does not include an infrastructure element. The involvement is 
limited to school management and operations. In a newsletter penned in 2016, the 
Premier of the Western Cape described the implementation of a pilot partnership 
agreement for five local ‘Collaboration Schools’, aimed introducing non-profits and 
sponsors to operate public schools (Zille, 2016). The model is based on the ‘Academy 
Schools’ programme in the United Kingdom. Under this model, public schools 
normally operated and funded by the local authority are instead funded directly by the 
United Kingdom’s (UK’s) Department for Education (DfE). Academy schools are 
permitted considerable discretion in terms of their operating norms. Critically, this 
includes admission criteria, curriculum selection and staff remuneration (UNISON, 
n.d.). 
The Academy Schools model was originally intended to target underperforming 
schools in specific communities with the concept being that this new state of self-
determination would allow private trusts to operate and manage the schools with the 
freedom to choose how best to meet the educational need of their given context (Eyles 
& Machin, 2018:1). While initial reports extolled the virtues of the model, the Academy 




falling educational standards and financial irregularities with regard to the remuneration 
of principals and board members; the blame being laid with the deregulated 
environment within which they are permitted to operate, and on private sector interests 
outweighing those of the public that they were set up to serve (Sodha, 2018; Inge, 2018). 
Similar to the privately operated and managed Academy Schools in the UK, Charter 
Schools in the United States have been severely criticised for draining funding from 
public schools that operate within the same district (Lafer, 2018:5). This is due to the 
fact that schools are assigned funding in proportion to the number of students in 
attendance. As students leave the public-school system in favour of charter schools, so 
the funding goes with them. The result is reduced educational standards, falling 
enrolments and job cuts in public schools (Lafer, 2018:6). 
This situation is not unique to the developed world. Closer to South Africa, the Bridge 
Schools model in Uganda, similar to the Academy and Charter Schools models, was 
closed based on “poor infrastructural conditions and under-qualified teachers” and 
protests by civil action groups and government ministers alike (Black, 2017; New 
Vision, 2018). Citing the international precedent available on Academy Schools in the 
UK, Charter Schools in the US and Bridge Schools in Uganda, Black (2017) identifies 
the need to proceed with caution in introducing similar private-sector actors into the 
South African public education system. This concern is rooted in reports that, while the 
impact (positive or negative) on learning outcomes are inconclusive, there is a pro rata 
(per learner) increase in administration costs (operational spend) and decrease in 
instructional costs (teaching spend). This situation is further impaired by the secondary 
impact on the quality of teaching – these schools generally employ younger, less-
experienced educators and experience high staff turnover (Black, 2017). The negative 
long-term effects on learning outcomes is apparent. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH PROPOSAL AND REPORT STRUCTURE 
Given the abovementioned context, the research question under review is: what can 
public-sector implementing agencies do to address the growing deficit between the 
demand and supply of public schools in the Western Cape? The subtext to this question 




become feasible, i.e. what can be done to create a favourable climate to give alternative 
delivery mechanisms the best chance of success? 
To answer these questions, Chapter 2 will review the conditions and challenges in the 
current context of public infrastructure delivery. Potential options will be identified and 
the various factors critical to their success will be investigated through a review of 
available literature. The legislative and regulatory framework for the alternatives will 
be reviewed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 will also include a review of the effects that these 
policy frameworks have had on the industry to date. 
Chapter 4 introduces the detailed research design and methodology as the project enters 
its empirical phase. This phase has three steps that will be analysed in the two 
subsequent chapters: Chapter 5 identifies the factors that require review through case 
study analysis (content analysis of secondary data), followed by Chapter 6 where the 
factors identified in the previous chapter are quantified to establish their relative levels 
of priority in the present environment using a survey questionnaire and conducting 
depth interviews to delve into the underlying reasons for the survey findings and 
identify proposals to address them. Triangulating the study through utilising multiple 
modes of data analysis to establish findings adds the benefit of increasing the validity 
of the study. 
To round off the research project, Chapter 7 includes a discussion on the way forward 
for future research. This includes a proposal on the feasibility of implementing the 
recommendations before the summary and conclusion in Chapter 8. 
 
1.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the way in which population growth in the Western Cape and 
rapid urbanisation in the Cape Town metro currently places pressure on all levels of 
government to deliver public infrastructure to meet demand. The provincial government 
is under pressure to scale up delivery of public schools to keep up with its constitutional 
mandate of providing the means for basic education to an increasing population. While 
political pressure prioritises the provision of new schools, many older schools built of 
inappropriate materials are scheduled to be completely replaced. Worse still, the 




disrepair due to a lack of planned maintenance activities. The key reasons given for this 
underperformance are inadequate budget provision and a lack of internal resources to 
implement the required projects and programmes. 
This chapter also provided an overview of how the SA public service delivers 
infrastructure, where it is evident that there is a preference for traditional procurement 
modes that rely heavily on internal resource capacity and retain most of the risks 
associated with delivery. While private sector involvement is not new to the provision 
of education in SA, it is typically associated with private schooling with application in 
the public realm currently limited to corporate social investment (CSI) projects where 
there is no return on investment (ROI) for the private partner. In the context of this 
research project the use of the traditional public-private partnership (PPP) model (where 
both the public and private sector benefit from the arrangement in the provision of 
public schools) has yet to see practical application in this country. Finally, the way 






2: LITERATURE REVIEW – PUBLIC SECTOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
2.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
In order to research applicable alternative mechanisms to accelerate the delivery of 
public schools in the Western Cape, it is first necessary to review the available 
paradigms, the regulatory framework for these paradigms and the factors and conditions 
influencing these paradigms. This chapter begins with a review of the model for state 
infrastructure delivery most familiar to public sector officials delivering public schools 
in the Western Cape. The variants of this mode will be critically reviewed before 
entering into an investigation of public-private partnerships, which are currently 
untested in the field of public schools in the local context. However, the broader context 
of public infrastructure delivery first requires an overview before the PPP mode can be 
thoroughly reviewed. To provide this methodology for analysis requires a formulation 
of the conceptual framework underpinning the broader context. 
 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework for delivery of public schools in the Western Cape can be 
argued as resting on three distinct elements: 
1. The procurement and delivery options available to public sector infrastructure 
delivery components; 
2. Current conditions in the internal and external environment; and 






Figure 5: Diagram of the conceptual framework underpinning the research proposal 
methodology 
 
While legislative and regulatory frameworks are covered in Chapter 3, this chapter 
focuses on a detailed analysis and critical review of opportunities available for the 
implementation of public infrastructure projects, as well as an investigation into internal 
and external conditions using case studies from recent experiences locally and abroad. 
The next section will start with a review of the prevailing mode of infrastructure 
delivery in the present environment: traditional infrastructure procurement or TIP. 
 
2.3 PUBLIC-SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY 
2.3.1 Traditional Infrastructure Procurement 
Before launching into the possibilities of alternative arrangements, it is important to 
review how the public service currently implements infrastructure projects. The present 
paradigm focusses on what is termed the ‘client-contractor’ model, also known as 
traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP). TIP is defined as the process whereby “the 
government specifies the quantity and quality of the service, while the infrastructure is 
constructed by private companies to whom the construction is typically awarded 
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through tender. Once the construction is finished, the asset is transferred to and operated 
by government.” (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:4). Yescombe (2007:4) reiterates this 
process, noting that in traditional public sector procurement the “Public-Authority sets 
out the specification and design of the Facility, call for bids on the basis of this detailed 
design, and pays for construction of the Facility by a private-sector contractor”. It is 
therefore incumbent on the public sector to provide specialist skills necessary to ensure 
that the arrangements are carefully formulated and implemented so to ensure value for 
money is achieved at each stage of design, procurement, implementation and delivery. 
 
 





In this scenario the responsibility for risk falls primarily on the public-sector authority 
in terms of ensuring that the specifications, budgetary and financial arrangements, 
procurement and contracting strategies, as well as the implementation and delivery 
aspects are all managed and monitored by the state or those contracted directly to it. If 
any one of these is found to be deficient the state is held liable. 
Considering the level of risk placed on the client during TIP it is incumbent on 
government to ensure that there are adequate frameworks and systems as well as 
specialist internal officials in place to manage and monitor these risks effectively at all 
stages of the process. The human capital requirements include strategy and planning 
specialists to adequately plan and forecast; financial specialists to budget and manage 




documentation, as well as to specify, evaluate and adjudicate bid submissions; 
infrastructure delivery specialists to implement, drive and monitor projects from 
inception to completion; and operational specialists to fit out and take over the facility 
on completion/transfer. 
Watermeyer (2010:69) notes that TIP works well when “the client has adequate in-
house capabilities and capacity to either undertake the design or to brief consultants and 
to oversee the design process [and] there is adequate time to complete the design and 
associated documentation before tenders for construction are invited”. Watermeyer and 
Thumbiran (2009) identify two key constraints in the present environment: the lack of 
specialist skills in the public service to implement, manage and ensure the effective 
delivery of projects; and the constraints of the prevailing procurement systems reliant 
on skilled infrastructure specialists. 
 
 




Watermeyer (2010:70) proposes a shift to forms of procurement whereby the contractor 
takes on greater responsibility in terms of the design and is brought on board at an 
earlier stage, proposing a shift from the standard TIP contracting strategy of ‘design by 
employer’ to ‘develop and construct’, ‘design and construct’ and ‘management 
contracting’. However, although there are subtle differences in the risk allocation 
between these options, ultimately the public-sector entity still takes on most of the risk. 
These involve financial risks associated with budgeting, project cost monitoring and 
payment of suppliers; procurement risk in terms of the nature and form of tender and 
contract; risks associated with quality specification and monitoring; as well as 




The private sector is limited to being responsible for performance/delivery risk, more 
specifically relating to time and quality (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:4-5). 
 
Table 2: The culture change need to improve performance 
 
 
Source: ICE, 2010, cited in Watermeyer (2010:76) 
 
Watermeyer (2010:77) notes that what is required in SA is a change in culture of 
delivery in order to address the following issues: “severely stressed departmental and 
municipal oversight resources; a crisis-management culture, which cuts corners in the 
planning processes; fragmentation of design and construction with aspects such as 
constructability and cost-modelling determined by the design team and cost consultant 
only; tasks being allowed to take their course or extreme and inappropriate risk 
avoidance or risk transfer; a ‘pay-as-you-go’ culture, where significant cost overruns 




for example fee rates as a percentage of the value of the works; [and] a history of under-
expenditure and poor service delivery”. 
 
2.3.2 The Rise of Public-Private Partnerships 
It is generally accepted that public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a vehicle to assist 
governments in their duty of delivering public services. In the rare event of governments 
having adequate internal resources to deliver on their mandates there would be no need 
to investigate alternative means of service delivery. Unfortunately, governments 
globally are beset by the limitations of finite budgets, lack of internal capacity and 
bureaucratic processes, all of which stand as constraints to efficient and effective 
service delivery. Governments the world over constantly engage with the private sector 
to assist in service delivery, generally through the abovementioned traditional methods 
but, as noted, traditional infrastructure delivery in the face of the abovementioned 
limitations can only go so far. 
The origins of PPPs lie in the 1800s. Yescombe (2007:5) identifies the origins of PPPs 
in the concession arrangements or ‘user-pays’ models of the 19th century where private 
companies were permitted to repair civil infrastructure such as roads with the promise 
that they would be able to charge a usage fee or toll in order to recoup the initial 
investment. More recently the “Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), developed in the 
United States in the 1980s provided the template for modern PPP contracts” 
(Yescombe, 2007:6). PPAs outline the framework for private sector companies to 
provide the initial infrastructure, in this case for power generation, at their own cost and 
then enter into an ‘off-take’ agreement whereby the private company sells the proceeds 
of the initial investment back to the state for a set time to recoup costs and generate 
profit. In this most basic arrangement, alignment of objectives is based on the public 
receiving a service and the private sector receiving a profit to provide this service. 
Over the past 30 years, and mostly due to the advent of New Public Management (NPM) 
in the 1980s, the public sector has looked to supplement their own capacity for service 
delivery through partnering rather than simply contracting with the private sector, with 
the PPP becoming the vehicle for this form of procurement. Although the efficient, 




private sector were the primary reason for selecting this mode, this was complemented 
by the use of private finance to supplement government spending and a fresh approach 
to risk management through sharing certain risks with the private sector partner. 
While PPPs represent an opportunity for a significant augmentation of current public 
service delivery arrangements, their scope is limited by the complicated and 
cumbersome process of planning and implementation (Burger & Hawkesworth, 
2011:5). Even the UK, which has extensively made use of this method of procurement, 
only sees on average 12% of total annual public capital budget spent on PPP projects. 
Other countries intimate that they do not envisage spending more than 15% of their 
total public infrastructure budget in this manner (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:5). 
By comparison, in SA the percentage of public infrastructure expenditure allocated to 
PPPs amounted to 5.5% in 2007 (Burger, 2009:88-89). This has since dropped 
substantially in subsequent years from 6% in 2011/12 to 1.5% in 2016/17. The decline 
as a proportion of total infrastructure spend is illustrated in Figure 9, below. 
  
 
Figure 8: Public-sector infrastructure spending 
 





2.3.3 Definitions of Public-Private Partnerships 
PPPs are generally considered an alternative mode of providing a public good through 
contracting with the private sector and whereby the traditional ‘one-way’ relationship 
between state and private sector described above is turned into a mutually beneficial 
relationship through a combination of financial arrangements and risk allocation. Most 
definitions have the following themes in common: some form of contractual partnership 
between the public and private sector to deliver goods, services or infrastructure; unique 
financial arrangements; and some form of risk transfer. 
It is evident from the literature that public-private partnerships, although similar in 
overall intent, take on slightly different meanings depending on their context, be they 
regional or global. Definitions of PPPs abound, but a conference paper on the use of 
PPPs in Africa and Asia offers the following fairly concise definition: “A Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) is a contractual agreement whereby the private sector is given the 
right and agrees to provide a public service or public infrastructure traditionally 
provided by the public sector on behalf of the government.” (DIIS, 2015:4). 
The World Bank provides an alternative definition for PPPs, using the presence of 
common elements, namely value for money; government responsibility and 
accountability; government specification of time, cost and quality; private sector 
delivering the service or product; the entering of long-term relationships; integrated 
functions (design, construction, maintenance and operation); shared risk allocation; and 
whole life approach (World Bank, 2009:9). 
“[T]he Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines a 
public-private partnership as an agreement between the government and one or more 
private partners (which may include the operators and the financers) according to which 
the private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery 
objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private 
partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer 
of risk to the private partners.” (OECD, 2008:17). 
Burger and Hawkesworth (2011) refer to various regional definitions of PPPs. Korea 
defines a PPP as a “project to build and operate infrastructure … which have 




thus tapping the creativity and efficiency of the private sector”. The UK uses the 
definition of “arrangements typified by joint working between the public and private 
sectors … cover[ing] all types of collaboration across the private-public sector interface 
involving collaborative working together and risk sharing to deliver policies, services 
and infrastructure.” (HM Treasury, 2008:18). Australia defines a PPP as “relating to the 
provision of infrastructure and any related ancillary service which involve private 
investment or financing, with a present value of payments for a service to be made by 
the government.” (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:4). 
In South Africa, a PPP is defined as: “a contract between a public-sector institution and 
a private party, where the private party performs a function that is usually provided by 
the public-sector and/or uses state property in terms of the PPP agreement. Most of the 
project risk (technical, financial and operational) is transferred to the private party.” 
(RSA National Treasury, 2017:159). 
 
2.3.4 Types of Public-Private Partnerships 
One of the advantages of PPPs is the flexibility in how the contracting model may be 
structured. The choice of options depends on which of the constituent phases are 
required, namely design, construction, finance, management, operation, ownership and, 
finally, transfer to the public sector partner. A PPP involves the inclusion or exclusion 
of any one of these aspects depending on the needs of the project. The various 
arrangements of these aspects that have evolved to date include the following main 
types and sub-types (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:53): 
• Design-Build-Operate (DBO) or Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) 
• Build-Own-Operate (BOO) 
• Build-Develop-Operate (BDO) 
• Design-Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF) 
• Buy-Build-Operate (BBO) 
• Lease-Develop-Operate (LDO) 
• Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
• Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) 




• Build-Lease-Operate-Transfer (BLOT) 
 
In South Africa, common types of PPP projects include Design-Finance-Build-Operate-
Transfer (DFBOT); Design-Finance-Operate (DFO); Design-Build-Operate-Transfer 
(DBOT); as well as equity partnership projects and facilities management projects 
(RSA National Treasury, 2017:171). 
Private Finance Initiatives or PFIs are a version of PPP predominantly utilised in the 
UK where the “government takes bids for and then buys a whole project package”, with 
the government entering into a long-term contract with the successful bidder to provide 
the service (Guardian, n.d.). The novelty of this type of PPP is that it involves 
considerable use of private finance for the initial infrastructure investment 
(construction) while the government pays for the service during the off-take period, 
which could be in the order of 30-50 years, and during which the private company 
established to provide this service has a chance to recoup its initial investment and 
generate a profit. 
PFI projects typically also make use of an arrangement specially created for the purpose 
of delivering the product or service. This structure is termed a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) and is, in essence, a contractual arrangement or company set up with the various 
actors (public and private sector entities) listed as partners and shareholders in the 
enterprise (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:53). This unique entity is created as a 
response to the critical success factors (CSFs), which will be investigated in more detail 
later. PFIs have been extensively used to deliver health, education and infrastructure 
projects in the UK. 
 
2.3.5 Why and When to Use Public-Private Partnerships? 
Burger (2009:83) notes quite plainly that the decision to deliver public services via a 
PPP is generally premised on preferring to harness “the perceived efficiency of the 
private sector [rather than the] inefficiency of the public sector”. In the context of the 
developing world, Banzon, Lucero, Ho, Puyat, Quibid and Factor (2014:3-6) expand 




developmental goals of many countries” as well as efficiency where projects delivered 
by partnering with the private sector are “designed to minimize costs while improving 
performance”. 
Smith (2010:91) notes that PPPs are most often adopted to: 
• “reduce costs and generate efficiencies”; 
• “ensure the delivery of services of a high standard”; 
• “facilitate risk transfer from the public sector to the private sector”; 
• “improve the performance of the public sector and assist in public sector 
reform”; and 
• “create innovation in the delivery of custodial services and support the 
development of new ideas”. 
 
Li and Akintoye (2003:3) note that PPPs offer a “long-term, sustainable approach to 
improving social infrastructure, enhancing the value of public assets and making better 
use of taxpayer’s money”. Further benefits are also noted: 
• “Enhanc[ing] government’ capacity to develop integrated solutions; 
• Facilitat[ing] creative and innovative approaches; 
• Reduc[ing] the cost to implement the project; 
• Reduc[ing] the time to implement the project; 
• Transfer[ring] certain risks to the private sector partner; 
• Attract[ing] larger, potentially more sophisticated, bidders to the project; and 
• Assess[ing] skills, experience and technology”. 
(Li & Akintoye, 2003:7-9). 
 
A synthesis of the above benefits can arguably be grouped under the following themes: 
improved service delivery; value for money; risk transfer; and higher quality of 
products or services. 
In terms of when to use PPPs, it is generally accepted that they are most commonly 




additional investment in time and effort associated with the rigorous planning phase. In 
the developing world, however, this is only part of the reason. Much of the decision to 
enter into PPPs depends on the ability, i.e. capacity, of the public sector to deliver a 
service given its internal constraints. 
 
“Governments in developing countries increasingly look to … PPPs as a means 
to expand coverage, improve quality and ensure efficient delivery of a range of 
services.” (DIIS, 2015:4) 
 
In developing countries the use of PPPs is generally due to two main reasons: lack of 
public finance available (state revenue) and lack of specialist public officials (human 
capital) to plan and implement service delivery projects efficiently and effectively 
(Akintoye, 2009:138). However, without sufficient policy instruments and internal 
officials to properly develop, implement, monitor and manage PPPs, the risk of failure 
or exploitation, i.e. corruption, can be high. Farlam (2005:i) notes that although this 
method of delivery may increase service delivery, the results in Sub-Saharan Africa 
over the last 15 years have been considerably mixed.  
In a local review of PPPs in the delivery of healthcare services, Shuping and Kabane 
(2007) note the following objectives of a public-private interaction (PPI) of which a 
PPP is one typology: 
• Public sector leveraging private finance to strengthen the public sector; 
• Sharing of scarce resources between the sectors to maximise benefits for the 
broader population; 
• Improvement in the quality of services rendered; and 
• Promoting equitable allocation of resources. 
(Shuping & Kabane, 2007:152) 
 
In a paper on the relative merits of PPPs in delivering healthcare services, Banzon, et 




relies on the following factors: what it is that needs to be fixed, scale, who is to oversee 




Figure 9: PPP decision tree for stakeholders 
 
(Banzon, et al., 2014:26) 
 
Linking back to capacity, the decision of who is to directly oversee the project is used 
as a key decision-making criterion, noting that a PPP may not be a good idea if the 
government partner is unwilling or, more critically, unable to directly oversee it. 
Minnie (2011:518) raises an interesting dual aspect, somewhat of a ‘catch 22’, in the 
debate around internal public sector capacity, noting that while “it seems that a PPP is 
most useful where the public sector is failing to provide a public sector need for which 
a market exists”, this is countered by the statement that “a PPP would not be a good 
idea if there is a lack of financial management skills in the public sector”. This is an 
important aspect in the context of this report that requires consideration. If the very 
reason for entering into a PPP is because the state does not have the specialist resources 
to deliver services, it cannot be assumed that entering into a PPP arrangement without 
adequate capacity to plan and manage the process is going to allow for efficient and 




a requirement, this can also be said of specialist officials skilled in procurement, project 
management and construction to ensure that PPP projects are carefully planned and 
implemented, as well as that critical public sector oversight is maintained at all points 
in the process. Failure to ensure the above could lead to project failures or deficiencies 
for the public sector in terms of value for money. 
This raises the next question of which projects to implement. In the UK, the 
identification of projects for PPPs is based on the following criteria:  
• “major capital investment is required”; 
• “the nature of the service allows outputs to be clearly defined, and risk 
allocation between the public and private sectors can be made and enforced”; 
• “the capital value of the project exceeds GBP 20 million so that procurement 
cost is not disproportionately large relative to the size of the project”; 
• “the technology involved is stable and not subject to fast and frequent 
change”; and 
• “planning horizons are long, and the project is foreseen to operate into the long 
term” 
(HM Treasury, 2008:19, cited in Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:38) 
 
Locally, having already been established as being relatively uncomplicated and stable 
in terms of typology, the implementation of a programme of new school projects over 
a long-term period lends itself to implementation via a PPP. 
There are other value-added benefits. Suttie and Taylor (2010:129;132;137-143) note 
that the use of PPPs in schools in the UK has driven a modernisation of the model for 
new facilities, particularly manifesting in the Building Schools for the Future or BSF 
programme. This aspect of PPPs links back to one of Smith’s (2010:91) observations 






“To increase the PPP project pipeline, the National Treasury is considering ways 
of streamlining the implementation of such partnerships and at the same time, 
reduce the time it takes to complete project planning.” 
(RSA National Treasury, 2017:162) 
 
The South African National Treasury has developed a regulatory framework (through 
the Public Finance Management Act) and created the PPP unit (recently incorporated 
into the Government Technical Advisory Centre or GTAC) to promote, regulate and 
monitor PPPs in SA. This unit has seen sporadic attempts to implement projects, but 
the list is currently too fragmented to be considered a strategic approach to delivery 
through this procurement model. It is anticipated that more effort will go into ensuring 
that PPP projects are readily promoted and integrated into the delivery of vital and 
strategic government projects and programmes instead of being selected in a one-off or 
standalone fashion. It is to be noted that, to date, PPP projects have been implemented 
in the provision of “hospitals, transport and roads, tourism and head office 
accommodation” but not education facilities (RSA National Treasury, 2017:171). 
 
2.3.6 Criticism of Public-Private Partnerships 
Ismail, Mabuza, Pillay and Xolo (2014:573) note the PPP model “is seen as a superior 
alternative to other financing methods, as both government and the private sector share 
the risks involved” based on the following advantages: 
• “Eas[ing] the strain on the government’s balance sheet; 
• Introduc[ing] competition when bidding for infrastructure projects takes place; 
• Restructur[ing] the public sector by embracing the private sector capital and 
practices; and 
• Achiev[ing] greater efficiency than traditional methods of providing public 
services.” 





However, the same authors also list the following disadvantages: 
• “Transaction costs associated with PPP contracts are normally high and this 
discourages many small potential service providers from participating in the 
bidding process; 
• Lack of a well-developed capital market can limit the development of a viable 
PPP market; 
• Inappropriate risk transfer rais[es] the perceived risk to investors … resulting 
in a high cost of capital; and 
• PPPs hinder accountability, as PPP costs to the government are not reflected 
on the government balance sheet.” 
(Ismail, et al., 2014:574) 
 
Delmon (2011:3) notes three issues that have negative consequences for the effective 
delivery of public services through PPPs: 
1. PPP projects are often prepared in a hurry with little attention given to proper 
planning and a sufficiently detailed feasibility study. 
2. PPP projects are often implemented as standalone projects disconnected from 
wider strategic goals and an over-arching policy framework. 
3. The role of government is critical in ensuring that project implementation is 
effective, carefully monitored and flexible enough to handle changes or 
conflicts. 
 
Delmon (2011) also notes that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to PPPs, citing that 
although there are various basic frameworks or types of PPPs that have evolved, it is 
not sufficient to simply assume that a PPP implemented in one environment will yield 
the same results in another where conditions may differ. What is apparent is that there 
are various critical success factors (CSFs) that need to be addressed to provide the 
framework for an effective PPP and that these often need to be tailored to suit the 
desired outcome. This is most pertinent in the UK where the public has grown 




lack of transparency involved around how project financing was structured and, more 
recently, due to the failures of several projects and contractors involved in these 
schemes leading, very recently, to a moratorium on PFI projects (Davies, 2018). 
Critics of PFI schemes are by no means new to the scene, with concerns being raised 
by various commentators over the past decade (Pollock & Price, 2010; Monbiot, 2010). 
Chief amongst concerns is use and alleged abuse of state funds in value-for-money 
terms and the corporate governance (or lack thereof) in administration both on the part 
of private companies and public sector actors engaged in these initiatives. What is 
apparent is that the role of government highlighted by Delmon above in engaging with 
the private sector to ensure that the interests of the public are put first is an essential 
element for successful PPPs, with catch-nets and corporate governance matters 
remaining paramount at all phases in the process right from inception and planning 
through to procurement and implementation. 
 
2.3.7 Public-Private Partnerships in the South African Context 
 
“South Africa has all the right ingredients for a successful PPP programme. It 
has a simple but user-friendly regulatory framework, well-developed financial 
and capital markets, a tradition of efficient private sector service provision, and 
considerable infrastructure and basic services backlogs.” 
(Michael Schur as quoted in RSA National Treasury PPP Unit, 2001b:2) 
 
Fombad (2013:12) notes that although SA has a strong regulatory framework for PPPs 
and high-level political support for their implementation, the successful conclusion of 
many PPPs initiated by various state institutions falters due to a lack of leadership at 
project level and lack of capacity on the part of the public sector. 
To this end, the National Treasury established the Government Technical Advisory 
Centre (GTAC) to provide “public finance management through professional advisory 




promot[ing] public sector capacity building through partnerships with academic and 
research institutions, civil society and business organisations” (GTAC, 2015a). 
With Treasury Regulation 16 for PPPs at national and provincial level having only 
come into existence nine years earlier, by January 2009 the PPP unit noted that 18 PPP 
deals had already achieved financial closure (USAID, 2008:7). A further nine years 
later (August 2018), GTAC lists 25 projects as having achieved financial close, with 89 
PPP projects registered with their unit in various stages of inception, feasibility and 
procurement (GTAC, 2018). It is notable that the number of projects that achieve 
financial close form a small fraction of the number of projects initiated. One would 
assume that there would be some attrition, but not at the rate described: less than a third 
of PPPs initiated in SA achieve conclusion. 
 
 
Figure 10: Public-private partnership projects in South Africa since 2000 
 
(by researcher from data gathered from RSA National Treasury PPP unit’s periodical “PPP 
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The illustration above charts the number of projects in progress against the number of 
projects that achieved financial close. The figures are based on data gathered from the 
rather sporadic PPP Quarterly published by the National Treasury’s PPP unit. Although 
there is a lack of data from years 2011-2016 the trends are fairly clear: the number of 
projects proposed consistently outnumber the projects closed by a ratio of 
approximately 3:1. This discrepancy does little to warm the hearts of PPP advocates, 
with the risk of sinking considerable funds into a project with a 33% success rate not 
seeming particularly palatable to most risk-averse public sector project managers. 
A further reason for concern amongst advocates for large infrastructure projects, 
typically the mode for PPP procurement, are the significant costs variances, typically 
associated with delays (late completion). The table below gives an indication of the 
scale of the projects and degree of delays associated with some of the largest 






Table 3: List of significant public-private partnerships or publicly financed/guaranteed 

















Corporate finance with 
government guarantees 





Corporate finance with 
government guarantees 





2013 (phase 1), 
phases 2 and 3 
ongoing 
Corporate finance with 
government guarantees 




2017 Corporate and public 
finance 







Public finance R5.2bn R8.5bn 64% 





2010 Public finance R8.1bn 18.4bn 126% 




2013 Private sector finance and 
corporate finance 
R1.1bn R2bn 82% 
(Note: Table is combined from separate tables in the reference text)  
 
Source: Ismail, et al. (2014:579-581) 
 
While not all PPPs, the projects above are prone to the same factors vital for success, 
notably value for money, affordability and the ability and capacity of the public sector 
to adequately manage and administer the contracts to minimise cost-overruns and 
delays. Risk transfer, a critical element of PPPs, appears to not have taken this into 
consideration in a satisfactory manner and the public sector seems unable to pass this 
risk onto the private party in the contract usually due to poorly structured contracts or 





2.4 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
The subject of critical success factors (CSFs) forms a major part of the body of 
knowledge available on the subject of PPPs. This is due to the planning phase being so 
important to successful implementation of a PPP, and the identification and assessment 
of CSFs therefore forming a critical component of this phase. As PPPs vary so widely 
in type and scope depending on the need, it is essential to understand precisely which 
themes require appropriate coverage before being formalised into a contractual 
relationship. For this reason, successful implementation relies on a thorough analysis 
of CSFs in their many dimensions. This process requires “detailed analysis and 
planning as well as high levels of technical expertise in areas such as financial and 
economic analysis, commercial contractual law, procurement, budgeting, engineering 
and construction, investment due diligence and project management.” (DIIS, 2015:4). 
 
 




Before delving into finer detail, it is worth noting that CSFs are subject to various 




generic headings (DIIS, 2015; Delmon, 2011; Hardcastle, Edwards, Akintoye & Li, 
2006), while others prefer more specific classifications on the premise that grouping 
may dilute their specific relevance, and in some case go into extensive detail (Minnie, 
2011; Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015; Babatunde, Opawole, 
Akinsiku, 2012). 
While many texts refer to a wide range of CSFs, it is apparent that there are some 
common themes. A report by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS, 2015), 
draws considerably from experience in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, referring to CSFs 
under the following themes: “a demonstrated, capable private sector, capacitated, 
committed government officials; an enabling PPP framework and a functioning 
judicial/legal system”; the importance of balancing public and private financing 
arrangements; “managing risk”; “ensuring a positive local impact”; and “citizen 
engagement” to ensure genuine buy-in by all stakeholders, both parties to the contract 
and beneficiaries (DIIS, 2015:5-9). 
Delmon’s PPP guide for policy-makers (2011) notes the following CSFs (identified as 
chapters and subsections of the guide) as critical to a successful PPP: careful project 
selection, extensive viability study, government regulation and monitoring, 
transparency and anticorruption, asset life-cycle consideration, flexibility to ensure that 
changes may be incorporated as conditions vary, financial arrangements carefully 
addressed to suit the needs of the project, consideration of appropriate risk allocation 
(with significant detail presenting the various types of risk), appropriate form and 
structure of contract and, finally, appropriate project implementation. 
Hardcastle, et al. (2016, cited in Babatunde, et al., 2012:215-216) list the following key 
groups with relevant sub-groups: “effective procurement” in terms of transparency, 
competition, good governance, committed public agency, social support, shared 
authority between public and private sectors, and realistic cost-benefit analysis; “project 
implementation” in terms of a favourable legal framework, project feasibility, risk 
allocation and sharing, commitment on the part of both public and private sector actors 
and good private consortium; “government guarantee” in the form of both a public 
financial commitment and political support; “favourable economic conditions” in terms 




market” in terms of suitable and adequate private financial resources in the market to 
support the private sector actor/s. 
A review of PPPs in Nigeria (Babatunde, et al., 2012:223) reveals the following CSFs: 
“competitive procurement process, thorough and realistic assessment of the cost and 
benefits [i.e. value for money], favourable framework, appropriate risk allocation and 
risk sharing, government involvement by providing a guarantee, political support, 
stable macroeconomic condition, sound economic policy and availability of suitable 
financial market”. 
A review of studies on CSFs by Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015:1342-1343) across 27 
publications on the subject identifies 36 CSFs and ranks them according to prominence. 
The following are the top five in descending order: “appropriate risk allocation and 
sharing”; “strong private consortium” (appropriate capacity and quality to deliver); 
“political support” (support from within the public sector to promote and drive the 
project); “public/community support” (acceptance and understanding by the public, 
media, civil society, etc.); and, finally, “transparent procurement”. 
In the South African context, a few authors have dived into CSFs. Minnie (2011:491-
514) identifies a comprehensive list of 43 CSFs with the intention of providing a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ tool to navigate PPP procurement methodology. For brevity, Minnie’s 
CSFs could arguably be grouped under the following headings: leadership (especially 
among the public sector partner); willing partners: aligning goals for mutual benefit; 
balancing power relationships; transparency and accountability; performance 
management, monitoring and review; governance; clear contract management; cost 
management; stakeholder engagement; effective communication; flexibility and 
adaptability; resource management (human, public, private and financial). 
In a lessons-learnt presentation utilising various local health PPPs as case studies, the 
following critical success factors (CSFs) are raised (Marawa, 2015:3-4): financial 
sustainability (affordability); regulatory and institutional framework; adequate skills, 
experience and capacity of public officials; adequate integrated planning and 
management of PPPs; period of concession agreements and flexibility; and need for an 
exit plan. In a similar investigation into the enablers and barriers of PPPs in a healthcare 
co-location project in the semi-rural Eastern Cape, Ricks, van Rooyen, Gantsho and ten 




delegated decision-making on the part of the public sector manager, leadership, attitude, 
support from authorities, perseverance and commitment (all of which fall under 
political will); good communication and relationships based on honesty and trust (goal 
alignment); and adequate skills (capacity). 
Burger and Hawkesworth (2011:50) include the following CSFs: addressing risk in 
terms of identification, measurement, allocation/transference, scale and acceptance by 
the private partner (risk analysis and transfer); addressing competition in terms of 
market demand; the relative benefits of whole-of-life contracts (incorporating 
construction and operations); the degree to which quality and quantity of the service to 
be delivered can be measured and dealing with potential trade-offs; the role and degree 
of innovation required; public sector skills availability for operation; expected degree 
and rate of change to the technology needed for the project; and degree of flexibility in 
output specifications required by the public partner. 
The scope of this chapter will focus on the key CSFs which, through an appreciation of 
their inter-relatedness or interdependence, can be demonstrated as linked to the 
achievement of the delivery of public education infrastructure in the current context. 
The CSFs are: 
• Affordability 
• Value for money 
• Risk transfer 
• Leadership 
• Goal alignment 
• Governance 
 








“It is tempting to think that if we bring private finance to the party, we will be 
able to afford more expensive champagne. Of course this is wrong – a PPP may 
shift a financing requirement from the public to the private sector, [but] … [i]n 
none of these cases do we increase the quantum of services that the economy can 
accommodate; rather we change the structure of the accounting and perhaps the 
locus of the obligation to pay. If we are serious about public-private partnerships, 
then we have to be serious about our commitment to accessible services, for all. 
And so affordability has to be a cornerstone of our planning.” 
(Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance, Cape Town, December 2000, as quoted in 
RSA National Treasury PPP unit, 2001a:1) 
 
The European PPP Expertise Centre defines affordability in its PPP guide quite simply 
as the “capacity to pay for building, operating and maintaining the project” (European 
Investment Bank, 2015a). Allied with affordability is an assessment of how the project 
is to be paid for with the guide differentiating between two revenue streams: the ‘user-
pays’ model, where users are levied a usage charge or fee (in the case of a concession), 
or an ‘authority-pays’ model, where government is levied a usage charge by the private 
operator, such as a monthly or annual instalment to provide the services required. 
Another perspective is that projects that are deemed more expensive than what is 
allowed for in the budget are deemed unaffordable (OECD, 2008:38). While this may 
appear obvious, governments are often unaware of the budgetary implications that some 
projects place on the fiscus in the long-term, particularly large infrastructure projects 
that run over multiple years, as government forecasting is typically limited to the year 
ahead (OECD, 2008:39). The South Africa National Treasury makes a three-year 
outlook (the medium-term expenditure framework or MTEF) mandatory for all national 
and provincial finance departments to ensure that funding allocations are not limited to 
just the coming year and that financial commitments to multi-year projects or 




PPPs are often defined by the fact that they utilise alternative sources of revenue 
(typically private debt or equity) to provide the financial resources necessary for 
implementation. The APMG Training Guide for PPP procurement (APMG 
International, 2018) suggests the following questions be asked when testing the 
affordability of a PPP project: 
1. Can the government make a long-term financial commitment commensurate 
with the cost of the project during the proposed off-take period? Alternatively, 
is there opportunity for the costs to be recovered through a revenue generation 
aspect of the project, i.e. user charges? 
2. If the answer to the above is ‘no’ then is there an innovative solution to make 
the PPP project affordable? I.e. can ‘synergistic commercial development 
opportunities’ be harnessed? 
3. Even if there is a facility for a long-term financial commitment by the public 
sector, are the short-term cash flow requirements taken into consideration? I.e. 
Can government afford the often significant short-term capital injection 
required for the construction phase? If not, then private financing opportunities 
may need to be considered to supplement the short-term shortfall, i.e. private 
debt or equity. 
 
PPPs are very rarely fully privately funded as the cost of borrowing money in the private 
sector is generally higher than that of the public sector due to additional lending costs 
(interest) levied by private investors and commercial lenders. Therefore, PPPs are often 
financed through a combination of public (initial capital investment) and private 
funding (debt or equity in the project). Affordability is further enhanced when there is 
the possibility of recovering costs through a revenue-generating aspect during the 
operating period, as in the case of a concession. The link to risk transfer is implicit and 
the private sector partner takes on the risk of recovering user charges in a concession 
(demand risk) or, where private debt or equity is involved, ensuring the project is 
brought to and kept at the specified operational standard timeously and efficiently. 
Given the constraint of finite government budgets, a project or programme that exceeds 
the budgetary provision is often perceived as a good candidate for a PPP as the 




attractive in creating the facility to make a project affordable. However, it would be an 
oversight to assume that this is indeed the case in the authority-pays model, with this 
aspect having become a primary source of criticism, particularly in the UK where there 
has been a moratorium on new PFI projects since 2018 (Davies, 2018). 
Bearing in mind that the public or user pays for the service in some manner or form, 
either through taxes or user charges, it would be unwise to draw the conclusion that the 
private sector can simply supplement public funding provisions: either way someone 
has to pay the piper. In the UK the public disapproval of projects procured in this 
manner is based on the so-called ‘off-book’ nature of financing arrangements where 
critics have decried the lack of transparency regarding the government’s degree of 
exposure to PFI contracts (Davies, 2018). Commentators have also harshly criticised 
the lack of public disclosure of the finer details around contracts procured under the PFI 
facility and the unknown extent of the public sector’s exposure and, when failures 
occur, they lay the blame squarely on the obtuse and misunderstood nature of these 
contracts (Pollock & Price, 2010; Monbiot, 2010). In South Africa this concern is to 
some degree mitigated where PPP projects, for which registration with the National 
Treasury’s PPP unit is mandatory, are disclosed in the National Treasury’s annual 
budget review (see Figure 12 below). 
 
 
Figure 12: Excerpt of a public-private partnership project list from the South African National 
Treasury's 2017 budget review 
 





2.4.2 Value for Money 
 
“A PPP project yields value for money if it results in a net positive gain to society 
which is greater than that which could be achieved through any alternative 
procurement route.” 
(European Investment Bank, 2015b) 
 
Value For money (VFM) is generally defined in terms of the presence of three elements: 
“economy, effectiveness and efficiency” (Diamond, 2005:162, cited in Burger & 
Hawkesworth, 2011:51). As a performance measure for government, this is an essential 
component of ensuring that public funds are appropriately utilised to deliver public 
goods and services. It is therefore essential that VFM be a key driver in the selection, 
planning and implementation of PPPs. 
Burger and Hawkesworth (2011) conduct a thorough discussion on the critical aspect 
of VFM in PPPs, noting “[a]ny project, whether it is a PPP or traditionally procured 
project, should be undertaken only if it creates value for money” (Burger & 
Hawkesworth, 2011:34). In the report, VFM is identified as a major driver in terms of 
requiring approval from various countries’ respective ministries of finance (Burger & 
Hawkesworth, 2011:16). The report suggests that a VFM assessment conducted early 
enough in the procurement process should be included to decide between going the PPP 
or traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP) route. 
Burger (2009:83) cites three types of efficiency: “allocative efficiency, i.e., the use of 
resources so as to maximise profit and utility; technical efficiency; and X-efficiency, 
i.e., the prevention of a wasteful use of inputs”. The private sector is acknowledged as 
the main driver of the latter two types of efficiency, with experience of the PFI schemes 
in the UK eliciting a 10-20% cost saving vs. traditional infrastructure procurement 
(Burger, 2009:83). 
Li and Akintoye (2003:7-8) corroborate the above findings, describing value for money 
in terms of cost reduction and citing savings of PFI projects in the order of 17-20% over 




savings are cited as due to a concurrent approach to design and construction, i.e. fast-
track project management; incorporating financial incentives to encourage early 
delivery; reduction in procurement time by only having to tender once due to packaging 
or bundling multiple projects into a single PPP; and discouraging scope changes or 
variations, thereby reducing cost overruns and delays (Li & Akintoye, 2003:7-8). 
According to reports on PFIs and PPPs in the UK and Australia, VFM is linked to the 
following factors: “risk transfer, output-based specifications, the long-term nature of 
contracts, performance measurement and incentives, competition, and private sector 
management expertise … innovation, greater asset utilisation and integrated whole-of-
life management” (OECD, 2008:37). 
In terms of the evaluation of VFM in the UK, the process involves a quantitative 
assessment (a ‘VFM test’) of the estimated cost of the proposed PPP against a Public 
Sector Comparator or PSC (HM Treasury, 2008). In South Africa, the PPP Manual 
includes a similar VFM test during phase 2 (feasibility study) in order to achieve 
Treasury Approval: 1 (RSA National Treasury PPP Unit, n.d.:vi). The feasibility study 
is intended to ascertain if a PPP is indeed the best value option to deliver the project or 
whether traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP) should be considered instead. 
The HM Treasury (2008:39-40) notes that a key driver for VFM is competition during 
procurement. Maintaining competition between suppliers is therefore a prerequisite to 
the assurance of VFM and the approval and success of a PPP. Due to the large scale of 
the projects generally contemplated for PPP procurement and the comparable time and 
effort putting together bids, it is inevitable that there may be a natural attrition with 
regard to bidders who no longer sense the effort is justified or sense that the probability 
of success is limited. In order to ensure VFM under these circumstances it is essential 
that competitors remain engaged in the process in order to maintain competition. An 
innovation in the bid process on the Chapman’s Peak Drive PPP (where procurement 
took nearly two years) included the requirement for bidders to obtain bid bonds to 
ensure commitment to the process (Rintala, Root, Ive & Bowen, 2008:150). 
Burger (2009:83) identifies a primary mechanism for VFM being the shifting of risk to 
the private sector partner, as transferring risk is a way to encourage the private sector 




with Burger (2009:90) adding that “risks must be allocated between the public and 
private partners in such a manner that … VFM is maximised”. 
 
2.4.3 Risk Transfer 
 
“PPPs are a way to transfer some risks to the private sector and to finance, 
develop and implement a range of projects spanning from smaller social services-
oriented projects to large-scale physical infrastructure projects. With decreasing 
funding from traditional donors, developing countries see PPPs as a new tool for 




“Risk transfer is at the heart of structuring a PPP project” (Yescombe, 2007:242). 
Yescombe (2007) notes that there are limited ways that risk may be managed and 
allocated: “risks can be retained by the Public Authority”; they may be “transferred to 
and retained by the Project Company” (the private sector partner); they may be 
“transferred to the Project Company, but then reallocated to third parties [via] 
subcontract[ing], insurance [or] having them guaranteed by Sponsors”; or, lastly, and 
in the case of concessions, they may be “transferred to end-users through the Project 
Company having a right to impose higher Service Fees” (Yescombe, 2007:242-243). 
The following top five risks in PFIs in the UK were identified by contractors, clients 
and lenders in a study by Akintoye, Taylor and Fitzgerald (1998, cited in Hardcastle & 
Boothroyd, 2003:40): 
1. “Design risk; 
2. Construction cost risk; 
3. Performance risk; 
4. Risk of delay; and 





Lesser risks were cited relating to operational matters (beyond the scope of this report), 
as well as those associated with payment, procurement, site-specific issues (use, 
selection and availability) and, finally, legal and market-related risks. 
While the risks identified above could be considered fairly self-evident to most 
construction professionals, the evaluation of risk in a PPP is arguably more critical due 
to the focus on the allocation of risk, one of the most significant advantages of PPPs 
when compared to TIP. Burger and Hawkesworth (2011:39-40) identify the following 
critical criteria for the evaluation of risk: 
• Defining, identifying and measuring risk; 
• Transfer of risk; 
• Quantifying the size of the risk; 
• Identifying the willingness to accept risk (degree of risk aversion); and 
• Competition levels: either for the market or in the market. 
 
Delmon (2011:95) identifies two aspects of risk that must be managed by the public-
sector partner. Firstly, not to ‘cram’ risk on the private sector partner as this could be 
costly and inefficient and, secondly, to allow for changes in the risk profile and risk 
allocation during the various stages of the project. Regarding the allocation of risk, it is 
generally accepted that the entity best able to manage the risk should be the one to 
accept it (Delmon, 2011:115). Risks that lend themselves to being managed by the 
public-sector partner include political risk: changes in the legislative of regulatory 
frameworks; performance risk: creating conditions for the contracting, procurement or 
financial arrangements in the contract; and social risks: the influence of stakeholders 
and beneficiaries. Risks that lend themselves to being managed by the private sector 
partner include completion risk during design and construction; and operation risk, in 
the case of a Design-Build-Operate (DBO) arrangement. 
Yescombe (2007:243-244) repeats the call to not shift too much risk onto the private 
sector partner, noting that this could create a situation where the private sector partner 




leading to catastrophe should lenders/investors lose their appetite to make further funds 
available and ultimately risking the collapse of the private partner. 
Some risk categories require a shared allocation whereby neither party may be able to 
accept the full impact in the event of a risk being realised. These include financing risk: 
the public-sector’s ability or willingness to provide funding and the private sector’s 
ability or willingness to provide the necessary guarantees or insurances; currency risk: 
the public sector’s exposure to foreign financing and the private sector’s exposure to 
the foreign market to provide the goods, materials or labour; offtake risk: the degree to 
which the public sector will pay to use the facility from the private sector operator (in 
the case of a concession) or the degree to which the private partner is able to generate 
revenue from the asset (i.e. a toll road); and, lastly, environmental risks either due to 
legislation and regulation or negative environmental impacts during construction or 
operation. These risks will need to be balanced based on each partner’s exposure to the 
risk or potential impact, with risk allocation forming a critical part of any PPP 
arrangement at inception and requiring constant review during the various phases 
(Delmon, 2011:114-115). 
McConnell (2010:248-249) identifies the following risks during construction: “delays 
to the works”, “contractor insolvency” and “poor project management”. Although these 
risks are common to delivery under traditional infrastructure procurement, the 
implications of who manages the risk in the case of a PPP fundamentally changes how 
these risks are mitigated. For example, delays typically borne between the client and 
contractor in TIP where the public agency has a vested interest in service delivery and 
may allow some leeway in terms of applying penalties for late completion are, in the 
case of a PPP, a matter between the contractor and lenders who have a different appetite 
to accept the costs of delays, these costs eating into their return on investment. This 
principle is similarly applied in the case of contractor insolvency and poor management. 
One of the proposed solutions to manage risk is to conduct a full risk analysis (a risk 
matrix), identifying the various risk types through the various stages of the project, 
allocating the risk accordingly and proposing mitigation measures in advance 
(Yescombe, 2007:246-247). It is also important to allow for flexibility and re-allocation 
when critical milestones are achieved that reflect the level of risk associated and the 




although traditional risk mitigation may be implemented through contractual 
arrangements such as insurances, financial incentives for good performance and delay 
damages in the event of poor performance, alternative strategies should also be included 
in the vehicle, such as performance management and dispute resolution. Performance 
management could involve the use of project monitoring and early identification of 
potential risks, while dispute resolution should include more informal dispute resolution 
techniques, such as adjudication and mediation, before entering more formal methods, 
such as litigation, which may be timeous and costly and ultimately lead to adverse 
delivery of the project. 
Burger and Hawkesworth (2011:41-42) identify a major risk to PPPs that is of particular 
relevance to the context of this report, namely the “availability of public sector skills”, 
noting that a PPP may be a “better option if the government does not itself possess the 
requisite skills to construct and operate the project” but that “if the government then 
opts for a PPP, it will nevertheless need skilled staff to monitor the private partner and 
to manage its own responsibilities and risk”. This ‘catch 22’ highlights a critical irony: 
on one hand the shortage of critical skills is a motivating force for entering into 
alternative procurement arrangements to supplement the skills shortage required to 
expand delivery, while, on the other hand, there is a need for specialist skills to 
successfully initiate, plan, manage and monitor the contractual relationship between 
public and private partners. 
The implications of the above on VFM are significant: without sufficiently skilled 
internal personnel to manage a profit-motivated private partner, the public sector 
partner could find itself on the receiving end of the risk to the achievement of VFM, 
which is one of the prime reasons cited for entering into a PPP in the first place. For 
developing countries, this aspect is a critical factor in the selection of PPPs to 
supplement public service delivery due to the shortage of in-house specialists. In South 
Africa, where there is a critical shortage of construction project managers and 
construction industry engineers, this is a considerable factor in the consideration of a 





2.4.4 Leadership and Political Will 
Minnie (2011:491-492) identifies leadership as a significant factor when the public 
sector partners with the private sector. The sub-themes of leadership relate to 
“overcom[ing] institutional inertia” (resistance to change), driving the PPP (being a 
“strong champion”), encouraging involvement and limiting interference through 
“visible political leadership”, “leadership from top management” (top management 
support), clear roles and “responsibility of function”, and “competent [and] motivated 
management (Minnie, 2011). 
The subtext to the above is recognition that the public sector has more of a role to play 
in this theme than its private sector counterpart. This bias can be attributed to the 
numerous public-sector actors involved in the initiation, planning, implementation and 
monitoring of a PPP project. The opportunity for political interference is amplified by 
the general scale and profile of the projects undertaken under this method of 
procurement. The private sector, on the other hand, is not motivated by political means, 
with profit-generation instead being the over-riding factor uniting the various private 
sector entities involved in the partnership. 
Fombad (2013:21-22) notes that political will and political stability are both critical to 
a project being consistently promoted by the public sector partner. Political will is 
critical due to the need to make decisions at a level befitting the strategic importance 
and high value of the project. Further, the scale of the projects also tends to create a 
significant degree of public scrutiny, leaving political actors accountable for their 
promotion. Lastly, political will is required to maintain accountability at project level, 
making political actors able to ensure that responsible officials drive projects to meet 
deadlines and expenditure or budget targets. Political stability is equally critical as 
large-scale strategic projects, such as those delivered via PPPs, are generally strategic 
in nature and linked to policy decisions made by the prevailing political regime. 
It is thus logical to expect changes in leadership to bring about changes in the trajectory 
of public service delivery. This is detrimental to any long-term project that straddles 
election periods, with their survival resting on new political incumbents. Any shift in 
political agendas in service delivery can have terminal consequences for projects, 
especially if they are at a sensitive stage, i.e. during procurement. The scale and 




considering the large sums of public funds that are committed, which may be considered 
better used elsewhere. An example is a pharmaceutical distribution PPP project in the 
Eastern Cape that fell prey to a late change in executive leadership at the provincial 
Department of Health (Aiello, 2014:20). 
A critical aspect of leadership is the need to consider the requirements of each partner 
in a PPP. To this end, steering a PPP through the various phases of planning, design 
and implementation requires both strong internal leadership and political will of public 
sector actors involved, as well as strong leadership by private sector partners to ensure 
the goals and values of all parties are recognised, and balance maintained at all points 
in the process. 
Being able to lead and steer PPPs also relies heavily on the ability of public sector 
managers, elected as PPP project officers, to successfully manage the projects they are 
assigned to lead. Project management expertise is critical in successfully administering 
the project and contract. An investigation by Rwelamila and Phungula (2009) into the 
competence of public sector agents to manage projects notes that officials “do not 
possess sufficient skills and abilities to manage [the agency’s] projects” (Rwelamila & 
Phungula, 2009:453). The report cites a lack of focus on project management as a 
proficiency, laying the blame with public implementation agents’ culture, structure, and 
senior management who are neither able nor willing to recognise the need to ensure that 
operational officials acquire the necessary skills to manage projects effectively. The 
result is an inconsistent and generally ad-hoc approach to project implementation. 
 
2.4.5 Goal Alignment 
Connie, Wong and Chikolwa (2010:1) note the imperative of identifying differing 
values between public and private sector partners. The former spans an incredibly broad 
range of stakeholders, while the latter is primarily concerned with shareholders’ needs. 
Public value is of prime consideration for public agencies, noting that governments “use 
market forces to protect public values rather than opposing and trying to alleviate such 
forces which companies adopt” (De Bruin & Dicke, 2006:725, cited in Connie, et al., 
2010:2). Public value is noted as governing relationships between government and 




to the identification of issues and balancing the needs of stakeholders. Lastly, regulating 
the interests of the private sector while creating conditions for efficient market 
allocation through competition is a complex balancing act between the public and 
private sector partners. 
Private value is generally accepted as based on incentives created through the 
realisation of profit. Market-based resource allocation via the competition is critical to 
driving efficiency, effectiveness and economy. The presence of these three ideals 
underpin the concept of value for money. However, these values can have negative 
societal effects: profit maximisation through downsizing and cutting corners can lead 
to job losses and lowered quality (value-engineering), which are at odds with public 
sector values (Connie, et al., 2010:2). 
While encouraging a private partner to deliver value is based on the realisation of profit, 
regulating a partner motivated by profit often relies on having applicable legislative 
frameworks in place and the need to ensure that adherence and compliance is 




“In South Africa which has had a protracted mass struggle for democracy and 
better conditions of life on the base of a poorly performing economy there have 
been high expectations for change even in the conditions of mass unemployment. 
There are enormous pressures for delivery and resistance to cost recovery.” 
(WRC, 2003:72) 
 
Considering the scale of infrastructure spending, it is of vital importance to ensure that 
public funds, especially when utilised for infrastructure, are used in a manner that is 
fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective (Watermeyer, 2005:19). 
Making use of a PPP therefore requires adequate checks and balances being in place to 




without taking advantage of the means to do so, i.e. state assets or public finance. It 
remains incumbent on government to ensure that PPPs are appropriately managed not 
only to ensure delivery, but also to ensure that public funds are not misused and value 
for money remains a prime factor in the transaction. Transparency and accountability 
are generally considered public-sector responsibilities, and government needs to ensure 
that procurement is fair, reasonable, transparent and that the opportunities for 
corruption, unethical conduct and nepotism are limited (Minnie, 2011:497). 
A key aspect of good governance in procurement is transparency, which is considered 
achieved when “the terms upon which the procurement process are to be conducted and 
the criteria upon which any decisions are to be made are properly documented and made 
widely available; the eventual procurement award decision … is made publicly 
available as are the reasons given …; [and] it is possible to verify that the documented 
procedures and criteria were indeed applied” (Watermeyer, 2005:19). 
Despite the perception that developing countries may be on the back foot in terms of 
developed and established legislative controls, regulations, accepted accounting 
practices and capacity in the civil service to appropriately implement and monitor 
compliance, this does not mean that lack of governance is unique to their context. 
Developed countries also suffer from this deficiency. However, it is well established 
that private sector companies looking to maximise revenue for shareholders or 
themselves are incentivised to seek out insufficiently regulated markets for the 
provision of public services where access to public funds may be exploited without 
interference from the government, thereby optimising revenue (WRC, 2003:71). 
South Africa’s National Planning Commission (NPC) is acutely aware of the lack of 
technical expertise available in the public sector vital to the adequate implementation 
of the governance frameworks and policies in place. Without this expertise the 
government is insufficiently equipped to ensure that the principles of governance and 
transparency live up to the expectations set by the public and politicians alike 
(Watermeyer, Wall & Pirie, 2013:21). While institutional reforms, such as the creation 
of a separate Supply Chain Management (SCM) framework for the delivery and 
maintenance of infrastructure and the introduction of the Infrastructure Delivery 
Management System or IDMS, allow for a streamlined approach to delivery, the 




processes is of critical concern (Watermeyer, Wall & Pirie, 2013:21-25). The NPC 
report cites “a looming crisis in the generational reproduction of professional expertise 
as the ageing cohorts continue to leave the system” (NPC, 2011:23). 
 
2.5 CONDITIONS IN THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
The previous section addressed the critical success factors leading to a successful 
partnership between public and private sector. This section will now investigate 
whether the current context is conducive to this partnership. To this end, conditions in 
the internal and external environments need to be evaluated to confirm if the theoretical 
aspects can be linked to effective implementation. This section will investigate failures 
in the delivery of schools both internationally and locally, the reasons for which include 
many of the factors critical to the success of PPPs in the local environment. 
 
2.5.1 Learning from the United Kingdom: Private Finance Initiatives 
The extensive use of PPPs in the UK over the last two and a half decades using the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) model provides a good statistical analysis of the value 
of public-private partnerships (PPPs) compared to traditional infrastructure 
procurement (TIP). McConnell (2010:247) notes that, in terms of performance against 
similar TIP projects, 69% of PFI projects were delivered on time, compared with 63% 
for TIP. In addition, 65% of PFI projects were delivered as per agreed cost against 54% 
for TIP. 
While PPPs have generated much in the way of extending public service delivery 
globally, it is also worth noting the shortcomings of this mode in order to understand 
what causes are linked to failures. The PFI model in the UK, used extensively to provide 
health, education and transportation infrastructure, has recently been found 
unsatisfactory for the provision of public infrastructure when it comes to value for 
money. On the lesser end of the scale it costs the UK taxpayer dearly for 




The criticisms stem from two aspects identified as critical success factors, namely lack 
of flexibility and an overly complex contracting and delivery model (Davies, 2018). 
The recent collapse of construction firm Carillion, which contracted extensively with 
the UK public sector under this model, forced officials and politicians to completely 
rethink the PFI model. PFI failures in recent years include lack of progress on healthcare 
projects in Liverpool and Birmingham, causing the contractor to suffer irreparable 
financial loss; the Scottish schools’ disaster where structural defects caused the closure 
of numerous facilities; the failure of the major contractor on the London Underground, 
costing the UK taxpayer £160 million to cancel (this in the context of saving £225 
million if left unaddressed); and eight school projects being constructed under the 
Building Schools for the Future or BSF programme where fire safety issues were 
discovered after a kitchen fire at one of these schools. The BSF programme was also 
found susceptible to a lack of flexibility when a state-of-the-art school built in Brighton 
in 1999 had to close just six years later due to lack of demand. With 22 years left to run, 
the PFI contractor pocketed £4.5 million (twice the initial investment) after the local 
council was forced to cancel the contract (Moore, 2007). 
Considering that 860 PFI projects have been delivered during the period of 1992 to 
2010 at a total capital value above £50 billion (McConnell, 2010:247), the above 
failures could arguably be seen as statistically inconsequential in the grander scheme; 
however, due to the large scale of PFI contracts, when a failure occurs the singular 
impact has far-reaching consequences both in terms of cost to the taxpayer and in terms 
of the effect on service delivery. While the above failures were largely due to poor 
planning and lack of flexibility through inadequately structured contracts, the case 
study below on the Edinburgh Schools disaster of 2016 illustrates a prime example of 
a lack of oversight on the part of the public sector, which is of particular relevance to 
this report. 
When 17 schools in Edinburgh were temporarily closed in 2016 after major structural 
failures occurred, an independent inquiry was commissioned and undertaken by the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability (CIPFA) to investigate the 
cause of the problem (CIPFA, 2017). While the results found technical issues in the 
quality assurance process, the underlying reason laid with the procurement process 
which did not adequately provide for independent quality control during construction – 




The report cited issues with quality and poor management of the building contract. It 
went into significant detail on the financial incentives to produce the projects at least 
cost, laying the blame squarely on the PFI system placing priority on private sector 
profit and not public sector delivery and quality (Brooks, 2016; Carrel, 2016; Carrel & 
Brooks, 2016; Small, 2016; Perraudin, 2017). 
 
2.5.2 External Conditions: The Local Construction Industry 
Local conditions in the construction industry are by no means stable. The effect of the 
global economic crash in 2008/9 had an adverse effect on the local industry that is still 
being felt nearly ten years later. In addition to this, trust in the local construction sector 
is at an all-time low, with collusive activities being brought to light through the recent 
findings of and rulings by both the Competition Commission and the judicial system. 
These events have cast significant aspersion on the industry, making clients wary in 
both the private and public sectors. 
The construction of new stadia in SA for the 2010 FIFA World Cup was an example of 
how few contractors able to deliver the project can collude to drive prices up for mutual 
benefit. Contractors met to coordinate the submission of uncompetitive bids in order to 
ensure that they each had a slice of the work and that that slice was driven up to an 
agreed profit margin of 17.5% (Nicholson, 2013). This was considerably above industry 
norms where profit margins during this period generally fell in the range of 2.8-5% 
(Peyper, 2016; Venter, 2013), the estimated rand value of this mark-up cost the SA 
public in the region of R14 billion (Steyn, 2015). 
This situation has not been limited to short-term ‘hay-making’ during the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup. The Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP) is identified as 
overpriced by a factor of 321% when reviewed against 11 similar international case 
studies, with the Gautrain and Lesotho Highlands Water Project rounding out a list of 
large public infrastructure projects found by the Competition Commission to have 






“The renewed push to crack down on the industry comes as the slowest economic 
growth since 2009 slashes profits and market valuations for companies including 
Aveng, Murray & Roberts Holdings and Group Five. The seven-member 
FTSE/JSE Africa Construction & Building Index has slumped 53 percent over the 
past two years, Aveng has posted three consecutive annual net losses.” 
(Wild, 2016) 
 
The fallout from the above had a significant impact on the local construction industry. 
Authorities in the public sector have called for a crackdown on collusive activities by 
reviewing procurement practices (Wild, 2016). Lack of trust in construction companies 
has also contributed to a downward spiral for conditions in the sector, with the major 
construction companies posting consistently poor results on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange in recent years. Further, government’s reduced spend on infrastructure due 
to budget cuts from the National Treasury has placed strain on large contractors reliant 
on these projects. This has led to many of the large contractors scaling down operations 
to suit the market. However, this has seen the emergence of small- and medium-sized 
contractors who have taken advantage of the government’s move to break up large 
contracts into smaller ones (Cokayne, 2018). Further impacts on the domestic 
construction industry, which are claimed to be contributing collectively to a perfect 
storm, are plunging commodity prices, downsizing and job losses to compensate for the 
lack of work, an unstable power supply, mining industry contraction, and the brain drain 
in the industry as specialists who are able to seek opportunities elsewhere or relocate 
abroad (Hill, 2016). 
Minnie (2011) notes the need for “transparency and accountability” for partnerships, 
specifically referring to “ethical conduct” and “addressing vulnerability to corruption 
and nepotism” (Minnie, 2011:497). While Minnie refers primarily to the need for these 
values in the public sector, there is a dual responsibility on the part of private sector 
partners to similarly internalise these values, a deficiency resulting in the practices and 
consequences described above. It is obvious that these values cannot simply manifest 
in a private partner motivated by profit. While checks and balances need to be put in 
place to ensure that the three elements of value for money (efficiency, economy and 




encouraged by shifting certain risks to the private sector partner and financial rewards 
for the achievement of targets. There are two aspects to the achievement of this end: (1) 
agreed partnership arrangements at the outset; and (2) monitoring and evaluation of 
arrangements to achieve these ends during and at conclusion. Burger and Hawkesworth 
(2011:36-47) refer to these as the “ex-ante” and “ex-post” VFM assessments. 
It is evident from the above that, should the public sector enter into contracts with the 
private sector in the current environment, significant effort will need to be put into the 
arrangements to ensure that the public interest is prioritised in terms of value for money, 
transparency, fairness and accountability. It is not good enough to simply insert ‘mutual 
trust and spirit of collaboration’ clauses into contracts, as these are difficult to define 
and often legally contestable. What may be required is a public sector that is far more 
explicit in its requirements for fair and transparent contracting arrangements, which 
could include performance monitoring and the use of compliance-related targets with 
financial incentives for their achievement or penalties for non-conformance. 
 
2.5.3 Internal Conditions: The Public Service 
The skills shortage in the SA construction industry has placed great strain on 
government departments in which these skills are critically important for the efficient 
implementation of infrastructure programmes and projects (CIDB, 2007:4). The public 
service requires skilled internal built environment professionals and procurement 
specialists to source, contract, engage and administer the services of professionals and 
contractors required to deliver public infrastructure (Accenture Consulting, 2016:2). 
This situation is largely mirrored in the private sector, placing further strain on 
achieving the efficient, effective and economic delivery of public infrastructure. 
 
“Lawless (2005) found that there are no civil engineers, technologists or 
technicians whatsoever employed in 34% of South Africa’s local municipalities 
and 9% of district municipalities. Only one civil technician was employed in 18% 
of the local municipalities and 9% of district municipalities while 16% of local 




and technicians under the age of 35. Only 19% of local municipalities and 53% 
of district municipalities have at least one civil engineer in their employ.” 
(Watermeyer & Thumbiran, 2009:2) 
 
The Construction Industry Development Board or CIDB identified an alarming trend 
in public-sector infrastructure delivery in a practice note titled ‘Scaling up Delivery and 
Accelerating Empowerment’ (CIDB, 2006). The challenges identified are two-fold: 
extensive reliance on traditional infrastructure procurement whereby singular projects 
are overseen by a “gradually disappearing cadre of skilled staff”; and unbundling 
strategies aimed at “reducing the size of contract[s] in order to ‘spread the sunshine’ … 
[through] target[ing] small emerging enterprises.” (CIDB, 2006:2). The results are well 
summarised in the report, citing “severe work overload for officials” leading to “poor 
quality end products, rework and delays that add to the burden” with proposed solutions 
including utilising a “fresh approach to procurement and delivery” and “changing the 
contracting strategy” (CIDB, 2006:3-5). 
 
“Many short-term responses to skills shortages do little to address long-term 
capacity constraints. Consultants can be brought in to design and build 
infrastructure, but without in-house technical expertise, provincial and local 
governments lack the capacity to ensure that the work is done to an adequate 
standard or to maintain the infrastructure once the work has been completed.” 
(NPC, 2011:24) 
 
As an illustration, it is worth reviewing the fairly recent attempt to deliver public 
schools in the current environment. In 2010, the national government’s Department of 
Basic Education (DBE) instituted a programme to rapidly address school backlogs in 
various provinces. Entitled the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative 
(ASIDI), the programme involved the rapid delivery of 49 schools across the country, 




A contemporary report evaluating the impact of the programme tabled the following 
lessons learnt: 
• “Proper project planning is fundamental”; 
• “Detailed planning and design [is essential] to minimise the possibility of 
failure”; 
• “Contract management is crucial”; 
• Resourcing is critical: additional resources were required to oversee some of 
the projects; and 
• Managing the expectations of stakeholders and beneficiaries is crucial. 
(DBSA, n.d.:(a)) 
 
From the contractor’s point of view, a report noted the importance of carefully 
considering the context of the project and ensuring that significant partnerships are 
instituted from the local community and stakeholders to guarantee timeous completion 
(DBSA, n.d.:(b)). What is disconcerting is the extensive involvement of multiple 
additional resources drafted to assist in the timeous completion of the project during 
construction, the subtext being that the original contractor did not have the means 
(skills, capacity or access to finance) to complete the project at the outset. This casts 
aspersion on both the contractor’s ability to complete the project, as well as a concern 
that this should have been more thoroughly assessed during the procurement phase. 
That said, the rapid implementation of the programme caused by undue political 
pressure may have further contributed to oversights during the process and a certain 
optimism bias by the various parties involved. 
In the Western Cape, the closure of four out of 25 school projects planned as part of the 
ASIDI programme shifted affected learners to temporary facilities while the projects 
were investigated (Meyer, 2015). The closures were due to structural failures caused by 
design errors by the consultant team assigned to deliver the projects. While the blame 
was laid squarely on the consultant design team, secondary reasons were cited which 
included the immense pressure to rapidly up-scale delivery to meet the timeframes of 
the programme and a lack of in-house specialist public works officials to maintain 




Public Works’ (SCOTPW) report into the failures cited the unreasonable timeframe for 
delivery as affecting the proper implementation of quality control measures otherwise 
typically in place. The following detailed concerns were tabled: 
• A “lack of specialised structural expertise in engineering in the [government] 
department, coupled with 
• reduced project design specification and documentation, as well [as] 
• limited official scrutiny and a lack of verification of engineering Professional 
Services Provider documents [which] were also contributing factors”. 
(SCOTPW, 2017:75-76) 
 
Although exacerbated by the stringent timeframe, this case highlights the shortage of 
in-house capacity within the public service (specialist officials) to ably monitor and 
oversee the works in the event that delivery has to be rapidly scaled-up. 
 
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Having identified the advantages, disadvantages and critical success factors of PPPs, as 
well as undertaken a contextual analysis of current conditions, it is worth pausing to 
contemplate the combined implications and relevance of PPPs to the scope and nature 
of this report. Given that education infrastructure in the local context is generally 
repetitive in nature and fairly unsophisticated in typology, it can be argued that 
improved implementation should focus on streamlining design and construction 
through a thorough standardisation process. The building typology requires little in the 
way of bespoke design, lending it to considerable standardisation of otherwise fairly 
modular and repetitive elements, i.e. school halls, classrooms, toilet blocks and admin 
blocks. Within this context of modularity, the informants for variation are limited to 
site conditions, spatial arrangements to suit the site and scale, with the size of a school 
being a function of the number of learners requiring accommodation. Schools are fairly 
unsophisticated and constant in terms of typology; thus the delivery of education 
infrastructure aligns with the argument for using PPPs – one of the critical success 




Given the above, the critical success factors relating to value for money and risk 
allocation can arguably be fairly straightforward to achieve. VFM can be fairly simply 
obtained through the efficiencies of an improved design and implementation process 
and, given the uncomplicated typology and scope for repetition, private partners may 
more readily accept the design and construction risks. 
That said, there are two constraints that stand in stark contrast: (1) the lack of specialist 
officials in the public service to specify, oversee and monitor implementation; and (2) 
the lack of trust that currently exists within the local construction industry. Without 
sufficient specialist and professional public officials able to manage private partners 
emerging from a local industry littered with a track record of collusion and anti-
competitive behaviour, there is a significant risk to the attainment of VFM: one of the 
prime drivers for entering into a PPP in the first place. 
The above could change quite rapidly in the current environment. Given that large 
contractors are currently in uncertain economic times there could be a shift in attitude 
towards capitulation rather than abuse of public procurement processes and projects, 
and profit-seeking could take a back seat to survival. In this context it is more important 
to ensure that private sector partners have sufficient resources to deliver and adequate 
liquidity to accept the allocation of risks and persist in the event of adversity. 
Within the context of the risk to VFM, it is important to identify a critical risk that has 
yet to be considered and one which is borne by the public sector partner alone, namely 
the more absolute effect of non-delivery of services or infrastructure on which the 
public desperately depends. In this context, the risk of not achieving VFM could be 
argued as of lesser import to that of not delivering public services. The consequences 
of this aspect go beyond simple economic concerns. The social cost of a generation of 
children without adequate education being an incalculably dire consequence. 
At this point it is apt to introduce the regulatory frameworks applicable to the 
achievement of governance, one of the critical success factors discussed above and, 
given the situation described above, of critical consideration within the current context. 
The next chapter identifies the tools at the disposal of the public service to ensure that 
taxpayers’ money is utilised effectively, efficiently and economically – the three 




3: THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK – PUBLIC SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE 
DELIVERY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter unpacks the regulatory frameworks in terms of two dimensions: (1) 
regulatory frameworks that pertain to the provision of public sector education 
infrastructure; and (2) those that pertain to PPP-specific procurement. The provision of 
public infrastructure in South Africa is governed by regulations pertaining to the 
management of state assets, regulations specific to the provision of public schools, as 
well as the infrastructure delivery frameworks aligned to construction industry 
standards. Identified as a critical success factor in the previous chapter, an enabling 
framework for the procurement of PPPs is essential for proper implementation. The 
South African government, recognising the need for this form of procurement as an 
option for the delivery of infrastructure, has gone to considerable lengths to ensure that 
PPPs are given an enabling legislative and regulatory framework, as well as to provide 
resources to promote this form of procurement. Public-private partnerships have 
already been employed extensively to deliver public services. The RSA PPP unit (a 
component of the National Treasury) has helped to complete 24 PPPs by 2015 and, at 
the times, were involved in the implementation of 50 more (DIIS, 2015:4). 
 
“Experiences from India, Kenya and South Africa all demonstrate that a solid 
PPP framework is an essential precondition for successful PPPs.” 
(DIIS, 2015:6) 
 
Being a form of government procurement, PPPs are regulated through various levels of 
legislation relating to financial management, beginning with Section 217 of the 
Constitution and cascading down through the PFMA to the detailed provisions of 




through the documentation produced and circulated by the National Treasury’s PPP 
unit, specifically created to assist in promoting, offering technical assistance, planning 
and implementation, monitoring, regulating and reporting on PPPs in South Africa. 
Firstly, however, it is important to note that infrastructure delivery relates to immovable 
assets and, as such, falls under the regulations of the Government Immovable Asset 
Management Act or GIAMA. Secondly, it should be noted that public schools fall under 
the regulations of the South African Schools Act. 
 
3.2 PUBLIC EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION AND 
MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS 
3.2.1 Government Immovable Asset Management Act 
The Government Immovable Asset Management Act of 2007 or GIAMA forms the 
regulatory framework for how state infrastructure at national and provincial level is 
managed. The Act provides the regulatory framework for relationships and duties of 
custodians (such the DTPW) and users (such as WCED), as well as the principles of 
immovable asset planning and management relating to the acquisition, use, 
improvement and disposal of state infrastructure. PPPs are given specific provision in 
Section 4(5), wherein custodianship of PPPs is defined (RSA, 2007:7-8). 
3.2.2 South African Schools Act 
The provision of public school infrastructure is governed by sections 12-14 of the SA 
Schools Act (RSA, 1996b:10-12). Section 12 sets out who is responsible for the 
provision of public education infrastructure in a given province, in this case the 
provincial Member of the Executive Council (MEC) and the relevant while sections 13 
and 14 provide the regulatory framework for the ownership and use of immovable 
property for public education whether on state-owned (section 13) or private (section 
14) land. 
Understanding the framework pertaining to land ownership for the provision of state 
schools is particularly significant as this factor is often a critical item in the contracting 





3.2.3 The Construction Industry Development Board 
The Construction Industry Development Board or CIDB is a schedule 3A public entity 
established by an act of parliament to “promote a regulatory and developmental 
framework that builds: construction industry delivery capability for South Africa’s 
social and economic growth and; a proudly South African construction industry that 
delivers to globally competitive standards” (CIDB, n.d.; RSA, 2000). 
Conscious of the skills shortage in the public sector, the CIDB proposes the following 
solutions to increasing the efficiency of the resources available in the sector: using a 
programme approach to project implementation, i.e. bundling similar projects into 
delivery programmes to increase efficiency through repetition of process; increasing 
the size of contracts where efficiencies may be achieved through economies of scale; 
including targeted procurement requirements to ensure micro-level empowerment and 
development of emerging contractors; increasing the duration of contracts using term 
contracts or frameworks under which individual projects are issued as work packages; 
and an emphasis on a systems approach to delivery through comprehensive 
standardisation of procurement documentation, designs (norms and standards for 
repetitive or modular elements), as well as pricing, contracting and targeting strategies, 
all with the aim of increasing efficiency (CIDB, 2006:4-8). 
The above has been largely fleshed out in revised procurement options produced by the 
National Treasury to assist with alleviating the crisis. This involved the creation of the 
Infrastructure Delivery Management System (IDMS) and the subsequent Standard for 
Infrastructure Procurement and Delivery Management (SIPDM). 
 
3.2.4 The Infrastructure Delivery Management System 
The Infrastructure Delivery Management System or IDMS is a delivery system for 
public-sector infrastructure that closely mirrors the industry standard, PROCAP, which 
specifies the delivery of professional services for the various professions engaged in 
the built environment through gazetted guidelines. PROCAP is based on six stages of 




from project inception through to completion. The IDMS loosely mirrors this process, 
adding additional stages upfront to handle the strategic phases for long-term planning, 
budgeting and resourcing, as well as the close out phases involving asset transfer 
between departments, i.e. between the Implementing Agent and User Department, 
unique to the public sector (CIDB, 2012). 
Any implementing agent considering delivering public infrastructure is obliged to 
comply with the system in order to achieve the appropriate level of governance 
(transparency and accountability) expected from public institutions. The most onerous 
part of the system falls under procurement as this is where the largest portion of the 
budget is committed. The role of the relevant Supply Chain Management unit is 
therefore critical to ensuring that effective and appropriate contracting arrangements 
meet the governance obligations of the institution committing public funds. 
The transfer of risk onto a private sector partner is considerably tenuous. Private sector 
partners are unfamiliar with the checks and balances required and, if this is not made 
explicit from the beginning, may not allocate sufficient time and resources to duplicate 
these procurement processes when implementing projects on the behalf of government. 
Recently the IDMS has been updated with the One-IDMS framework. This policy 
framework updates the delivery management system by aligning it to the activities of 
the International ISO 55000 Standard for Asset Management. The One-IDMS contains 
additional frameworks for operations and maintenance, as well as introduces the 
concept of full lifecycle asset management from construction to disposal. Also new to 
the system is a clearer understanding of portfolio and programme management 
involving the more detailed activities that go into long-term asset planning, delivery 
and management. 
 
3.2.5 The Standard for Infrastructure Procurement and Delivery 
Management 
The Standard for Infrastructure Procurement and Delivery Management or SIPDM 
(RSA National Treasury, 2015) provides the infrastructure procurement policy 
framework for the South African public sector. This policy document sets the stage for 




Although generally aligned with traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP), it allows 
for more efficient implementation of alternative contracting arrangements to increase 
capacity under the client-contractor model. 
While SIPDM allows for a degree of risk re-allocation it does not allow for total 
allocation of risk onto a private sector consultant or contractor. The state is still referred 
to as the employer, meaning that ultimately all risk is the responsibility of the 
government entity involved in the contractual relationship. Retention of ultimate 
accountability is implicit in all public-sector transactions. Given the lack of resource 
capacity to monitor the various risks involved in public sector infrastructure delivery, 
this is an impossible task in practice and one which is being slowly eroded as skilled 
professionals leave the service without replacement. The inability to shift whole risks 
to the private sector in a partnership arrangement is the single biggest shortcoming of 
this model. 
The National Treasury recently revoked SIPDM and replaced it with the Framework 
for Infrastructure Procurement and Delivery Management or FIDPM. This framework 
aligns infrastructure delivery to the ISO 55000 Standard for Asset Management, and is 
promoted by the One-IDMS. 
 
3.3 SOUTH AFRICAN PPP PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS 
3.3.1 The South African Constitution 
Of pertinence to PPPs is the chapter framework for procurement which has its origins 
in the Public Finance Management Act, which in turn finds its origins in the 
Constitution, Chapter 13 (RSA, 1996a:110). Section 217 of the Constitution provides 
the basic framework for procurement which has a direct effect on PPPs, referring to the 
needs for “a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-
effective.” (RSA, 1996a:112). The finer detail of this section is manifested in more 





3.3.2 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) 
 
“To regulate financial management in the national government; to ensure that 
all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of that government are managed 
efficiently and effectively; to provide for the responsibilities of persons entrusted 
with financial management in that government; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.” 
Preamble to the Public Finance Management Act (RSA, 1999) 
 
With its roots in the Constitution, the Public Finance Management Act, or PFMA, forms 
the regulatory framework for the effective use of public funds. Section 38 (a) (iii) of 
the PFMA provides the basis for a value-based framework for procurement whereby 
the accounting officer of a given public department must ensure “an appropriate 
procurement and provisioning system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective” (RSA, 1999:36). 
The National Treasury regulations, which are written as a schedule to the PFMA, 
provide the detailed framework for financial management in national and provincial 
departments in Section 16, issued in April 2001. These include specific regulations for 
PPP procurement. 
 
3.3.3 South African National Treasury Regulations and Public-Private 
Partnership Unit 
Added to the PFMA as a schedule in April 2001, Section 16 of the Treasury regulations 
issued in terms of the PFMA sets out the process for initiation, proposal, procurement 
contracting, management and variations to be considered in terms of the relationships 
between the various parties involved in a PPP with an organ of state (RSA National 
Treasury, 2005:43-47). Created in 2000, the RSA National Treasury’s PPP unit has 
sought to provide the necessary framework to stimulate and regulate this form of 




PPP agreements comply with the legal requirements of affordability, VFM and 
sufficient risk transfer” (Burger, 2009:90). 
 
Figure 13: Extract from PPP Quarterly summarising the support role intended by the Unit 
 
(RSA National Treasury PPP Unit, 2002a:8) 
NATIONAL TREASURY’S PPP UNIT: HERE TO HELP 
The PPP Unit has both a regulatory and a technical assistance role. The former is derived from Chapter 
16 of the Treasury Regulations and requires that all government departments obtain various Treasury 
approvals prior to the signing of a PPP agreement with the private sector. 
The three criteria set by government are: 
• Affordability 
• Value-for-money 
• Appropriate transfer of risk 
These stringent tests require detailed feasibility work prior to approaching the market, top-quality 
procurement processes, excellent contract structuring and negotiations and sound contract 
management. 
Departments and public entities are given support in all these stages by the dedicated PPP Unit, this 
is part of the Budget Office at the Treasury. The team is headed by Aijaz Ahmad, an internationally 






Figure 14: Generic public-private partnership project life cycle 
 
(RSA National Treasury PPP Unit, 2002c) 
 
What is particularly notable for the purposes of this investigation into critical success 
factors is that the criteria set by the National Treasury as part of the PPP procurement 
process refers specifically to the needs for affordability, value for money and risk 
transfer. These three factors are therefore seen as founding principles and essential for 
the implementation of PPPs in terms of the local regulatory framework. 
A 2008 report by USAID on RSA’s PPP program notes the following functions of the 
National Treasury’s PPP unit: 
• “Develops, formulates and promotes PPP policy; 
• Evolve[s] as a dynamic and sustainable centre of excellence for PPPs; 




• Gives technical assistance to public institutions through project feasibility, 
procurement, and management; and 
• Promotes an enabling environment for PPPs by: facilitating certainty in a 
regulatory framework, developing best practices guidelines …, providing 




As part of the last point, the PPP unit has developed a fair amount of literature: an online 
manual (RSA National Treasury PPP Unit, n.d.), a public-relations document (RSA 
National Treasury, 2007), as well as a presentation by a senior advisor working within 
the unit that provides an overview of the regulatory frameworks, PPP projects 
implemented to date and an outline of the related success factors and challenges (Gqoli, 
n.d.). These documents are intended to assist organs of state in the investigation into, 
and initiation and implementation of, PPPs by ensuring alignment with the Treasury 
regulations. They also offer technical assistance and training for government officials 
in all three spheres of government. 
While most of the literature on PPPs is produced by the unit themselves, Burger 
(2009:82-96) gives an independent overview of the origins and roles of the dedicated 
PPP unit of the RSA National Treasury created in 2000. Burger notes achievements to 
date, comparisons in terms of performance and exposure with international precedent 
(specifically the UK PFI model) and, lastly, the challenges associated with this model 
in SA given the local skills crisis and lack of implementation capacity. More recently, 
the PPP unit has been absorbed into the Government Technical Advisory Centre 
(GTAC) where specialists are available to advise and provide the expertise necessary 
to increase government’s capacity through the use of PPPs amongst other forms of 
procurement (GTAC, n.d.). 
Criticism of the PPP unit is based on its limited mandate or scope. The unit focusses 
almost solely on the phases of initiation to financial close of a PPP and very little during 
the operational phase or off-take period (OECD, 2008:112). This focus is reinforced by 




and reporting (GTAC, 2015b). This is not to say that the unit does not take monitoring 
and evaluation into account, the case studies’ section of the GTAC website indicates 
that the unit commissions independent reviews of various projects, providing links to 
the documents via the web page (GTAC, 2015c). 
 
3.3.4 National Budget and an Overview of Exposure to PPPs 
RSA National Treasury provides an overview of all committed PPP projects either in 
the planning or already committed and in operation in the annual Budget Review, the 
2017 document, for instance, listing all PPP projects in significant detail (RSA National 
Treasury, 2017:159-163). The document quantifies national government’s exposure to 
PPPs with the intention of ensuring the public is appraised of the exposure to various 
projects committed at national and provincial level. As noted in the previous chapter, 
SA’s use of PPPs has decreased significantly in recent years (see Section 2.2.2). The 
National Treasury intends to reverse this trend, noting partnerships “with local and 
international development finance institutions to explore the development of alternative 
infrastructure funding” (RSA National Treasury, 2017:162). 
 
3.3.5 Division of Revenue Act 
A review of the available frameworks for budgeting would not be complete without 
mentioning the Division of Revenue Act or DoRA. The Act is promulgated annually to 
identify the extent of funding assigned to various grants allocated at national, provincial 
and local government levels. Of relevance to this project are the two revenue grants 
specific to funding public school infrastructure: the Education Infrastructure Grant 
(EIG) and the School Infrastructure Backlogs Grant (RSA, 2019:130-132;146-148). 
The former is the funding mechanism for the general construction, replacement and 
maintenance of public school infrastructure in a given province, while the latter is a 





3.4 THE EFFECT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS ON 
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY 
Wall, Watermeyer and Pirie (2012) review the implications of supply chain 
management prescripts on infrastructure procurement and delivery. Conscious of its 
context, the proposal is that policy frameworks should not restrict delivery to a point 
where implementation is constrained or adversely effected, noting solutions to the 
challenges as setting clear timelines and achieving a balance of governance and 
compliance within the relevant context of the delivery scope. 
Burger and Hawkesworth’s survey into VFM in PPPs (2011:47) states “officials in a 
significant number of countries clearly noted that the rules in place impede attaining 
value for money by creating incentives to prefer traditional infrastructure procurement 
over PPPs.” The cost of compliance to legislation and regulations is often seen as a 
barrier to the achievement of one of the major motivators for PPPs in the first place: 
increasing the capacity for service delivery. This bias towards TIP is further 
compounded by public officials’ unfamiliarity with the contractual relationships 
between public and private partners in PPPs. Public sector officials view a PPP as 
relinquishing too much control over the governance aspects of the contract and putting 
them at risk in the event of failure. 
While it is all well and good to attempt to fix the systems in place, this does not address 
the underlying cause of the issue: a lack of specialist officials available in the public 
sector to plan, promote and implement infrastructure projects. A review of available 
literature finds remarkably little on the implementation of skills development 
programmes or encouraging learners to consider a career in the construction sector. A 
report by global management consulting firm McKinsey (Barbosa, Mischke, Parsons, 
2017) notes that the global construction industry is going through a productivity slump 
when compared to other sectors, but positions “reskilling the workforce” as a solution 
at a distant number seven, behind such headings as “reshaping regulations”, “rewiring 
contractual frameworks” and “improving procurement and SCM practices”. These all 
purport to fix the processes and systems, but overlook the chronic shortage of human 





3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Although it is apparent that a sufficiently comprehensive regulatory framework exists 
for infrastructure procurement with a special provision for PPPs, compliance to the 
extensive procurement and implementation aspects of developed policies and systems 
is generally perceived as a constraint rather than an enabler. The irony is not lost on the 
public sector infrastructure official when contemplating the origins of the IDMS and 
SIPDM lie in a process intended to streamline and accelerate infrastructure delivery. 
Despite the creation of a dedicated PPP unit and a considerable track record of PPP 
projects in SA, the question remains: why are so few of South Africa’s public projects 
implemented in this manner? One could argue that the primary reason is the skills 
shortage in the public sector. Although the risk identified in the discussion in the 
previous chapter relating to regulating a private sector partner emerging from an 
industry associated with anti-competitive intent may be considered mitigated by the 
well-developed regulatory framework, without adequate human capital in place to 
apply the policies the public sector is understandably risk averse. It is further 
understandable then, when considering the degree of anti-competitive behaviour by the 
local construction industry in recent years combined with the public-sector skills 
shortage, that there is a reduced appetite on the part of the government to embark on 
fairly unfamiliar high-value contracting arrangements, such as PPPs. Within the scope 
of this project, this is exacerbated by the fact that PPPs remain as yet untested for the 
provision of education infrastructure in this country. 
Another factor contributing to the lack of PPP projects is the reduction in expenditure 
on public infrastructure with few commitments to large infrastructure projects. Having 
noted the critical importance of the additional time and effort (and therefore cost) 
required for proper initiation, planning and procurement of PPP projects, the reduced 
scale of infrastructure projects in the present environment means that initiation costs 
have less chance of being recouped with concomitant implications for the achievement 
of value for money, a central tenet of PPPs. 
In summary, considering that the regulatory framework is sufficiently developed to 
enable the public service to effectively administer the proposed partnership agreements 
considered by the National Treasury and the presence of a dedicated agency ready to 




infrastructure delivery is internal capacity and political will on the part of the public 
sector to accept potential risks of partnering with private sector partners emerging from 





4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
As described in the introduction, this chapter introduces the empirical data analysis 
phase. The chapter will begin by establishing the research problem and the objectives 
necessary to investigate the research problem in its various dimensions. The three stages 
of the data collection and analysis phase process will be described in detail and includes 
a discussion regarding the validity of the findings. The chapter concludes with a review 
of the ethical considerations and a discussion about research scope and exclusions. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 
With the effective and efficient delivery of infrastructure being a core objective of 
public works departments in all spheres of government, it is imperative that due 
consideration is given to the public service’s ability to procure resources required to 
implement infrastructure projects and programmes. In the current environment this 
aspect is directly affected by available human capital (internally or contracted) and the 
applicable delivery frameworks. In the Western Cape, the provincial education and 
public works department are jointly under pressure to realise their mandates of 
providing adequate infrastructure, both in terms of quantity and quality, to deliver basic 
education to all. The challenge, however, is one of increasing the portfolio in the 
Western Cape to respond to rapid population growth and urbanisation, as well as 
maintaining the existing portfolio given the public sector’s constraints (funding and 
human capital). With resource-intensive traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP) 
the mainstay of local public works departments, the public sector is under pressure to 
investigate augmenting the delivery of public schools with modes that do not rely so 
much on internal capacity. The urgency to deliver against an increasing backlog leaves 
the public sector with insufficient time to create new policy frameworks that may 
unlock new infrastructure delivery modes. The only option left in terms of unexplored 




With the above as the background to the research problem, notably: how can the 
Western Cape scale up delivery of public education infrastructure using alternate 
modes? The question being investigated in this research project is, in essence: 
• Are PPPs a feasible delivery option for public schools in the Western Cape? 
 
The secondary questions to be answered relate to the feasibility of achieving this end: 
• What factors are critical to the success of infrastructure PPPs in the local and 
current context? 
• Are these factors sufficiently present in the current context to provide a 
suitable environment for the effective delivery of public schools in the 
Western Cape? 
• What can be done to improve the appetite or address any constraints this mode 
may suffer from should a PPP be considered to deliver public schools in the 
Western Cape? 
 
This research project involves addressing each of the above three secondary objectives 
through three distinct stages of data collection and analysis. These stages emanate from 
the design and methodology described below. 
 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
A study of PPPs by Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) found the following research 
methodologies relevant to the subject: case studies, questionnaire surveys and mixed 
methods (combinations of questionnaire surveys and case studies). As per the previous 
section, in order to answer the three secondary questions listed above it is evident that 
a triangulated study is most applicable, using a combination of the methods described 
by Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015). 
The proposed research methodology for this report therefore begins with a critical 




this period being the last twenty years since the formation of the PPP unit. While PPPs 
have yet to be tested in the provision of education infrastructure in South Africa, they 
have been used to deliver toll roads, public transport and health infrastructure. The case 
study analysis also forms the first step in identifying which factors may be applicable 
to the current context in the provision of public education infrastructure. The case study 
reviews provide preliminary critical insights into the successes or relative importance 
of various factors that may have influenced the outcome of the PPP projects in the case 
studies, insights vital in validating the findings of the subsequent empirical data analysis 
stages. A review of the available literature found that there are sufficient academic 
sources on the six local case studies which provides a sufficiently broad base to cover 
the local PPP paradigm while also further reinforcing the validity of the findings. 
The second stage, the collection and analysis of quantitative empirical data, includes a 
quantitative study on the prevalence of CSFs identified in the case studies via an online 
questionnaire. Respondents are members of relevant public and private organisations 
that may have been or may become engaged in this manner of infrastructure 
procurement and delivery due to their background or current position in their respective 
organisations. Initial respondents were selected from a narrow set of colleagues and 
consultants in the field known to the researcher with subsequent respondents recruited 
through a snowball sampling process. Data collection involves a combination of an 
online survey questionnaire and semi-structured interviews to obtain quantitative and 
qualitative data, respectively. An online survey questionnaire was selected to obtain 
quantitative data as this is deemed the most efficient method of obtaining measurable 
quantities to a pre-defined set of questions. The survey questionnaire attempts to 
measure two dimensions of the identified CSFs, namely the perception of the 
importance of the various CSFs (to attempt a ranking) and the prevalence or 
achievability of the same CSFs in the current context. The design of the questionnaire 
is premised on obtaining an index of each of the factors identified in the case studies 
based on the respondents’ opinions. Babbie and Mouton (2001:153-154) refer to the 
use of Likert scaling to develop simple indexes for response categories based on a range 
of incremental responses between two extremes, i.e. ‘strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
strongly disagree’. Assigning each of these responses with a number, i.e. from 1-4, 
allows responses to be measured, and an aggregate of the responses can be used to 




Likert scale permitted measurement of the opinions of each participant relative to the 
factor under consideration. Further, the resulting aggregate responses could then be 
used to create an index for each factor and allow the factors to be ranked. Respondents 
were asked to first score the importance of ten factors pertaining to PPPs on a scale of 
1-5 with 1 = ‘not at all important’, 2 = ‘minimally important’, 3 = ‘somewhat 
important’, 4 = ‘very important’ and 5 = ‘critically important’. The questionnaire then 
asked respondents to score the same ten factors based on their perceived prevalence or 
achievability in the current environment again on a scale of 1-5, 1 = ‘not at all 
achievable/prevalent’, 2 = ‘minimally achievable/prevalent’, 3 = ‘somewhat 
achievable/prevalent’, 4 = ‘very achievable/prevalent’ and 5 = ‘completely 
achievable/prevalent’. The two indices for each factor were then analysed in terms of 
the difference between their relative importance and perceived prevalence or 
achievability in the current context. The results allowed the researcher to rank the 
factors requiring more attention (where there was a significant variance between the 
two attributes of each factor), as well as assisted in focussing the investigation during 
the next phase where qualitative data was collected to investigate the underlying causes 
and effects of the factors on the proposed delivery of public schools via PPPs. 
While understanding the relative importance and presence of the ten factors influencing 
PPPs was the primary focus of the questionnaire, secondary questions were also 
included which were intended to understand the perceptions in the industry relating to 
the applicability of public schools as a delivery objective, as well as the proposed or 
preferred role of finance in the transaction. Finally, a general question regarding the 
respondents’ readiness to get involved in a PPP was included to ascertain the degree of 
interest in this delivery mode in the current environment. 
The third and final phase involves the collection of qualitative empirical data through 
semi-structured in-depth interviews with subject matter experts and key stakeholders in 
the field. Depth interviews were considered appropriate for this stage as they are 
concerned with understanding the origins of participants’ beliefs or opinions on a given 
subject (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:291). Using this method, the intention is to understand 
and qualify the results of the quantitative data phase using qualitative insights from 
specialists in the field. While this primarily intends to investigate the root causes and 




in the current context, it also lends an air of validity to the quantitative data collected in 
the previous phase. 
Similar to the online questionnaire, initial recruits were from the researcher’s contact 
base with subsequent interview subjects identified through a snowball sampling 
approach. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured mode in order to classify 
the data into themes based on the various factors measured in the survey questionnaire. 
These themes form the sub-headings in the relevant findings chapter. The data collected 
in the interviews is intended to identify precisely what may be done or needs to be 
addressed in order to correct the imbalances or shortcomings in the factors evident from 
the quantitative data set. 
 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
The first phase of critical data analysis (content analysis) involved gathering case study 
research conducted on South African PPP projects since 2000. The case study research 
on local PPPs was found in academic and construction industry journals, as well as on 
the case study section of the GTAC website (GTAC, 2015c). The factors evident in 
each case study were both quantified and analysed in terms of their qualitative 
dimensions, i.e. their influence on the PPP: positive or negative. These factors were 
then tabulated and used to determine which factors required identification and 
investigation in the next two phases. 
Empirical data was collected using two methods: (1) through an online questionnaire; 
and (2) through a series of semi-structured depth interviews. A total of 16 respondents 
/ participants took part in the empirical data collection phase. Respondents / participants 
either elected to complete the questionnaire, take part in the depth interviews or a 
combination of both. This added the complication of having to carefully separate any 
overlaps to ensure that the data retained its integrity in preparation for the analysis 
phase. The online questionnaire garnered ten responses, while the semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with ten participants. Results of the survey provided 
quantitative data regarding the importance and prevalence of the ten factors (CSFs) 




qualitative data from current PPP specialists and role-players in the local environment, 
public and private sector alike. 
The choice of respondents / participants for the questionnaires and interviews required 
careful consideration. As the field of PPPs is fairly specialised and specialists are few 
and far between, it was decided to start with recognised PPP proponents (identified 
from the PPP units known to the researcher), asking them to identify subsequent 
potential respondents / participants. Babbie and Mouton (2001:167) refer to this as 
snowball sampling, noting that it is “appropriate when the members of a special 
population are difficult to locate”. As such, a small set of initial respondents / 
participants were identified and approached to participate in the questionnaire and 
interviews. Initial selection was based on the researcher’s access within the direct work 
environment (the Western Cape government), with subsequent respondents / 
participants identified through the abovementioned snowball sampling, i.e. suggestions 
from the previous participant. While it is noted that the data set is small (ten 
questionnaires were completed and ten interviews conducted) the set is considered 
representative for two reasons: firstly, it reflects the small scale of knowledgeable PPP 
specialists in South Africa prepared to give their opinions on the topic. Secondly, it 
contains a diversity of views as public sector PPP specialists, implementing agents 
representatives and financial specialists provided input; private sector transaction 
advisors, contractors and financiers participated in the data collection; and academics 
in the field conducting research on PPPs in the South African context also provided 
valuable insights, opinions and direction to other contemporary and contextual research 
on the topic. 
The intention with the online questionnaire is to obtain quantitative results to measure 
the perception of the importance of the critical success factors identified in the case 
study chapter, as well as measure the perception of the state or prevalence of the same 
CSFs in the current environment. Combining the two measurements permits a 
comparative gap analysis between the importance of the various factors and their 
relative presence or prevalence in the current context. 
The interviews were conducted to gain insight into the underlying causes or reasons for 
the findings in the quantitative analysis. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured 




analysis. The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for a comparative 
analysis based on themes identified in the survey. 
 
4.5 VALIDITY 
The critical data analysis based on a series of case studies, which is the first part of the 
study, includes six PPP projects delivered in the PPP mode within the last twenty years. 
The analysis of these projects represents a significant body of knowledge not only 
because they have been delivered in South Africa under the current prevailing 
regulatory framework, but also because they refer to contextual factors that have critical 
bearing on the effectiveness of the delivery mode. Each case study was analysed using 
either primary data from participants in the actual PPP in question (public and private 
sector alike) or literature from academic or construction industry sources. As such, the 
data analysis is considered sound and valid. 
The empirical data collection includes a relatively small data set (n = 16). This small 
size in no way invalidates the findings as the number of PPP specialists with sufficient 
experience in the country is incredibly limited. This is, in and of itself, a finding of the 
research as well as a concern should this mode be considered for future projects. 
 
 




















The data collection also captures the experience of each participant in terms of both 
infrastructure delivery and familiarity with PPPs. While most respondents / 
participants’ have greater than 15 years’ experience with infrastructure delivery (10 of 
the 16), in terms of PPP experience the mode fell in the 6-10 year band. One participant 
had less than two years of experience with infrastructure delivery, but this is due to 
being involved in the field of academic research on the topic of PPPs and not being 
exposed directly to the field in a practical sense. Although three participants admitted 
to having less than two years’ experience with PPPs, the same three each have more 
than 15 years’ experience in infrastructure delivery. 
 
 
Figure 16: Respondents / participants’ experience in infrastructure delivery 
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4.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The study was considered low risk when considered against the University of 
Stellenbosch’s DESC guidelines (published September 2012) for the following reasons: 
1. The research material was not considered sensitive, as information and 
analysis of PPPs is generally available and accessible in the public domain in 
the form of academic sources and articles in the mainstream media; 
2. In terms of empirical data, only opinions were collected and analysed, not 
personal information; and 
3. Respondents / participants in the study were not considered part of a 
vulnerable population. 
 
In terms of the mode of data collection, while the survey questionnaire provided for 
anonymity by its very nature (respondents’ names were not requested), it is not possible 
to guarantee anonymity to participants in the depth interviews due to the limited scope 
of the PPP typology in South Africa. This was confirmed with the participants and 
written consent was obtained prior to their acceptance as subjects in the study. 
 
4.7 SCOPE AND EXCLUSIONS 
It is important to note that this project focusses exclusively on the infrastructure 
delivery aspect of PPPs and not the operational arrangements often associated with this 
form of procurement. This is not an oversight, the reason being that the present focus 
on the provision of basic education in the Western Cape is placed on infrastructure 
delivery alone and not the resources needed to maintain the facilities or even operate 
the schools. 
However, this could change if cognisance is taken of the very real prospect of the 
declining condition of education facilities, which is highlighted in the WCED’s UAMP 
alongside the need to grow the portfolio, requiring a facilities management solution or 
a complete operational solution should WCED be unable to provide the operational 
capital (teachers and administrators) to effectively run the facilities. In the latter 




Menashy (2012) who, along with chapter contributions from other authors, undertook 
a review of PPPs in delivering comprehensive education services in the global context. 
Their research goes into considerable detail regarding the origins, reasons, benefits and 
challenges of using PPPs as a comprehensive vehicle for education delivery. The 
lessons learnt could be invaluable, should the model shift to include the broader 
opportunities afforded by PPPs, especially where this model has been extensively 
utilised in the UK. Being able to include school operations and facilities management 
in the scope of a PPP makes a considerable difference to the capability of the public 
sector to transfer risk to the private partner with a concomitant effect on value for 
money. Both of these, as has been established previously, are cornerstones of PPPs. 
It is also worth noting that this report does not investigate the provision of education 
through independent schools as these facilities fall outside the scope of the public 
sector. However, the growth in this sector is not to be overlooked. A 2016 article cites 
a surge from 65 independent schools in the province in 2011 to 244 schools just five 
years later – a nearly four-fold increase (Fredericks, 2016). 
In the context of partnering with the private sector, this avenue may be worth 
considering given that independent schools account for approximately 15% of the total 
number of education facilities in the Western Cape province, but only cater for 3% of 
the total number of learners (Markle & Van Der Lingen, 2018:19). The discrepancy in 
the proportion of facilities versus the proportion of learners is evidence of both smaller 
learner numbers per school (smaller facilities when compared to public-sector 
counterparts) and a more favourable learner-educator ratio. Although these two aspects 
are typically associated with a higher quality of education allied with a considerable 
price of admission and leaving these facilities out of reach of the poor, this perception 
is thrown into stark contrast by the many no-fee or low-fee schools receiving funding 
from provincial government. While the independent school model is typically 
associated with the for-profit model, such as the Curro schools and the various 
ADvTECH group schools, approximately 40% of independent schools in the Western 
Cape are subsidised by provincial government, with the WCED having transferred 
R107.5m to partially fund these schools in 2017 alone, the shortfall being covered 
mostly by private donors (WCED, 2017). These schools are given grants on the 




been accommodated in this fashion in 2017 with 24 of these schools offering no-fee 
education (WCED, 2017). 
 
4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
To investigate the potential to unlock the delivery of public schools in the Western Cape 
and having established in previous chapters that PPPs remain the only unexplored 
procurement mode available to the public sector to augment traditional infrastructure 
procurement (TIP), it is critical that suitable modes for delivery be explored. This 
chapter established that there are at least three secondary objectives, namely 
establishing what factors should be measured, how they may be measured and what 
may be done to mitigate any deviant findings. For this, a triangulated methodology was 
proposed involving, firstly, a review of local PPP examples through secondary data 
analysis to establish the factors requiring review, secondly, a quantitative survey to 
measure the importance and prevalence of these factors in the present environment and, 
lastly, depth interviews with PPP specialists from various sectors (representing the 
various role-players required) where the underlying causes underpinning the 
observations were investigated and solutions proposed to correct them. 
The validity of the study was also discussed, the relatively small sample size having a 
bearing on this matter. It was concluded that, despite the small size, the sample is 
sufficiently representative of the few PPP specialists in the local environment and this 
is further enhanced by the breadth of the respondents across both public and private 
entities as well as their experience in the industry and with PPPs. 
Ethical considerations were given an overview and it was established that, despite the 
small scale of the PPP sector in the country, the survey and interviews can be considered 
sufficiently anonymous for respondents to feel comfortable giving their opinions. 
The chapter concluded with a discussion on the scope and exclusions noting that, while 
this project is focussed exclusively on the delivery of infrastructure, taking a more 
holistic approach can be beneficial. Including school operations and facilities 
management will allow the public sector to transfer more risk to the private partner and, 









5: CASE STUDIES – PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY 
5.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Although South Africa engaged with the private sector in various ways before 
Regulation 16 of the PFMA was promulgated in 2001, local PPPs have since been 
procured and implemented in a standardised manner, enabling comparative analysis. 
The National Treasury’s PPP unit has regularly publicised the projects and reviewed 
them on an ad-hoc basis in their periodical PPP Quarterly. In addition, the unit has in 
the past commissioned case study research in order to ensure that projects are 
independently assessed and findings made available to assist in the initiation and 
structuring of future projects (GTAC, 2015c). Considering the scope of this project 
being specific to infrastructure, it makes sense to review projects that have provided 
public infrastructure projects through PPPs – this being a sufficiently small set. For the 
purposes of case study research, the selection of PPPs for this purpose was narrowed 
down based on the following criteria: 
1. The PPP must be an infrastructure or infrastructure-related project; 
2. The PPP must have followed the PFMA Section 16 prescripts; 
3. The PPP must be considerably into the off-take period to be able to evaluate 
the project during the delivery phase; and 







Table 4: Closed infrastructure public-private partnerships found suitable for case study review 
 
No. Project Type Financial Close Value 
1 Chapman’s Peak Drive DFBOT May 2003 R450m 
2 Gautrain Rapid Rail Link DFBOT September 2006 R23bn 
3 Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital Facilities Management* December 2001 R4.5bn 
4 Universitas and Pelonomi Hospitals DFBOT November 2002 R81m 
5 Humansdorp District Hospital Co-location PPP June 2003 R49m 
6 Western Cape Rehabilitation Centre and 
Lentegeur Psychiatric Hospital 
Facilities Management November 2006 R334m 
*note, a DFBOT is listed in the applicable document but this is not, in fact, accurate. 
Source: GTAC (2017; RSA National Treasury, 2017:160) 
 
From the most current list of closed projects (dated September 2017) on the GTAC 
website (GTAC, 2017), the projects in the table above were found to meet the criteria 
to be considered for case study analysis. 
 
5.2 CASE STUDY 1: CHAPMAN’S PEAK DRIVE 
5.2.1 Background 
In January 2000, the 78-year old iconic and scenic mountain pass of Chapman’s Peak 
Drive on the Cape Peninsula was closed indefinitely following two fatalities within 
days of each other caused by rock fall events. Due to the perceived risk of future rockfall 
events being too high, the provincial Minister of Transport issued the closure instruction 
to reliably secure the safety of road users and, after the High Court set a precedent for 
compensation to be paid out in these events, the provincial government made the 
decision to close the road until the rockfall risk could be satisfactorily reduced 
(Chapman’s Peak Drive, n.d.). 
With early estimates for the rehabilitation of the pass being of a magnitude in excess of 
its strategic purpose (the pass is primarily a tourist attraction), the WCG began 
considering a ‘user-pays’ model, i.e. a toll road. In terms of procurement this would 
form the basis for a concession agreement whereby the government contracts with a 




after which it will be transferred back to the province (Rintala, et al., 2008:146). In PPP 
jargon this series of activities is known by the acronym DFBOT. 
Aside from being lauded as an engineering masterpiece at the completion of the 
construction phase in December 2003, the Chapman’s Peak Drive PPP is notable for 
being one of the first public-private partnerships brokered by a provincial government 
in terms of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999. The procurement processes 
were also seminal in the development of the PPP policies subsequently issued by the 
nascent PPP unit within the National Treasury (Dreyer, Breytenbach, Watters, Van 
Oudenhove & Parring, 2005:457; Rintala, et al., 2008:155). 
 
5.2.2 Procurement 
Four months after the drive’s closure (in April 2000), the WCG was approached by 
Capstone, a private-sector consortium of specialist engineering and construction 
companies, with a proposed solution to mitigate the risk of rockfall. Although the 
solution appeared technically sound – making use of a series of specially constructed 
concrete canopy structures and a novel series of catch-fences – the unsolicited nature 
of the proposal could not be considered by the state as it was not supported by an 
applicable regulatory framework. Further, without a competitive process to ensure 
value for money (VFM), a requirement of the prevailing public procurement 
framework, the proposal was disregarded (Rintala, et al., 2008:148). 
In order to investigate the solution using prevailing procurement processes, the 
province began a competitive process, issuing a Request for Proposal (RFP) in August 
2001. The process involved numerous steps: 
1. Prequalification: bidders were prequalified based on meeting minimum 
requirements; 
2. Bidding: bids were evaluated against seven weighted criteria; 
3. Best and Final Offer (BAFO): bidders were given a last chance to refine their 
proposals; 
4. Preferred bidder: first place bidder was announced with runner-up held in 





5. Financial close: signing of the deal and commencement of the works and 
concession agreement. 
(Rintala, et al., 2008:148-154) 
 
Through this process the initial five bidders were reduced to two by the time of the 
VFM test, with the preferred bidder kept in check by the option to award to the first 
runner-up if all conditions were not met. Financial close (award) was finally made in 
May 2003, 21 months later and the deal was signed with a total value of R350m and a 
period of 30 years. 
Due to the lengthy procurement process, bid bonds were a key innovation to ensure that 
bidders remained committed to the process. After construction was completed, the road 
reopened in December 2003 as a toll road on a 30-year concession agreement. 
 
5.2.3 Critical Success Factors 
 
“In terms of the PPP guidelines, the [Chapman’s Peak Drive] proposal had to 
demonstrate ‘affordability’ and ‘value for money’ with ‘appropriate risk 
transfer’.” 
(RSA National Treasury PPP Unit, 2002a:4) 
 
From the above, it is evident that the deciding factor to enter into a concession 
arrangement on Chapman’s Peak Drive was affordability. This coincided with value for 
money and risk transfer which, in this instance, form the obvious next critical success 
factors in ensuring that the project makes best use of both taxpayer’s and road-user’s 







“In 2000 it was clear that, however unpopular, tolling would need to be 
introduced if the 9km of pass were to be re-opened and kept open on a safe and 
sustainable basis.” 
(WCG Ministry of Transport & Public Works, 2012:5) 
 
The initial decision to enter into a concession was based in the fact that the degree of 
capital funding required via traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP) would have 
put considerable pressure on the government’s ability to roll out other infrastructure 
projects. In the absence of a revenue generation facility through levying a usage cost or 
toll, the total cost to the province to maintain and operate the road would have proved 
prohibitive in the long term and created a burden that the taxpayer would have to cover 
in full, diverting resources from other aspects of service delivery in the province. 
 
6.2.3 Value for Money (VFM) 
Rintala, et al. (2008:149) notes that achieving value for money on the Chapman’s Peak 
Drive proposal was based on the format of the competition being a “first-price sealed-
bid auction”. In essence, the tender would be awarded to the bidder that found the least 
cost solution that met the required criteria. Maintaining an acceptable level of 
competition therefore relies on having a sufficient number of bidders participate in the 
process. During the procurement phase the level of competition was compromised 
when only two bidders remained after the bidding stage. The risk of having one of the 
two remaining bidders withdraw was mitigated when the WCG instructed the bidders 
to supply bid bonds and hence remain committed to the process. This meant that the 
risk of being left with one bidder and a compromised competition due to the extended 
procurement phase did not impact negatively on VFM. 
However, Rintala, et al. (2008:152) speculate that the inclusion of bid bonds at Best 




could only be applied to the two remaining competing consortia. Including this 
requirement at an earlier stage could have allowed more of the original bidders to 
remained committed to the process. 
At preferred bidder stage, the final hurdle was to ensure that the winning bid passed the 
National Treasury’s value for money test. Similar to the UK’s standard, the VFM test 
involves comparison between the PPP proposal and a Public Sector Comparator (PSC). 
The PSC is a hypothetical example of what the proposal would cost if procured through 
traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP) and the facility operated by the state. 
 
6.2.4 Risk transfer 
At an early stage in the process the financial responsibility for the initial construction 
was agreed to be conducted on a 50/50 basis: the private consortium responsible for 
half of the R150m initial construction cost and the provincial government the balance 
(Dreyer, et al., 2005:463). The WCG hence contributed approximately R72m via a grant 
payment while the private consortium obtained a similar sum through a combination of 
debt arranged through Rand Merchant Bank and equity placed by the construction 
companies involved. The addition of equity into the financial mix is a positive step in 
transferring risk to the contractors responsible for the construction phase. While a 
construction contract includes penalties for late completion, the addition of equity on 
the part of the contractors means that there is a commercial interest in ensuring that the 
construction meets or betters the completion date, and the sooner the better for the 
recovery of the investment during operation. 
In terms of the optimal off-take agreement for the concession, the forecast risk of 
rockfall events became critical in assessing the degree of risk transfer in the event of 
potential rockfall events. The original deal concluded in 2003 enabled the operator (the 
concessionaire, Entilini) to unilaterally close the pass at its discretion with the province 
required to compensate the operator for the shortfall in revenue, meaning that all risk 
was transferred to the WCG. In 2008 the Western Cape Premier, Lynne Brown, 
announced that the impact of this deal was calculated to have cost the province nearly 
R58m in compensation during the first five years of operation, with the pass being 




of local residents (Underhill, 2012). A task team was convened to investigate the deal 
and find a solution, the conclusion of which allowed for a restructured deal in 2011. 
The new deal allowed both partners to jointly agree on future closures and the financial 
compensation was revisited. 
One aspect of the project which had onerous effects on the operational phase was the 
considerable delay of the decision regarding placement of the toll plaza. The onus was 
on the provincial government to conclude this process. In the interim, a temporary 
facility consisting of containers and fibreglass booths was used to house the 
management offices and tolling operations pending the decision on the location and 
design of permanent accommodation. Following a Heritage Impact Assessment (HIA) 
in 2003, full Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 2005, two records of decision 
(RODs) in support of the toll plaza (in 2005 and 2008 respectively) and amongst 
considerable public outcry during construction, the toll plaza was eventually completed 
in 2013, nearly ten years after the pass was re-opened under the PPP agreement. 
 
6.2.5 Innovation 
The technical solution proposed by the private partner and its refinement during the 
bidding process was arguably the key ingredient in the success of the winning bid. The 
need to reduce the risk of a rockfall incident while minimising the visual impact on the 
drive’s scenic splendour was optimised through a combination of unique (to the South 
African context) catch-fences and specially constructed concrete canopy structures 
were the catch-fences proved to be inadequate. The competitive procurement process 
further incentivised the private sector to value-engineer the proposal, making use of 
advanced computer modelling to optimise the engineering solutions to be deemed 
sufficient to reduce the risk satisfactorily (Dreyer, et al., 2005:459). Allied with the 
novel engineering solutions were notable procurement innovations which had a 
secondary impact on VFM, notably the use of bid bonds and a combination of three 
different sources of investment to finance the project upfront. 
Aware that if a bidder pulled out during the procurement process (a significant risk due 
to the lengthy and onerous process) and the detrimental effect this would have on 




the two remaining competing consortia to obtain bid bonds to ensure their commitment 
to the conclusion of the process. 
 
6.2.6 Flexibility 
The ability to renegotiate the contract during the off-take period was critical in ensuring 
equal risk transfer between both parties (WCG and Entilini). The original agreement 
whereby one party could unilaterally close the pass was shifted to one where the two 
parties would jointly agree on closure. The ability to renegotiate the contract to ensure 
fairness during the remainder of the contract period was critical to its ongoing success. 
 
5.2.4 Lessons Learnt 
5.2.4.1 Lack of transparency 
During the bid process there were complaints that bidders were being treated unfairly 
or given additional information. This situation was created due to the complications of 
evaluating two quite different solutions to solve the problem of lowering the rockfall 
risk. Against international best practice, the province entered into negotiations with the 
two remaining bidders to find a solution (Rintala, et al., 2008:152). The bidders were 
permitted to refine or change their proposals to suit what they perceived to be the 
province’s emerging preferences, more specifically the need to maintain unobstructed 
views to the ocean as much as possible. Although critical to ensuring that the scenic 
nature of the drive would not be adversely affected, this was not a critical requirement 
at the outset. The above could have been called into question later, affecting the entire 





5.2.4.2 Lack of public-private partnership unit oversight during the 
operational phase 
According to Dreyer, Breytenbach, Watters, Van Oudenhove and Parring (2005:467), 
the abovementioned restructured deal could have been mitigated earlier if the National 
Treasury’s PPP unit had assisted in extending their oversight role into the concession 
agreement and provided a monitoring and evaluation role during the off-take period. 
 
5.2.5 Summary 
Chapman’s Peak Drive emerged out of a need to solve a complex engineering 
challenge. In addition to its technical success it also managed to achieve significant 
secondary benefits, namely: 
• Implementing the PPP requirements in terms of Schedule 16 of the PFMA 
during a protracted and complex procurement process; 
• Successful contract renegotiation during the off-take period; 
• Significant BEE investment and local community involvement; and 
• A sustainable user-pays model. 
 
The project demonstrated the application of the following critical success factors: 
affordability, value for money, risk transfer, innovation (technical and during 
procurement) and flexibility during the operational period. Lessons learnt include 
ensuring transparency and consistency during procurement and critical specialist 
oversight by PPP experts during the operational period. 
 
5.3 CASE STUDY 2: GAUTRAIN RAPID RAIL LINK 
5.3.1 Background 
In the mid-2000s, congestion on Gauteng’s freeways was reported as being the worst 
in the southern hemisphere and forecasts anticipated further deterioration at a rate of 




(Engineering News, 2008). In 2011, congestion on the section of the N1 between 
Pretoria and Johannesburg was estimated to cost over R300 million per annum 
(Thomas, 2013:80). Considering Gauteng’s status as “the economic heartland of South 
Africa, generat[ing] 38% of the total value of South Africa’s economic activities” 
(Engineering News, 2008), it was considered feasible to construct a high-quality public 
transport system for middle-class commuters who could afford private motor transport 
but refused to use the existing public rail system due to concerns around reliability, 
regularity, speed and safety. 
 
 




The provincial government considered a two-pronged approach to solving the 
congestion problem. The primary scheme was the implementation of a series of 
upgrades to the major transport arterials between Pretoria and Johannesburg, namely 
the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP), resulting in toll roads (the much-
publicised e-tolls) for users. The secondary scheme was the addition of a high-quality 
rail-based solution to provide a modal option for commuters intended to relieve road 




The Gautrain was intended to provide an effective (reliable and punctual), economic 
(versus owning and/or operating a private motor vehicle) and efficient (reliable and 
time-saving) alternative to commuting between these two major economic hubs by 
private transport. Funding was to come from three sources: direct funds from the 
provincial government (particularly in terms of the capital expenditure to construct the 
infrastructure and acquire the rolling stock), private lending and equity in the project 
by the private partners involved, and, finally, through the revenue generated by fee-
paying customers. 
While the primary objective was to provide a solution to road traffic congestion, 
secondary objectives included making significant inroads into socio-economic 
development (SED) in terms of BBBEE development, local procurement and 
subcontracting, job creation and skills development, as well as a contribution to urban 
renewal and regeneration through the strategic location of stations as development 
nodes and environmental sustainability through reduced carbon emissions (GMA, 
2015b:8-11; Ramabulana, n.d.). 
 
 




In a paper presented at the dawn of the project, Venter, Burnett and Malukele (2001:1) 
note the incredibly complex nature of the planning, involving 36 technical elements, 
with each requiring a specialist to lead the team responsible for that element. In 
addition, the project had to be significantly fast-tracked to meet the tight timeline, with 




away. This was at odds with international best practice which indicated that projects of 
this type, scale and complexity require on average approximately 14 years from 
initiation to completion. 
Venter, et al. (2001:3-4) go into considerable detail regarding the feasibility assessment 
and the responsibilities of the public and private sectors in addressing these elements. 
Although the finer detail is beyond the scope of this report, of relevance are the critical 
success factors tabled in the figure below and the allocation of who is to manage this 
element. The CSFs of relevance include financial viability (affordability), political will, 
economic feasibility (cost-benefit or value for money), technical feasibility and 
commercial risks (each of which arguably relate to risk transfer). 
 
Table 5: Gautrain feasibility elemental assessment 
 
 
Source: Venter, et al. (2001:4) 
 
At an early stage it is of interest to note the shared proposed responsibility of some of 
these elements. For instance, it might be assumed that political will would be 
exclusively a public sector responsibility. The assertion by Venter, et al. (2001) that this 
element presents a dual responsibility is based on the realisation that the project relied 
not only on advocacy by top public figures and senior officials but also on community 
acceptance (ground-level support). This alludes to the responsibility of the private 
partner to effectively engage with and present the project to interested and affected 
parties in a manner that it finds acceptance at grassroots level. During the process this 
was called into question with the public realisation that the project targeted only those 
who could afford to use it and would not directly address the needs of the indigent. 




mobility divide between rich and poor (Donaldson, 2006, cited in Thomas, 2013:78). 
When this came to light political will was firmly tested. 
 
5.3.2 Procurement 
The Gautrain project was structured as a DFBOT (Design-Finance-Build-Operate-
Transfer) type of PPP (RSA National Treasury PPP Unit, 2010:7). The project was 
initiated in April 2000 with the Gauteng Department of Transport issuing a Request for 
Prequalification (RFQ) in February 2002, and two bidders identified as prequalified in 
May of the same year (Dachs, 2016:14). Following a lengthy three-stage Request for 
Proposal (RFP) process, Best and Final Offer (BAFO) submissions were made in March 
2005 (Dachs, 2016:15). After evaluation, the 19.5-year concession agreement was 
signed with the winning consortium, Bombela (comprising Murray & Roberts Ltd., 
Bouygues Travaux Publics SA, Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd., SPG Concessions 
Ltd., Absa Capital and J&J Group), in September 2006 at which stage construction 
could commence (Thomas, 2013:79). Financial close was achieved in January 2007 
(Dachs, 2016:16). 
The capital cost of the Gautrain was substantially financed by public funding, with the 
national and provincial departments of transport contributing a combined R21.9 billion 







Table 6: Funding sources for the Gautrain project 
 
Paying for versus financing of infrastructure spending: four case studies 
  
Who pays 
Tax payer User Donor 
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Note: Funding sources for the Gautrain project are highlighted in yellow 
 





In the literature review, reference was made to special purpose vehicles (SPV) used in 
order to create the structure and tailor the contract to the specific need. This is one of 
the major differences from standard infrastructure procurement where the client simply 
sets the specifications and contracts with the private sector to implement the works. 
Although fairly standard by PPP practitioners, to the uninitiated the SPV created for the 
Gautrain is a fairly daunting matrix of public and private actors, each with a specific 
role to play and critical interdependencies. Achieving a structure that balances the needs 
and desires of the various actors is no small task and relies on critical input from 
specialist PPP practitioners. Putting the structure together is the role of the Transaction 
Advisory (TA) team with the National Treasury’s PPP unit playing an oversight role to 
ensure that due process is followed in the best interests of the public funds required for 
and affected by the project in the future. 
Prior to the final contract being signed in 2006 the provincial Construction Assurance 
Management (CAM) team was constituted to oversee the construction phase of the 
project (GMA, 2017:3-4). The CAM team was required to manage the construction 
team, the Bombela Civil Joint Venture (BCJV), in order to ensure it met its 
implementation targets. At first finding suitably qualified and experienced staff was 
problematic due to the simultaneous construction of similar megaprojects in the lead up 
to the 2010 FIFA World Cup but this was mitigated by expanding the search to 
international specialists. 
The Gautrain contract structure involved the provincial and national government 
(providing 88% of the capital contribution); the PPP consortium (Bombela); and the 
Gautrain Management Agency (GMA), an independent agency instituted to oversee 













5.3.3 Critical Success Factors 
While the Gautrain has been lauded as a transport masterpiece, it would not have come 
to fruition and provided the level of service expected without the presence of the 
following critical success factors: political leadership and will, continuous and strong 
project leadership and technical team, treasury involvement in funding and, during the 
operational phase, performance management (Dachs, 2016:4; GMA, 2015a:8-10). 
 
5.3.3.1 Affordability 
At initiation in 2000 the original cost estimate for the Gautrain was in the order of R3.5-
4 billion (Fombad, 2013:15). By February 2002 this had escalated to R7 billion, which 
was still within reach of the Gauteng provincial government (Thomas, 2013:86). 
However, in a presentation to the parliamentary Transport Portfolio Committee in 
November 2005, the project leader noted that the process had encountered additional 
issues, meaning that costs had ballooned to R20 billion (van der Merwe, 2005:46-47). 
These costs related to route realignment to mitigate environmental impact, greater 
demand than originally expected meaning an expanded offering, land costs, a reviewed 
risk analysis, VAT on construction elements not included in the original estimate, 
contingent liabilities, additional tunnel lining to mitigate potential geotechnical effects, 
relocated bulk services and additional insurance costs. The R20 billion price tag was of 
concern when compared to the entire 2004/2005 transport budget of R4.67 billion 
(PMG, 2005). Although not obliged to complete the Gautrain before the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup, the project was listed as one of the beneficiaries of the R33 billion released 
by the national government to make targeted infrastructural upgrades in preparation for 
the event (Gordhan, 2010:3). Under pressure to see the project to fruition by 2010, the 
National Treasury stepped in to assist, committing nearly three quarters of the 25.1 
billion required at the beginning of the construction phase in September 2006. As 
indicated by the figure below, the remainder of the funds came from provincial 










Having secured the capital required for the project, it became apparent that the project 
required some form of guarantee from the provincial government to ensure that the 
private partner could sustain it. The provincial government made available a ‘patronage 
guarantee’, an annual injection of public funding to subsidise the project during 
operations – a figure of R259 million allocated by the Gauteng Department of Roads 
and Transport’s 2011/12 budget (Thomas, 2013:87). While it is not unusual for the 
public partner to accept the financial burden in the event of lower than expected 
patronage, the greater concern is that with this as a line item in every consecutive 
financial year during the 19.5 years of the concession agreement, implementation of 
future projects could be displaced. 
 
5.3.3.2 Political leadership and will 
 
“A good example is the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link, which has so far survived three 
elections and five cabinets.” 
(Fombad, 2013:10) 
 
The Gautrain was considered a pet project by the provincial Premier, Mbhazima 




Express’ (Engineering News, 2001; Thomas, 2013:90). With a strong trade-union 
background, his interest in seeing the project become a beacon of success for Broad-
Based Black Empowerment (BBBEE) and job creation led him to continuously promote 
the project and ensure it met its secondary objectives of socio-economic development 
(SED) (Shilowa, 2006). An ANC politician, Shilowa was also able to continuously 
promote the project as his party remained the dominant political force in the province 
for the full duration of the initiation and financial close of the project. His leaving the 
party in 2008 did not affect the project, which achieved financial close the year before. 
This aspect of political will also had a negative side-effect as the project was criticised 
as a legacy project for the Premier. Barrett (2011, cited in Thomas, 2013:90) notes that 
“Shilowa … wanted a legacy project with his name on it”, with the effect being a project 
that proceeded despite significant queries raised regarding it being the de facto best or 
most cost-effective transportation option providing greatest benefit to the wider public. 
 
5.3.3.3 National Treasury involvement in funding 
With the project forming part of the infrastructural upgrades identified for the 2010 
FIFA World Cup, the national government became a key stakeholder in the project 
when it released nearly 75% of the required R21.9 billion in government funding into 
the capital cost of the project. While making the project affordable, this had two 
additional results: (1) the cost of borrowing could remain low (the cost of servicing any 
additional private sector debt could have adversely affected value for money); and (2) 
the project received parliamentary oversight. The latter point means that parliament’s 
Transport Portfolio Committee could retain oversight and enforce accountability at a 
national level at any point during and after the project, a critical aspect of ensuring that 
state funds were spent in the best interests of the public. 
What is important to note is that national government was included very late in the 
process (October 2005) meaning that cabinet’s participation in an oversight capacity 
during the procurement process was incredibly limited. By the time the project was 
reviewed by the Transport Portfolio Committee in November 2005, the preferred bidder 




financial close so that the first phase could be completed in time for 2010, it is unlikely 
that the national stakeholders had much option but to accede to approving the project. 
 
5.3.3.4 Continuity of technical and contract management team into the 
operational period 
Early in the planning phase a Province Support Team (PST) of specialists was 
appointed to develop the various technical aspects of the contract. This encompassed 
all facets of contract management, technical engineering expertise, selection and 
procurement, amongst others. At one stage this team comprised over a hundred 
specialists from various disciplines and backgrounds (GMA, 2015a:6). The PST was 
crucial in setting up the long-term management team – the Gautrain Management 
Agency (GMA) – who would manage the contract during the operational phase (the 20 
year off-take period). Key to the success of this process was continuity, with ten key 
members of the PST becoming part of the GMA. 
 
5.3.3.5 Performance management 
The GMA set clear quantitative performance specifications for the operator to meet 
with the intention of using continuous monitoring to measure the quality of the overall 
service. The Gautrain’s Performance Management System (PMS) measured average 
availability of trains at 99.5% and punctuality at 98.6% for the 2016/17 financial year 
(Global Infrastructure Hub, n.d.:3). The PMS is one of the key innovations linked to 
the operation of a successful service. Key parameters were identified and a performance 
standard agreed between the GMA and the operator, Bombela. This data-based 
approach to monitoring meant that areas of improvement could be quickly recognised 
and addressed as well as penalties implemented for non-performance (not meeting the 
agreed standards), which could be objectively applied. The parameters used for 
assessment were: 
• Train availability; 
• Punctuality and capacity and overcrowding management; 




• Cleanliness (number of times stations and trains cleaned); 
• Perception (number of customer complaints); and 
• Train set conditions (number of train set condition assessments passed). 
(GMA, 2015a:8-10) 
 
5.3.4 Lessons Learnt 
5.3.4.1 Lack of public consultation and transparency 
Reports state that the there was a general lack of public consultation in the lead up to 
and during procurement of the project, with calls being made to make this information 
public (Campbell, 2011; Fombad, 2013:4; Thomas, 2013:87). Although there is 
summary evidence of the overall process available in terms of the achievement of 
milestone dates, there is insufficient detail to effectively evaluate the procurement 
process. When compared against the information available on Chapman’s Peak Drive, 
where significant information was disseminated and analysed to the point where much 
of the analysis became formative in the policies and processes drafted by the National 
Treasury’s PPP unit, the Gautrain project stands in stark contrast. 
 
5.3.4.2 Pressurised political decision-making 
 
“On 25th October 2005, the Minister of Finance … announced in parliament that 
the [provincial] Gautrain project [now] had a ‘national’ status, and that it would 
be costing the national fiscus an estimated R20 billion. It has also been indicated 
that a final cabinet decision will be made in mid-December. If cabinet agrees, the 
roll-out of the project will commence in January 2006. We now have only two 
weeks of the final parliamentary session of the year remaining. This means that 
Parliament will have a few hours in which to assess what will be … the largest 






In November 2005, parliament’s Transport Portfolio Committee (TPC, 2005) raised the 
following concerns about the project: 
• “Are we sure that the Gautrain will indeed impact effectively and positively on 
congestion? 
• Are there not cheaper alternative public transport answers to the Ben 
Schoeman congestion challenge – bus rapid transit systems are increasingly 
being used in Third and First World cities, costing 10 to 20 times less? 
• If we are so optimistic about the Gautrain relieving congestion, why is there 
now also a go-ahead on the PWV 9 road? And what is happening to the 
planned Ben Schoeman toll-way, which might be a more effective transport 
management solution? 
• Is congestion best solved through construction and transport answers? What 
about a much more integrated spatial planning approach? Underpinning all of 
the concerns noted above is the following cluster of central questions: 
o Can the Transport Portfolio recommend to Cabinet that we proceed 
with a R20-billion plus project that might attract some affluent car-
users (reckoned at an optimistic 120 000) off one of the congested axes 
in Gauteng, while some 6-7 million existing regular public transport 
users experience public transport that we all admit is inadequate, often 
unreliable, unsafe and under-funded? 
o Can we recommend a project whose technical specifications and ticket 
prices are likely to widen the gap between the so-called ‘first’ and 
‘second’ economies? 
o Can we recommend a project that seems not to be integrated into the 
comprehensive Integrated Transport Plans of the affected metros, and 
which may well drain scarce resources away from other more 
integrated initiatives and, indeed, actively undermine spatial planning 





With just five years to go to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and despite the best efforts of 
the TPC at the time, many of the above questions were likely never fully addressed. 
This is mostly due to the combination of political insistence that the project be added 
to the list of priority infrastructure upgrades identified for the event and lack of time 
available to rigorously assess potentially more cost-effective and inclusive alternatives. 
 
5.3.4.3 Significant budget escalation 
Initial estimates for the Gautrain in 2000 placed the project in the order of R3.5 billion, 
ballooning to R4 billion within six months (Fombad, 2013:15). Despite the fixed price 
nature of the turnkey project at award in September 2006 of R25.1 billion, by 2011 
variations brought the total cost to R30.462 billion (Serrao & van Schie, 2011; Dachs, 
2016:19; Fombad, 2013:17). These irregularities concerning, with many variations later 
claimed to be due to ineffective contract management during construction. 
 
5.3.4.4 Ineffective contract management 
Disputes around the resolution of latent defects and discovery items incurred significant 
delays and, as highlighted in the preceding section, considerable additional costs 
(Serrao & van Schie, 2011; Fombad, 2013:17). Although this is nothing new to 
construction projects, reports on the Gautrain cite a lack of experience on the part of 
the contract managers or poorly constructed contractual arrangements for dispute 
resolution as an aggravating factor, delaying resolution and contributing to later-than-
expected completion dates. A 2011 presentation by the GMA highlights the above as 
one of the challenges and states that a “clear dispute resolution process” is essential for 





5.3.4.5 Ineffective risk allocation 
 
“A line item in the Gauteng transport budget for the coming year has revealed 




Thomas (2013:87) refers to a ‘patronage guarantee’ in the event that the project is 
unable to recoup sufficient fees from users, creating a situation where the project may 
become financially unsustainable. In order to address this matter, the provincial 
government agreed to pay a fee in the event that this occurs, lessening the risk to the 
private partner. Although this is not an unusual aspect of many PPPs, in the Gautrain 
this became an annual and unconditional injection leading to reduced incentive for the 
PPP consortium to ensure value. This places pressure on the management consortium 
to ensure that the project achieves its performance targets through financial penalties in 
the event of under-delivery, not through economic optimisation. 
Considering the hefty capital injection by the national and provincial government, as 
well as the ‘patronage guarantee’ promised in the event of poor passenger take-up, one 
may surmise that the public partner took on a considerable degree of the risk both during 
construction and into the operational phase (Flanagan, 2011; Fombad, 2013:19). This 
means that not only did government bear most of the delivery risk of the project, it 
accepted the demand risk (in the event of revenue being below projections due to poor 
passenger numbers) during the operational phase. Under these conditions the incentive 







Tainting the lack of transparency in the process, one of the partners involved in the PPP 
consortium was linked to a Tunisian arms and infrastructure ‘fixer’ who allegedly paid 
a bribe to a South African businessman to lobby for them to be awarded the contract. 
The SA businessman later admitted to the allegations (Fombad, 2013:16). 
 
5.3.5 Summary 
The Gautrain is regularly lauded as a technical masterpiece of international standard. In 
addition to this aspect, the project has been linked to significant private sector 
investment in the zones close to the rail link and stations, as well as job creation with 
figures of R11 billion in development spending and nearly 150 000 new jobs being 
touted during 2013 alone (Dachs, 2016:35). 
Critical success factors apparent in the project include affordability, political will and 
leadership, the National Treasury involvement in funding the project (linked to 
affordability), continuity between the implementation and contract management team 
and extensive monitoring to ensure that the project achieves its performance standards. 
Lessons learnt include lack of transparency and public consultation, pressurised 
political decision-making, spiralling costs, ineffective contract management (lack of 
experience in resolving fairly technical issues), concerns regarding risk allocation and, 
finally, corruption. The obvious omission in the list above is value for money, one of 
the three mandatory factors for a PPP project in SA. This is not an oversight. In 
reviewing the literature available, any evidence or secondary discussion around the 
required VFM test for this project may be found. The closest one can get to obtaining a 
VFM assessment around the project is a 2016 discussion by William Dachs and Nicky 
Prins (Richards, Prins & Dachs, 2016). The discussion goes into significant detail 
around the value of infrastructure in terms of the greater environment, such as socio-
economic development, and conducting cost-benefit analysis taking these external 
factors into consideration. What can be construed from this is that the Gautrain project 
was seen as a catalyst to not only partially solve a congestion issue, but also to deal with 
development in the greater Gauteng region. What is inferred is that it was taken into 




As this has yet to be confirmed, this aspect cannot be conclusively included as a 
determining factor. 
 
5.4 CASE STUDY 3: INKOSI ALBERT LUTHULI CENTRAL 
HOSPITAL 
5.4.1 Background 
With the aim of delivering high-quality healthcare to the public, the 846-bed Inkosi 
Albert Luthuli Central Hospital (IALCH) was intended to be a flagship hospital for the 
province of KwaZulu-Natal (Wits Business School, 2007c:2-3). To achieve this 
objective the provincial government opted to enter into a PPP to leverage the efficiency 
of the private sector in the delivery of a premium service for this public healthcare 
facility. The PPP was initiated during the construction phase (1996-2000) with the 
intention of having a private sector partner operating the facility on opening. In an 
interview given in 2012, the Chief Executive Officer for the IALCH described the 
rationale for entering into the PPP as being that the “professionals in the Department of 
Health will concentrate on the core business which is to take care of patients and the 
private partner will do the non-core functions … [t]he other reason is because of lack 
of expertise within the public service” (Rametsi, 2012:83). 
 
5.4.2 Procurement 
The services that were required to be provided by the private partner in the PPP included 
the supply of equipment, information management and technology, as well as facilities 
management (Wits Business School, 2007c:3). The private partner was essentially 
handed the building as a shell on completion of construction and instructed to fit it out 
and maintain it to the highest standards (Wits Business School, 2007c:4). 
After going through the various phases of Treasury Approval (I, II and III), the value 
for money (VFM) assessment found a VFM amount of R369.8 million, the PPP being 





Table 7: Value for money assessment of Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital 
 
 
Source: Wits Business School (2007c:8) 
 
Impilo Consortium, with shareholders including Siemens, AME, Drake & Skull along 
with various BEE shareholders, was awarded the PPP contract in March 2002 with a 
period of fifteen years and the IALCH was commissioned on 28 June 2002 (Aiello, 
2014:9; Rametsi, 2012:83). The off-take agreement was financed by unitary payment 
from the KZNDoH at R304.9 million per annum, inflation-adjusted at CPI. 
 
5.4.3 Critical Success Factors 
5.4.3.1 Political support 
At an early stage the Chief Financial Officer of KZNDoH was appointed as project 
officer (Wits Business School, 2007c:2; Haarhof, 2008:78). Having a suitably senior 
official in the client department promoting and overseeing the project allowed decisions 
to be made quickly and efficiently – a vital element for effectively administering a 
project of this scale and prominence. One of the other considerations on this point is 
the delegations framework which is familiar to most public officials whereby decisions 
are delegated to various officials by the accounting officer or AO, who is usually the 
director general (DG) or head of department (HoD). This delegations framework is 
critical to enable certain officials to use appropriate discretionary power to make 
decisions, and these decisions are typically based on their financial implications. It is 
therefore critical that the decision-making authority of a project officer is matched to 




made. It is therefore inappropriate to assign a junior official to a large-scale project 
where every decision will require the assent of a superior. 
 
5.4.3.2 Risk transfer 
The principle of risk transfer is that the private partner was to supply non-core services, 
freeing up the public partner to supply the core functions of the hospital. This was 
achieved by conducting a comprehensive analysis (a risk matrix) of the equipment, 
facilities management and human resource requirements. The equipment and facilities 
management aspects were transferred to the private partner while the human resource 
requirements (staff) remained the domain of the public sector partner. The latter risk 
became an issue when a considerable skills shortage was noted in the region, the 
analysis drawing particular attention to an estimated shortage of 200 theatre nurses 
(Wits Business School, 2007c:4). To mitigate this, urgent efforts were required to train 
nurses to ensure an adequate supply on opening. 
With all equipment being supplied and maintained by the private partner this meant that 
diagnostic tools were ‘state-of-the-art’ and regularly serviced or routinely replaced in 
order to be kept in an operational state. Monitoring the state of equipment became 
critical for ensuring that the private partner achieved expected levels of performance. 
For this reason, the private partner was required to provide a helpdesk to log and track 
errors, failing which financial penalties would be levied. Transferring this risk to the 
private partner meant that the public sector could focus its attention on delivering core 
healthcare services with the best possible support. 
 
5.4.3.3 Innovation 
The IALCH embraced innovation in its intention of providing high-quality healthcare. 
The facility makes use of a fully-computerised information management and 
technology system (IM&T), allowing administration to function in a paperless 
environment (USAID, 2008:12). The use of technology as a lever for efficiency and 
effectiveness means it can do more with less, a key principle considering the lack of 




with the latest diagnostic equipment, which is maintained and replaced (when obsolete) 
by the private partner. 
 
5.4.3.4 Performance specifications and monitoring 
In order to meet the agreed service levels, a full output specification was conducted to 
ensure that equipment met certain functional standards by being current and serviced. 
Replacement regimes for equipment were set at five-year intervals for medical 
equipment and three years for IM&T systems (USAID, 2008:13). This ensures that 
equipment is not only kept within operational lifespans, but that new, more advanced 
equipment can be acquired for use. 
Performance monitoring is used to assess the overall level of service of the facility, not 
just that of the private partner. The following items are tracked for quality (Rametsi, 
2012:87): 
• Patient care 
• Waiting times 






When asked whether PPPs represent a comprehensive answer to the provision of 
healthcare, the IALCH’s CEO answered positively in the case where the public sector 
has “done [their] homework”, has a “clear vision” for the project, if the scale of the 
project is sufficiently large and if there is “complete commitment to the [PPP] process” 
(Rametsi, 2012:84). However, he cautions that a PPP for healthcare should not be 
undertaken if the public sector sees this as “the easy way out”, if “outsourced functions 
are no longer [considered the public sector’s] responsibility” and if the public sector 




and contract management skills are required and that “courage, vision and leadership 
from top management is a prerequisite”. 
The IALCH presents the following critical success factors: political will, risk transfer, 
innovation as well as performance specification and monitoring. 
 
5.5 CASE STUDY 4: UNIVERSITAS TERTIARY AND PELONOMI 
REGIONAL HOSPITALS 
5.5.1 Background 
The Universitas and Pelonomi co-location PPP between the Free State Department of 
Health (FSDoH) and private healthcare provider Netcare came about primarily due to 
two factors: underutilised public healthcare facilities and restrictions on license 
applications for new private hospitals. The former factor was identified following a 
national audit of healthcare facilities in 1997. During this audit the FSDoH found that 
they had considerable underutilised public healthcare infrastructure, with unused 
facilities or wards and in various hospitals and clinics requiring an estimated R825 
million to address (Shuping & Kabane, 2007:153). The latter issue relates to a 
restriction on the number of beds that private healthcare providers are permitted to 
provide in terms of the prevailing norms and standards. This left private healthcare 
providers unable to expand their services and the FSDoH constrained in issuing 
additional licenses for new private facilities (Banzon, et al., 2014:53; Shuping & 
Kabane, 2007:154). This situation sowed the seeds for a PPP whereby the private sector, 
looking to expand their services with the intention of achieving revenue generation 
(profit), could make use of underutilised public facilities optimising the provision of 
health services in the province (Haarhof, 2008:85-86). 
Reviewing their infrastructure as part of a realignment process in 1998, the FSDoH took 
a view of combining the private sector’s interest in expanding their offering in the 
province with addressing public facilities requiring attention. Universitas Tertiary 
Hospital and Pelonomi Regional Hospital were identified: the former a top teaching 
facility with underutilised wards and theatres, the latter an underutilised facility in a 




2008:85; Shuping & Kabane, 2007:153). The essence of the PPP was that the private 
partner would be permitted to run part of each hospital as a private facility adjacent to 
the public facilities on the proviso that they bring, and keep, them to an expected 
standard during the period of the agreement. The private partner would ultimately 
transfer them back to the public partner at the end of the contract period. The private 
partner would be required to finance most of the capital spend and allowed to extract 
profit from the portion of the facilities they run as a private hospital. This is essentially 
a Design-Finance-Build-Operate-Transfer (DFBOT) PPP with the private partner being 
able to recoup their investment through a concession during the operational phase. The 
reason this is known as a co-location PPP is because the private and public sector intend 
to share the health facilities with the aim of achieving their own objectives in a manner 
that is mutually beneficial to end users, staff and patients, the critical focus being on 
collaboration and not competition (Shuping & Kabane, 2007:152). Banzon, et al. 
(2014:54) add that a co-location PPP allows both partners to inject capital into facilities 
that will benefit both public and private end users with the potential revenue generation 
benefitting both partners. 
The PPP was also seen as an avenue to achieve the following secondary objectives: 
• Extend affordable services despite limited government budgets (addressing the 
issue of affordability); 
• Remove or limit the duplication of services (excess capacity), addressing the 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the present healthcare system; 
• Address the pre-1994 ‘racial fragmentation’ of the healthcare sector and 
distribute public services more fairly; 
• Transfer skills from the private to public sector; 
• Improve the provision of quality healthcare services to the Free State public; 
• Generate employment; and 
• Improve the physical image of public facilities through facilities upgrades and 
better management/maintenance. 






The project was initiated in November 2000 with the appointment of a transaction 
advisor, Ignis, and proceeded through various stages of treasury approval to financial 
close in November 2002 (Haarhof, 2008:89;97). The initial period was 16.5 years 
(including a 1.5 year construction phase), later extended to 21.5 years (Aiello, 2014:10). 
In terms of capital expenditure, the private sector contributed R70.9 million while the 
FSDoH supplied R11.03 million (Shuping & Kabane, 2007:155). The concession 
period involved the FSDoH charging the private partner a monthly rental of R40 000 
fixed for the first five years, escalating to R60 000 until the end of the concession. In 
addition to this fixed fee, the FSDoH levied a turnover fee. This fee meant that 1.32% 
of the private partner’s total annual turnover for the project was to be paid to the public 
partner. From 2004 to 2007 the turnover fee amounted to a little more than five times 
the fixed rental amount, and total revenue paid over to the FSDoH amounted to R3.196 
million per annum for the period (Shuping & Kabane, 2007:156). 
 







Source: Shuping and Kabane (2007:155) 
 
5.5.3 Critical Success Factors 
5.5.3.1 Affordability 
As mentioned above, addressing the backlog maintenance required at Pelonomi alone 
would have required R100 million. To spend this magnitude on a single facility was 
unaffordable for the FSDoH if the provincial government conducted the required 
upgrades with their own funding, i.e. through traditional infrastructure procurement 
(TIP). Going the PPP route meant that the FSDoH only had to spend a relatively minor 
capital amount (R11 million) and allow the concessionaire to do the rest. This seemed 
feasible as long as the private partner was allowed to realise sufficient revenue 
generating potential for a long enough period to recoup the initial investment. 
 
5.5.3.2 Political will and leadership 
At inception stage, Dr. Victor Litlhakanyane, Chief Director of the FSDoH at the time, 
was appointed to be the public sector project officer for this PPP (Haarhoff, 2008:89). 
Similar to the Gautrain and the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital projects, having 
a senior official appointed to drive the project is critical to success in terms of being 
able to promote and make decisions at the appropriate level. Critically, his tenure as 
project officer was continuous during the various phases of approval and extended two 
years beyond financial close to November 2004. 
 
5.5.3.3 Risk transfer 
Significant risk was transferred to the private sector. Firstly, a major aspect of the risk 
transfer involved the acceptance of the existing facilities by the private partner as 
voetstoots, i.e. as is – meaning that the private partner would take on any latent defects 
not disclosed or discovered during the feasibility study process (Wits Business School, 
2007b:6-7). This was complicated by the fact that the Pelonomi facility was in a 
particularly poor state due to maintenance backlogs and badly in need of attention 




‘discovery’ items, with the burden being shifted wholly to the private partner. It is worth 
noting that this is as per prevailing best practice, confirmed later by the RSA Treasury’s 
PPP manual published in 2004, two years after financial close. 
The risk of underutilisation of the state’s diagnostic facilities was mitigated by making 
it obligatory for the private partner to make use of the FSDoH’s radiology services. 
This ensured guaranteed minimum revenue to the public sector for the use of this 
facility (Wits Business School, 2007b:7). The stipulation solved two problems: it 
ensured significant guaranteed revenue to the public sector of approximately R10 
million per year, and it avoided potential competition in the event that the private 
partner built or made use of another diagnostic facility. 
Haarhof (2008:119) notes that risk transfer was adversely affected by the public sector’s 
ability to coerce the private partner into accepting an unfair distribution of risk. The 
grounds for this were based on the desire for the private sector to expand their offering 
in the face of a limited number of beds in the region. Willing to make concessions to 
achieve financial close by accepting additional risks such as guaranteed use of the 
public partner’s radiology services and simply accepting the poor condition of the 
Pelonomi Hospital, the private partner was under pressure to recoup potential losses 
during the off-take period. Haarhof identified that at the time the private partner was 
“battling to make money”, concluding with the assertion that “it is important for the 
public sector to realise that risk transfer should not be to the extent that it prejudices the 
sustainability of the private partner … [a] threat to the sustainability of the private 
partner is a threat to the sustainability of the PPP” (Haarhof, 2008:119). 
Haarhof’s assertion that risk transfer was too heavily shifted to the private partner 
turned into a point of contention just six years later. Aiello (2014:11) notes that the PPP 
agreement was in renegotiation phase at that time, the sticking points being the 
radiology fees (the major cost to the private partner) and a backlog in services. 
 
5.5.3.4 Goal alignment 
Co-location PPPs rely on sharing resources in order to achieve a universal outcome – 
in this case the provision of quality healthcare. Not only does this goal rely on shared 




professionals to interact with private sector specialists in a co-location PPP allows for 
shared learning outcomes, which are one of the stated secondary objectives of the 
project and critical to advancing quality healthcare in the region. This is further 
underscored by the fact that the hospitals form part of the academic teaching wing of 
the Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of the Free State. The need to attract 
and retain skilled medical professionals was therefore a critical factor in being able to 
staff the facilities, train new doctors and nurses and ensure the provision of a high-
quality service to the public. 
 
5.5.4 Lessons Learnt 
5.5.4.1 Changing expectations 
In an opinion piece several years after beginning operation, senior administrators for 
the two hospitals decried the lack of specialists being attracted or retained by the facility 
citing demoralising working conditions and lack of career opportunities (Mollentze & 
van Zyl, 2009:546). According to the authors, a critical error was made when the staff 
establishments between the two facilities were split, creating a separation between 
public and private healthcare professionals. Under these conditions public specialists 
were not exposed to the methods and practices of their private sector counterparts, 
meaning that their ability to improve their services through skills transfer was put at a 
considerable disadvantage. Ultimately, this scenario began a vicious cycle whereby 
standards spiralled downwards to a point where, at the time of the article, accreditation 
as a teaching facility had been outstanding for ten months. 
 
5.5.5 Summary 
The Universitas and Pelonomi hospitals relied on the presence of the following critical 
success factors: affordability, political will, risk transfer and goal alignment between 
public and private partners. However, lessons learnt allude to the shift in attitudes 
between the private and public healthcare staff brought on by a separation of facilities. 




transferred between members of the private and public sector – were adversely affected 
by the split. 
 
5.6 CASE STUDY 5: HUMANSDORP DISTRICT HOSPITAL 
5.6.1 Background 
Faced with a slowly deteriorating facility and inadequate funding, the Eastern Cape 
Department of Health (ECDoH) began considering the private sector as a partner to 
upgrade and operate the 60-bed Humansdorp District Hospital and extend the 
healthcare offering in the area. In 1999 the ECDoH initiated what was to become Kouga 
Partnership Hospital, comprising the Humansdorp District Hospital and the Isivivana 
Private Hospital, a co-location project allowing the private partner to operate a revenue-
generating private facility next door to a public facility, creating an environment where 
both public and private sector partners could benefit from shared facilities and resources 
(Aiello, 2014:12; Haarhof, 2008:92; Wits Business School, 2007a:10-11). 
The PPP intended to achieve the following objectives: 
• A comprehensive upgrade and refurbishment of Humansdorp District 
Hospital; 
• Establishment of a private healthcare facility (the Isivivana Private Hospital) at 
the Humansdorp District Hospital (co-location); 
• Sharing of facilities between the private and public partners; 
• Facilities management; 
• Revenue sharing between the private and public partners; and 
• Secondary socio-economic benefits (skills transfer, job creation, BEE 
shareholding). 






Despite the lack of PPP regulations at initiation phase at the time, the ECDoH called 
for tenders in April 1999, recommending the preferred bidder of Afrox Healthcare (later 
renamed Life Healthcare in 2005) from the four submitted. However, in the absence of 
a PPP procurement policy or guidelines from the National Treasury, the tender board 
did not approve the recommendation and in June 2000 the project was shelved. With 
the publication of the 2001 PPP guidelines in the PFMA (Section 16), the ECDoH 
approached the newly formed PPP unit within the National Treasury and the proposed 
project was given approval to proceed (Wits Business School, 2007a:10-11). 
The ECDoH elected two senior officials to stand as accounting officer and project 
officer for the project: the ECDoH’s own Head of Department (HOD) and the General 
Manager of Supply Chain Management, respectively. Transaction advisor, Ignis, was 
appointed in November 2001 and, after following the PPP procurement process at the 
time (this being prior to the PPP Manual issued in 2004), financial close was achieved 
in June 2003. Construction work began in November 2003 and after one construction 
period the facilities were commissioned and began operation in November 2004 (Wits 
Business School, 2007a:3;13). 
 
Table 9: Total capital investment 
 
  Amount 
Public Facilities refurbishment / upgrade  R    7 759 246,00  
Private Facilities construction  R    6 750 809,00  
Subtotal  R  14 510 055,00  
Less: ECDoH contribution  R    1 500 000,00  
Total Private Sector contribution*  R  13 010 055,00  
*The concessionaire was to provide all funding and no direct third party asset or project 
finance was to be used. The concessionaire assumed a cost of capital rate of 15%. 
Source: Wits Business School (2007a:20) 
 
At financial close the private partner agreed to contribute R13m in capital funding to 
the public sector’s R1.5m, but this did not take into account substantial variations 
during construction. An AIDS clinic and pharmacy, initially estimated to cost R1.5 
million, ended up costing approximately R10 million and as the provincial Department 




infrastructural norms and standards, driving the costs up to a figure of R42 million (Wits 
Business School, 2007a:26). 
The project was not short of issues during the construction phase: late payments by the 
public sector partner led to strikes and delays, further variations during construction 
caused cost overruns, delays detrimentally affected value for money and the 
discontinuity of key role-players after financial close (the transaction advisors) meant 
that vital institutional memory was lost (Wits Business School, 2007a:23-28). 
 
5.6.3 Critical Success Factors 
5.6.3.1 Political will and leadership 
As seen in similar projects, appointing suitably senior officials in the provincial 
department to drive the project and ensure swift decision-making was critical to ensure 
that the project was appropriately promoted and supported at senior level. What is worth 
noting is the role of the nascent PPP unit in the negotiation phase. With political 
pressure mounting to see this project to a conclusion, the head of the PPP unit joined 
the ECDoH’s team during this phase to ensure that the deal was closed (Wits Business 
School, 2007a:17). 
While it is important to note that the inclusion of specialists familiar with this (at the 
time) very novel form of agreement, the private partner subsequently noted that certain 
concessions were made from their side in order to see the project to financial close. 
While some commentators argue that this was a case of ‘strong arm tactics’ on the part 
of the public partner, it would be convenient to overlook the reasons underlying the 
private partner’s apparent acquiescence in this regard (Wits Business School, 
2007a:17). Although Afrox Healthcare had already announced their preferred bidder 
status to their shareholders in 2000, which some may argue was premature considering 
that this was prior to the project being stalled in June of that year, their commitment to 
the project was more than just a simple need to follow through for their shareholders. 
They were looking to this project as a pilot for future works. For this reason they were 
prepared to accept a lower rate of return in this project with the expectation that 






5.6.3.2 Risk transfer 
Of 25 risks identified during the procurement process, the private partner was allocated 
twice the number of risks than that of the public partner: twelve private partner risks 
versus six allocated to the ECDoH. The remaining seven risks were considered shared 
between both parties (Wits Business School, 2007a:5-8). From a project management 
point of view, details of the financial impact of the risk and the probability of it 
occurring is missing from the risk assessment in each instance. This would have gone 
a long way to better understanding the potential impact of the overall risk allocation 
and whether or not it was indeed considered balanced in terms of impact on the project. 
 
5.6.3.3 Goal alignment 
While the public partner was looking to save a public facility that was gradually sliding 
into disuse and underutilisation, the private partner saw an opportunity to extend their 
offering in an area where there was little competition in the private healthcare market 
and where competing facilities were considerably far away. Further, the private partner 
was keen to ensure that this project succeeded even at the expense of not being able to 
recoup their initial investment. This desire was based on the concept that this project 
was opening an untapped market in the province. This became apparent during 
negotiations when a dispute regarding cost threatened to derail the project: there was a 
difference of R3 million between the construction cost (R15 million) and the private 
partner’s affordability threshold (R12 million). The public and private partners agreed 
to resolve the impasse by splitting the difference, and each agreed to contribute R1.5 
million (Wits Business School, 2007a:18-19;51;53). Further evidence that the private 
partner was willing to forego profit in the interest of the success of the project is the 
fact that the private partner, despite being able to make the PPP operationally profitable, 
was unable to recoup their initial investment (Wits Business School, 2007a:36). A 2014 
review of Healthcare PPPs in South Africa by the PPP unit indicates that both parties 
remained committed to the PPP, twelve years after financial close (Aiello, 2014:12). 
This sentiment is echoed in a 2013 report (Ricks, et al., 2013:299-300) of an 




the public partner (the issue under scrutiny being late payments) is being allowed to slip 
by the private partner. Responders are concerned that this could lead to an antagonistic 
environment in managing the agreement. Interviewees in the report note that levying 
penalties, which both parties are permitted to do in terms of the contract, have been 
foregone in order to avoid a potential breakdown in the PPP relationship and, 
ultimately, poor service delivery to patients. 
One of the items that was at odds with goal alignment was the apparent culture clash 
between the public and private sector staff in the facilities. The public sector staff were 
notably less disciplined than their private sector colleagues, with issues such as 
absenteeism being a common complaint and leading to a concurrent negative impact on 
service delivery (Wits Business School, 2007a:31). Despite senior management 
intervention, the attitudes of public sector staff remained unaffected. 
 
5.6.4 Lessons Learnt 
The Wits Business School (2007a:44-48) case study review makes the following 
suggestions for future PPPs: 
• Replicating this PPP model should include complete facilities management, as 
well as the replacement of equipment once it becomes unfeasible to maintain 
(too costly) or obsolete (a constant issue with medical equipment and 
technology); 
• Scale is important, small uncomplicated projects lend themselves to co-
location projects; 
• Ensure that both partners remain committed to the project with an emphasis on 
collaboration rather than competition; 
• The PPP unit should shift focus from simply regulating PPPs to promoting and 
advocating for them; 
• Involve all parties who have sign-off powers and PPP experts at an early stage 





• Projects should be sustainable and flexible in terms of ensuring that decision-
making is efficient and effective and that variations in the service delivery 
requirements may be allowed for or renegotiated as required; 
• Risk transfer must be balanced between the partners and occur upfront through 
a comprehensive analysis and not shift later in the process, failure to do so will 
invite detrimental effects on value for money; 
• Continuity of role-players and knowledge from the project team responsible 
for inception to the management team responsible for managing the contract 
during the off-take period is essential for continued long-term sustainability 
and effective operation; 
• Secondary benefits, such as BEE targets, must be clearly stated and 
achievable; and 
• Build resilience in the PPP should political administrations change. 
 
5.6.4.1 High cost of transaction advisors 
One of the critical issues highlighted is the high cost of transaction advisors leaving 
public bodies. These transaction advisors may be contemplating PPPs and unwilling to 
initiate the process due to the outlay involved in entertaining an uncertain, uncommon 
and potentially risky procurement mode. Since the publication of the PPP manual in 
2004, the work required in initiating and seeing a PPP through to financial close means 
many additional hours of specialist input by PPP advisors and legal experts (Wits 
Business School, 2007a:46). This puts PPPs beyond the reach of government 
departments without funding that stretches to anything other than a mega-project where 
the scale justifies initial expense. 
 
5.6.5 Summary 
The Humansdorp District Hospital PPP makes specific reference to the need for the 
following critical success factors: political will and leadership, risk transfer and goal 
alignment. In addition to the high cost of transaction advisors which affects the initial 




important to achieve optimal outcomes in co-location projects: including 
comprehensive facilities management in the agreement, ensuring sufficient scale 
(linked to complexity), independent oversight and advisory during the operational 
phase, early and comprehensive stakeholder engagement, sustainable and flexible 
contracts, PPP role-player continuity, clear and achievable secondary objectives, and 
resilience to withstand changes in the political environment. 
 
5.7 CASE STUDY 6: WESTERN CAPE REHABILITATION CENTRE 
AND LENTEGEUR PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL 
5.7.1 Background 
In a joint press release in 2006 (Uys & Brown, 2006) the Western Cape provincial 
Minister of Health and Western Cape Premier announced the first healthcare PPP for 
the provincial health department: a partnership whereby the non-core functions of two 
local health facilities would be rendered by a private entity. The 12-year PPP 
(amounting to a nett present value at the time of R344 million) involved rendering day-
to-day facilities’ management (gardening and cleaning), as well as regular maintenance 
of buildings and medical equipment at the 208-bed Western Cape Rehabilitation Centre 
(WCRC) and the 940-bed Lentegeur Hospital (LGH), a psychiatric facility. The two 
health facilities occupy adjoining sites in Mitchell’s Plain and both are part of a much 
larger precinct that includes other health and education facilities. 
With the intention of combining various rehabilitation units into one ‘state-of-the-art’ 
facility, the WCRC was constructed on a portion of the Lentegeur Hospital site by the 
WCG Department of Transport and Public Works in 2003/4 at a cost of R100 million 
(Roman, 2010:4; WCGDoH, 2015:17). With the intention of keeping this new facility 
in optimal state, a PPP was considered the most viable long-term option (Roman, 
2010:5). Considering their proximity and similar need, the LGH was included in the 
facilities management PPP in order to consolidate what was already being provided by 
various outsourcing arrangements (Roman, 2010:6). 
From the contract date start in March 2007 the winning bidder, Mpilisweni Facility 




Joint Venture), provided all the funding (no debt was required), with the Western Cape 
Government Department of Health (WCGDoH) providing a unitary payment of R30 
million per annum and annual escalation tied to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
(Aiello, 2014:14; Roman, 2010:14). 
The PPP listed the following objectives: 
• “Obtaining private sector efficiency and know-how on non-core needs, 
• Provision of preventative [scheduled, not just emergency] maintenance …, 
• Obtaining economies of scale by combining several outsourced contracts and 
in house functions at both hospitals, 




Services were not provided equally to each facility and the WCRC received the full 
scope while LPH (indicated as LGH in the table below) received only the soft facilities 
management, minus linen and laundry and utilities management. 
 






Source: Roman (2010:3) 
 
5.7.2 Procurement 
There is a lack of literature available on the procurement process, which makes it 
difficult to assess this item. This is an obvious concern, with lack of transparency being 
regularly cited as a criticism of this procurement mode. This is not to say that the proper 
processes were not followed – the project was listed as approved by the PPP unit in the 
regular periodical, PPP Quarterly. It is therefore difficult to gain first-hand knowledge 
of the affordability, value for money and risk transfer items as these factors are 
reviewed based on secondary data analysis. 
 
5.7.3 Critical success factors 
5.7.3.1 Affordability 
In a 2010 report affordability is described simply as being ringfenced by the WCGDoH 
according to the terms of the agreement. This leaves the cost of the PPP as a simple line 
item in the annual budget vote (Roman, 2010:14). Being locked into a unitary fee 
escalated by CPI makes budget forecasting fairly straightforward. Without further 
information on this item it is difficult to assess this aspect in any more detail; however, 
it suffices to say that the project could become a regular feature of the annual budget 
process, with its annual escalation making it a fairly straightforward project which to 
allocate funding. 
 
5.7.3.2 Value for money 
While the abovementioned report indicates that value for money (VFM) is being gained 
through the PPP, there is little justification as there is no Public Sector Comparator 
(PSC) against which to measure this. What the report does indicate is that in 2008/9 the 
cost per patient-day-equivalent (PDE) was recorded as R597.13 for LGH and R1 207 
for WCRC. When compared with a report comparing costs between public and private 
healthcare (Ramjee, 2013), the cost of delivering hospital services in the public 




R2 237 for all hospital types). At the rates given by the case study reports for WCRC 
and LGH above, adjusting for CPI three years later reveals figures of R1 407.83 for 
WCRC and R696.49, which is indeed below the average PDE cost in the 2013 report. 
 
Table 11: Table indicating patient-day-equivalent consumer price index adjusted for period 
2008-2011 
 
YEAR 2008 2009 2010 2011 
CPI N/A *6.16% *3.34% *6.32% 
WCRC PDE R1 207.00 R1 281.35 R1 324.15 R1 407.83 
LGH PDE R597.13 R633.91 R655.09 R696.49 
 
(*CPI figures according to Inflation.eu, 2019) 
 
Source: Researcher’s Own 
 
Table 12: Average cost per patient-day-equivalent (PDE) for public hospitals in 2010/11 
 
Average cost per PDE for district hospitals 1,543 
Adjustment factors for mix of hospital types 1,45 
Average cost per patient day equivalent for all hospitals 2,237 
Proportion of hospital costs related to personnel 65% 
Proportion of personnel costs related to medical practitioners and 
specialists 
40% 
Source: Ramjee (2013:ii) 
 
Although this analysis is rather crude and does not attempt to be a substitute for a full 
VFM test as per the standards set by the National Treasury it does at least affirm that 
the PPP is providing some form of value. Further, the comparison report indicates that 
private hospitals have an average PDE of R2 839 (Ramjee, 2013:iv). If the PPP is 
bringing private sector value to a public facility (albeit just for non-core services) at 





5.7.3.3 Risk transfer 
This aspect of the PPP raises some questions about whether this particular arrangement 
is in fact a true PPP or more of a fixed-price outsourcing arrangement. The risk matrix 
provided in the report (Roman, 2010:10-14) indicates a list of duties to be provided by 
the private partner and not a list of risks assigned to each party in the PPP as seen in 
other examples. The risks to the private party that can be gleaned from the matrix are 
the following: 
• Increasing sectoral costs associated with providing the cleaning services; 
• FOREX fluctuations; 
• Responsibility for providing equipment, technology, staff, ICT systems; and 
• Performance risk (non-performance being subject to financial penalties). 
 
The following risks are noted as either shared or passed on to the public partner: 
• Food inflation (noted as possibly requiring renegotiation in terms of the annual 
CPI inflation adjustment to the unitary charge); 
• Latent defects (building defects for which the original contractor or 
professional design team is responsible – this is standard in the construction 
industry); and 
• Changes in policy and legislation. 
 
There is a concern regarding the degree of risk being absorbed by the private 
consortium. Taking into consideration the relatively low level of risk being taken on by 
the private partner evidenced by the almost complete lack of private capital injection 
and the transferring of numerous risks to the public partner, the PPP appears to resemble 
a simple outsourcing arrangement, i.e. the appointment of a management contractor. 
Without further information to ascertain whether or not this is indeed the case, it is the 
opinion of this researcher that this is not a PPP in the pure sense as it does not fully 
meet the basic requirements of affordability, value for money and risk transfer. 
One aspect of the PPP does warrant specific mention, and this is the helpdesk that is a 




timeously. The helpdesk allows the contractor to ensure that turnaround times for 
various issues are optimised in the best interests of delivering a high-quality service. 
Failure to meet agreed performance criteria is met with financial penalties. One aspect 
of the risk matrix is disconcerting and this relates to penalties being ‘stringent’ and, 
depending on the service provider (presumably a subcontractor), the penalty could 
outweigh the particular service fee leaving the consortium to fund the penalty fee. This 
appears to be an example of poor contract structuring, the mitigation measure being to 
renegotiate this aspect. It is not known whether this has been actioned. 
 
5.7.4 Summary 
Although meeting at least two out of the three essential criteria for a PPP (questions 
surround the degree of risk transfer), this project appears to garner benefits to the public 
partner, namely bundling together numerous outsourcing contracts into one and 
ensuring issues are logged through a centralised call centre, failing which penalties may 
be levied against the private partner. Ultimately there is a concern regarding whether 
this is a pure PPP in terms of the presence of the three core criteria or more of an 
outsourcing arrangement, i.e. a management contract where a private entity 
subcontracts the various requirements of the public party for a set unitary fee. 
 
5.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND FINDINGS 
The case studies indicate that there are several factors common to the success of PPPs 
in the local context. The case study research also indicates a dichotomy of the factors 
attributing to the success of the various projects, i.e. factors that form an essential 
foundation for PPPs and slightly more peripheral factors that attribute to optimising the 
partnership. The former set relates to the factors prescribed by the National Treasury, 
namely affordability, value for money and risk transfer, but also implicitly includes the 
required regulatory framework to permit PPPs to be considered in the first place. The 
latter set includes clear performance specifications and monitoring, political will and 
leadership/advocacy, innovation, PPP specialist input and oversight (this is a 
requirement for both the public and private sector alike), goal alignment, technical team 












The quantitative aspect of the CSFs elicits the information in the table below. This list 
does not attempt to be comprehensive and needs to be taken into context given the fairly 
limited information provided by the case study material in some cases. It is therefore 
inadequate to state that simply because a factor was not discussed it is not relevant or 
included in the review. What the quantitative analysis confirms is that performance 
specifications and monitoring are far more critical in the local context than the literature 
review provided. With a focus on getting the deal in place, the general literature 
available overlooks this aspect of a PPP: the importance of the various factors related 
to management during the operational period. The case studies identify the need for 
performance monitoring to ensure standards are maintained, continuity of specialist and 
technical input from inception into the operational phase, and flexibility to respond to 
new realities or altered states. 
 
  
•Performance specifications and monitoring
•Political will and leadership / advocacy
•Innovation



























































































































































Chapman’s Peak Drive ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓   
Gautrain Rapid Rail Link ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   
Universitas and Pelonomi Hospitals ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Humansdorp District Hospital ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓  ✓  
Western Cape Rehabilitation Centre 
and Lentegeur Hospital 
✓ ✓      ✓   
Totals 6 5 5 4 3 1 2 5 3 2 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s Own 
 
A ranking of the CSFs according to the above table provides the following: 
1. Affordability 
2. Value for money / risk transfer / performance specifications and monitoring 
3. Political will 
4. Innovation/PPP specialist oversight 
5. Goal alignment/technical team continuity 
6. Flexibility 
 
The framework above makes it possible to investigate the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of these various factors in the current environment to evaluate the feasibility 
of an infrastructure PPP to deliver public schools in the local context. It is important to 
note that while the above CSFs cover most of the factors pertinent to PPPs, they do not 
cover some aspects relevant to the research project at hand. These relate to more 




The factors include public sector capacity, i.e. internal PPP specialists directly 
employed by the state; private sector capacity, i.e. external PPP specialists, consultants 
and contractors alike; and conditions in the current construction sector, i.e. economic 
stability and market-based competition. These factors are important as they influence 
the abovementioned CSFs, such as value for money, risk transfer and political will. 
These factors are fundamental to the research scope and measurables. As such, they are 





6: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
6.3 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Having established the scope of relevant CSFs in the previous chapter through a 
secondary data analysis of case studies of several local PPPs, the empirical data 
collection now focuses on measuring these factors in the local context. Having reviewed 
the CFSs identified it is necessary to consider which should be measured, and to adjust 
them to be more easily understood for measurement purposes. 
The foundational CSFs referred to in the previous chapter remain as identified: 
1. Affordability 
2. Value for money (VFM) 
3. Risk transfer 
4. Regulatory framework 
 
At this point it is important to note that the optimisation CSFs identified in the previous 
chapter could be better described as resulting from root causes or a combination of root 
causes. The optimisational CSFs and their considered root causes are summarised as 
per the below: 
Table 14: Optimisation CSFs and their root causes 
 
Optimisation Critical Success Factor Root cause 
Performance specifications and 
monitoring 
Public sector capacity 
Political will and leadership / advocacy (no underlying cause, remained as is) 
Innovation Combination of Public sector capacity 
and Private sector capacity 
PPP specialist input and oversight Private sector capacity 
Goal alignment Combination of Public sector capacity, 
Private sector capacity and Transparency 
Technical team continuity Combination of Economic stability and 
Political will 
Flexibility Combination of Public sector capacity, 






As such, the list was shortened to the below root causes. Note that one of the root causes 
impacting on Value for money is considered to be “market competition in the local 
construction industry” and, as such, it was considered important to measure this aspect. 
1. Political will and advocacy 
2. Transparency 
3. Public sector capacity 
4. Private sector capacity  
5. Economic stability 
6. Market competition in the local construction industry 
 
Empirical data-collection focussed on two measurable attributes of the above CSFs: 
perceived importance and perceived prevalence or presence in the current environment. 
Respondents were asked to rate each factor firstly in terms of their perceived 
importance and then in terms of their perceived prevalence or presence in the current 
environment. 
In addition to the CSF measurements, questions were included regarding perceptions 
about PPP financing options, preferred PPP infrastructure types and the involvement of 
PPP role-players. 
 
6.2 QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
6.2.1 Critical Success Factors – Importance 
Respondents were asked to supply a measurement for each of the ten factors based on 
a modified Likert scale from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (of critical importance). The 





Figure 23: Critical success factors in terms of their relative importance 
 
It is no surprise that one of the foundational CSFs from the literature review, risk 
transfer, is listed as most important. What is notable is that private sector capacity and 
public sector capacity rank 2nd and 4th on the list respectively, flanked by the other two 
foundational CSFs, affordability and value for money, at 3rd and 5th. It is interesting to 
note that political will and advocacy, considered one of the top optimisational factors 
in the case studies, ranks only 7th of the ten factors. 
 
6.2.2 Presence/Prevalence of Critical Success Factors 
When respondents were asked to rate the perceived relative prevalence or presence of 
the same factors in the current environment most of the factors remained in a similar 
position. The exception was public sector capacity, which moved from an importance 
ranking of 4th to last on the list of prevalence. 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Market competition in the local construction industry
Regulatory framework
Economic stability
Political will & advocacy
Transparency
Value for money
Public sector capability / capacity (skills and resources)
Affordability
Private sector capability / capacity (skills and resources)
Risk transfer






Figure 24: Critical success factors in terms of their relative presence in the current context 
 
While the findings above may not necessarily represent a considerable deviation from 
what is considered important, some rather interesting insights are obtained when the 
two data sets are superimposed. 
 
6.2.3 Relative Difference between Critical Success Factors’ Importance 
and Prevalence in the Current Context 
The ten factors were analysed in terms of the absolute difference between their 
importance and prevalence to understand significant discrepancies. This measurement 
is critical to identifying where efforts should be made to address imbalances. 
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Figure 25: Critical success factors in terms of the absolute differences between importance and 
presence in the current environment 
 
Public sector capacity ranks top of the list in terms of differences between importance 
and prevalence. This finding indicates that capacity building among public sector 
implementing agencies should be addressed in order to provide fertile ground for 
effective implementation should a PPP be considered. Second on the list is political will 
and advocacy, which is closely allied to public sector capacity in terms of falling under 
the responsibility of government to address. Only with regulatory framework does the 
presence of a factor outweigh its perceived importance. This is arguably due to the 
strong PPP framework stemming directly from Section 16 of the PFMA and which is 
substantially aided by the various PPP technical manuals and processes put in place by 
the PPP unit within the National Treasury. This could be linked to a perception that the 
present regulatory framework is over-prescriptive and viewed as a potential constraint, 
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i.e. there is too much ‘red tape’ when entering into a PPP. This will be investigated in 
more detail during the qualitative analysis. 
 
6.2.4 Public-Private Partner Finance 
When respondents were asked to identify how they thought PPPs should be financed, 
the majority agreed that the private partner should provide the majority of the finance 
with a relatively small government contribution. This is an interesting finding 
considering that most public megaprojects are predominantly regulatory framework 
government funded. This is also at odds with the findings of the case studies chapter 
where it was noted that the Gautrain’s ultimate R30bn delivery cost was subsidised by 
the national and provincial treasuries to the order of 88%, while even the fairly modest 
Chapman’s Peak Drive PPP (R350m) was 50% subsidised by provincial government. 
 
 
Figure 26: Public-private partnership financing option preferences (n = 9) 
 
While opinions on this item were reviewed during the quantitative phase (the 
interviews) it is worth noting that timely access to capital for effective cashflow 
management is the key driver for this finding. Concerns about the adverse processing 
time for direct interim payments by government departments (the scourge of late 
payments) appear to be tipping the scales towards a preference on the part of private 
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partners to favour financial arrangements through private financial institutions who are 
better equipped to release funding more effectively than the public sector, leading to 
improved cashflow, especially during the intense construction phase. 
 
6.2.5 Public-Private Partner Infrastructure Suitability 
As noted in the literature review, public schools are not considered a complex 
infrastructure type. Their programmatic elements are generally modular and repetitive 
with classrooms, which are uniform in layout and specification, forming the single 
largest collective element in the accommodation schedule of a typical public school. 
 
 
Figure 27: Public-private partnership infrastructure typology preferences (n = 12) 
 
In terms of the type of infrastructure considered appropriate for PPPs, most respondents 
identified semi-complex infrastructure (such as clinics and schools) as outright 
preferable. This finding is therefore in line with the selection of public schools as an 
appropriate building typology for a PPP. 
The next question relates to the quality expected to be delivered by an infrastructure 
PPP. Results are illustrated in the figure below. 
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Figure 28: Public-private partnership level of service expected (n = 9) 
 
Interestingly, no respondents selected ‘state of the art facility’. At 78%, ‘exceeding the 
standards set by the public sector partner’ was the mode while ‘meeting the minimum 
standards’ was found to occupy the remainder. The reason this is interesting is because 
often PPPs are associated with extracting maximum value out of the private sector, and 
this is associated with achieving best possible quality. What many overlook is that value 
is in this instance noted as achieving a level of service commensurate with balancing 
the best of both worlds: acceptable level of service at an equally acceptable cost. This 
aspect is given more credence in the qualitative findings. 
 
6.2.6 Perception of Public-Private Partner Role-Players in the Current 
Environment 
It is of critical importance to gauge perceptions around various key stakeholders in the 
current political, economic and technical environment. This includes the Western Cape 
government (as client and PPP initiator), the local construction industry (consultants 
and contractors) and private financial institutions (commercial banks and private equity 
providers). A Likert scale was used to measure this perception amongst respondents. 
These findings were ranked in order of most to least confident: 
1. Independent PPP specialists and consultants 
2. Contractors in the local construction industry 
3. Private financial institutions 
4. The Western Cape government 
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The perceptions of respondents indicate that there is a critical lack of appetite on the 
part of the provincial government to enter into a PPP. This result links back to two 
critical success factors: political will (desire to enter into PPPs) and public sector 
capacity (government’s ability to promote and administer a PPP). 
Despite pessimism surrounding the perception of government’s intention, when 
respondents were asked whether they would consider getting involved in a PPP the 
majority (56%) selected ‘absolutely yes’. The remainder indicated that they were either 
unsure or unable to participate in a PPP due to their circumstances. None of the 
respondents selected ‘absolutely not’. 
 
6.3 QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
In this phase of the research project, empirical data was collected through depth 
interviews conducted with PPP specialists, infrastructure professionals and academics 
with a PPP interest. The interviews were semi-structured and used a set of questions 
that took their cue from the survey questionnaire feedback. The intention was to delve 
into reasons underpinning the findings in the quantitative survey and uncover potential 
solutions as how to address them. 
The results of the quantitative data analysis phase directed the researcher to explore the 
following topics or factors directly influencing PPPs: 
1. The significant shortage of public sector capacity to implement PPPs; 
2. Lack of political will and advocacy acting as a barrier for the public sector to 
consider PPPs as a delivery option; 
3. Current economic instability/volatility does not favour initiating long-term 
contracts, such as those contemplated in PPPs; 
4. Affordability and value for money are currently significant barriers to the 





5. Transparency is a concern in the current climate in terms of the potential for 
misuse of state funds – a major concern regarding the procurement of large-
scale infrastructure projects, such as those contemplated for PPPs; 
6. Private sector capacity may be a gap in terms of providing specialist skills and 
capacity necessary to deliver PPPs; 
7. While risk transfer is considered the most important factor for entering into a 
PPP there is a low degree of confidence that this may be achieved; 
8. Although considered the least important factor and one linked to current 
economic volatility, there is a lack of sufficient market competition in the 
current construction industry, which could be a barrier to achieving value for 
money; and 
9. The current regulatory framework is more than sufficient for PPPs to be 
properly regulated in the current local environment. 
 
In addition to feedback on the above factors, the open-ended nature of the interviews 
allows for a broader discussion of the following topics: 
1. The applicability of public schools as the delivery objective; 
2. PPP financing arrangements; 
3. Unintended consequences of PPP arrangements; and 
4. Suggestions to improve the environment for PPPs. 
 
6.3.1 Public Sector Capacity 
Ranked as the number one factor in terms of the deficit between importance and 
prevalence in the current environment, respondents highlighted two dimensions to 
describe the shortage of PPP specialists: (1) the number or quantum of PPP specialists 
presently employed in the local public sector; and (2) the depth of understanding 
infrastructure officials generally have in terms of their knowledge around the PPP 
mode. Neither dimension was seen as a primary issue and it was widely noted that there 
is an equal deficiency in both dimensions. The reasons levelled at this issue were 
identified by one respondent who noted that most government officials who have been 




combination of scarcity of implementation, and therefore lack of exposure, as well as 
‘getting their fingers burned’ during the initial encounter and so shying away from 
subsequent engagements. The latter issue is a concern as there is a general view that 
PPPs require expertise that is either not considered normal and places officials outside 
of their comfort zone, or that the project they were involved in did not deliver on 
intended objectives. This may have resulted in officials preferring to avoid future 
encounters rather than unpack what may have gone wrong and why. A secondary issue 
related to this factor involves a deficiency of in-house technical expertise to support 
officials in this mode, which has obvious repercussions for risk-averse civil servants. 
This is understandable given the general lack of infrastructure professionals in the 
public service, a topic which is well-documented. Given their inability to adequately 
manage a novel delivery mode, it is understandable that there should be an aversion to 
electing to get involved in future projects if the experience was negative. 
But why would government need internal PPP specialists in the first place when there 
are plenty of private sector specialists in the field? This goes back to the role of 
government officials involved in transactions from the client’s side. Traditional 
infrastructure procurement (TIP), as established in the literature review chapter, is 
generally regarded as significantly resource-intensive in terms of both internal 
professionals and external consultants. This assumes that extracting optimum value 
from external resources relies on the proficiency of a client’s internal resources to set 
performance standards and effectively monitor and evaluate their achievement. This is 
equally true of PPPs, the difference being that in TIP the required work is generally 
singular in nature, tied to well-regulated and standardised professional scopes and the 
delivery processes and outputs established through many years of experience in this 
mode. In a PPP there is a need for officials deployed in these units to understand and 
appreciate the many facets of both the public and private partners’ needs, business 
models, legal frameworks, and so forth. With the preference towards TIP, government 
infrastructure delivery components generally recruit professionals who have extensive 
knowledge and experience in a singular field. There is no need to recruit specialists who 
have a complex private sector background and exposure to the various spheres of law, 
management and business modelling. Further, while this may describe the demand side 
of the equation it is generally accepted that specialists with the type of knowledge or 




sector due to the open-ended nature of their field and the ability to shift quickly between 
projects or deployment, with government being the very antithesis of this desire. 
This is particularly telling in the knowledge base of the respondents during this phase 
of data collection. The officials interviewed were not singular infrastructure specialists, 
i.e. construction project managers, architects, quantity surveyors or engineers, 
employed to deliver infrastructure using standard contracting forms and needing just 
the depth of their knowledge about their profession to guide them. Although they may 
have initially entered this arena through a singular professional background as 
described above, most PPP specialist officials displayed a broad and complex 
knowledge of both public and private sector property transactions involving property 
development, financial modelling, procurement, relevant legal and regulatory 
frameworks and a distinct aptitude in negotiating the complex interplay between the 
various role-players in order to extract optimum value. This last aspect is of particular 
interest and warrants discussion. It may be argued that, on the whole, government 
officials are typically known for an interest and proficiency in meeting the relevant 
compliance standards set for the field of work they dispose over. In contrast, the 
officials interviewed for the purposes of this project indicated a keen interest in 
extracting optimum value out of the frameworks pertaining to a given work scope. They 
describe instances of using the available policy frameworks at their disposal to unlock 
rather than constrain processes. It is also evident that the officials interviewed had a far 
wider field of knowledge of, and interest in, their immediate and peripheral 
environment, their interests sometimes going somewhat off topic on what seemed like 
a fringe area before tying it back to the subject at hand. The assumption is this aptitude 
speaks to a need to be able to respond to a complex and ever-changing environment. 
When asked to list the limiting factors on PPP projects in their sphere of the public 
sector, officials listed risk aversion, lack of in-house capacity, little understanding of 
contracting versus partnering, lack of good transaction advisors in the private sector 
(little competition and costly), a distinct lack of skills (especially with regard to project 
management and contract administration), delayed or deferred decision making on the 
part of executive officials and a general lack of innovation in the public sector (with a 
focus on compliance and rule adherence). 
Lack of public sector capacity also has a strong bearing on value for money, and one 




entity’s ability to ensure VFM is achieved at every point in the value chain. This is 
consistent with the assumption made above with respect to TIP, and PPPs are not 
immune. Although this seems at odds with the understanding of PPPs when considering 
VFM is a prerequisite during the National Treasury’s stringent PPP approval process 
the respondent noted that this is critical during the long-term off-take or operational 
period, inconsistent application during this period linked to adverse effects on 
extracting and ensuring VFM in the long-term. It is therefore important to understand 
that PPP transactions are not self-reinforcing. Despite the nature of the agreement, value 
for money relies on constant monitoring by a capable and capacitated public partner to 
ensure the private sector partner delivers according to set performance specifications. 
As noted in the Edinburgh Schools disaster, deviations or relaxations in terms of the 
public partner’s monitoring and evaluation mandate can have adverse effects as the 
private partner finds ways to cut corners in an attempt to extract value for itself. 
 
6.3.2 Political Will 
Respondents echo the findings in the literature review and case study analysis, noting 
that due to the scale and complexity of the projects usually associated with PPPs it is 
critically important to have a champion at a sufficiently high level to advocate for and 
provide decision-making impetus to push transactions through their often lengthy and 
complex approval process. In the present environment most respondents note general 
lack of political will being due to lack of risk appetite on the part of high-level officials 
and politicians, as well as the recent track record of abuse and corruption in large-scale 
infrastructure transactions causing scandalous political fall-out. Respondents also cite 
the lack of risk appetite being a result of a lack of innovation and appetite to try untested 
forms of delivery due to the ‘it’s been done like this for so long, why change it now?’ 
paradigm. Underscoring this lack of risk appetite and follow-through is the number of 
failed starts in the local PPP arena. This is evident when reviewing the latest list of PPPs 
on the GTAC’s website: 87 projects are currently in various stages of planning while 
only 25 have come to fruition, amounting to a success rate of 22% (GTAC, 2017; 
GTAC, 2019). 
That said, a respondent identified an aspect of advocacy overlooked in the literature, 




departments to advise, advocate and push the agenda of strategic transactions, such as 
PPPs, in the interests of service delivery. This ability to influence does not come for 
free, though the respondent cites the necessity for a proven track record of successful 
delivery and capable officials (note the link to public sector capacity) to generate 
confidence for political heads to support these and similar strategic proposals. In the 
Western Cape this aspect is supported by the perception that the province is able to 
deliver on planned objectives in the infrastructure arena and is therefore more capable 
of adopting new, innovative or untested approaches to solving infrastructure challenges. 
 
6.3.3 Economic Stability and Market Competition 
The current construction industry is in a state of significant flux with large contractors 
such as Basil Read and Group 5 having recently filed for business rescue and many 
others unable to achieve sustainability in what is considered a turbulent market. 
Reasons for this range from large government infrastructure contracts being in short 
supply due to the shortfall in the fiscus, down to ground level volatility in the 
construction sector with reports of a ‘construction mafia’ operating in the sector 
whereby groups target contractors with threats of violence and intimidation to force 
subcontracting arrangements involving a stake in the profits (Donelly, 2019). As such, 
there is general consensus amongst those interviewed that entering into large, long-term 
contracts in an environment fraught with risk of failure is a poor choice. 
On the other hand, some respondents note that in the current environment market forces 
could permit significant value as the private sector reconsiders their profit margins in 
the interest of maintaining cashflow. This high degree of competition as contractors 
fight for work means that, despite the volatility, risk tolerant clients can achieve 
significant value in the long run if they capitalise now to lock in value through long-
term contracts such as a PPP. 
 
6.3.4 Affordability 
Of those interviewed, public sector officials are first to latch on to affordability as a 




conducted in three-year cycles or medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs). 
This framework forces the public department to look beyond the coming financial year, 
but also to confirm the impact of longer-term projects or programmes to ensure 
sufficient budget provision in the outer years (years two and three of an MTEF cycle). 
With PPPs becoming contingent liabilities over even longer terms (30 years in some 
cases) it is imperative that departments understand the implications of locking in a line 
item on a budget document for this period. The impact of locking in budget for a PPP 
means that funds may not be made available for other projects or programmes for the 
period of the PPP. This means that any decision to proceed with a large project that is 
going to tie up a significant slice of a department’s budget for many years is unlikely to 
be taken lightly. 
Affordability is intrinsically linked to the nature of the funding mechanism. If the public 
partner is providing a significant portion of the capital cost, as in the Gautrain, then it 
is critical that the public partner is aware of its long-term commitments and that 
adequate capital budget is ring-fenced for the project at hand. Alternatively, if the 
private partner is providing a significant portion of the capital cost and the public 
partner is entering into a long-term off-take agreement then this finance needs to be 
ring-fenced for the duration of the PPP period. In user-pays models, the private partner 
typically finances and operates the facility at their own cost, but in the event that the 
private partner is unable to recover sufficient funds to turn a profit, this risk is often 
shared by both parties, such as in the Chapman’s Peak Drive case study where the 
provincial government provides security in the event that the pass is to be closed. One 
respondent notes that innovative funding models should be explored upfront by private 
partners in order to increase the scope of affordability options. In the case of public 
schools, for instance, the question was posed as to whether unused public buildings 
could be converted into schools maintained and operated by a private partner. This is 
an interesting concept as the biggest single line item in a feasibility study for private 
developments is usually the fixed cost of the land or buildings, which typically makes 
the single biggest impact on the rate of return. If this constant is removed from the 
equation, projects could be made considerably more appealing to private developers. 
Respondents also note that affordability has to be measured against the expected quality 
of the service or deliverable. Public sector clients have been known to raise the 




what is deemed acceptable. In these instances costs tend to spiral beyond what may 
have originally been considered as having a direct effect on affordability (the ability of 
a client to budget for the project), as well as value for money. Many projects have fallen 
foul of this expectation at an early stage where the public sector expects the private 
partner to deliver a premium product or service on a ‘best-value’ budget. 
 
6.3.5 Value for Money 
Although critical at procurement stage, value for money or VFM is often seen as not so 
important during the off-take or operational period. Some respondents reiterate this case 
as the theory is that VFM is ‘baked in’ at procurement stage and forms the basis of the 
transaction going forward. However, some respondents disagree with this due to the 
need to be able to manage the PPP consistently during operations in order to ensure that 
the performance criteria set at the outset are met during the period of the contract as 
failure to do so has considerably long-term effects on overall VFM. Even small VFM 
transgressions can add up and be amplified in the long term. 
As mentioned above under affordability, VFM is highly sensitive to the level of service 
or deliverable required. Getting the balance wrong could have considerably adverse 
effects on the actual value of the transaction and the public sector could end up paying 
far too much for something that could be delivered more modestly. Added to this is the 
perception that public funds may be being squandered on a given project and potential 
public fallout may ensue. 
Lastly, a respondent notes that the VFM calculation from the PPP manual, i.e. the Public 
Sector Comparator or PSC where a PPP project is compared against the option of being 
delivered via traditional infrastructure procurement (TIP), is often misunderstood. The 
process involves a fairly complex cost-benefit analysis of each option and VFM is 
declared if the PPP can prove better value on paper than the TIP model. Commentators 
and some respondents indicate that this process is often subject to optimism bias, where 
one expects to obtain better value than is really possible. As noted in the case studies, 
there is some flexibility in the VFM calculation. In some instances it is a fairly 
straightforward comparison (as in the hospital co-location project case studies); 




derived based on significant external factors which did not have a direct bearing on the 
project. These include macroeconomic factors such as impact on tourism and job 
creation with a secondary benefit being social development of local communities. 
These are incredibly difficult to analyse with any degree of accuracy upfront. The 
Gautrain presented a post-implementation analysis indicating the impact of 
developments in areas around the stations (in terms of property rentals), but again this 
would have been incredibly difficult to forecast at inception. 
Ultimately, one respondent sums it up rather neatly, stating that although VFM is 
important due to the use or potential for abuse of state funds, it may not be the foremost 




Despite transparency being one of the factors noted as important for PPPs to be 
successfully implemented, a respondent notes that PPP transactions are often not 
transparent and yet proceed anyway. Another respondent identifies a critical 
dependency as the perception of integrity of the government implementing agent in the 
transaction. This aspect is given credence by lack of available information on some 
mega-project PPPs, such as the procurement process for the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link. 
 
6.3.7 Private Sector Capacity 
It is generally noted amongst respondents that experienced private sector specialists are 
critical to the success of any PPP. Specialists in PPPs must have a broad knowledge 
base and yet be sufficiently specialised to unlock the potential of what can become a 
very complex transaction. 
One barrier to PPP initiation is the high cost of appointing transaction advisors, costs 
which become abortive in the event that the PPP is found unsuitable and does not 
proceed past initiation. Due to the time and effort that goes into the initiation phase of 




favoured for large projects: the economy of scale of the project diminishing the relative 
impact of these initiation costs. 
The skills shortage referred to in the literature review is a major worry amongst 
respondents. Respondents raise concerns about the number of specialists no longer 
available due to either shifting to other sectors of the economy or who have relocated 
overseas due to the shortage of work locally, both of which are significant factors in the 
depletion of the South African construction industry skills base. Due to the niche aspect 
of PPPs, even just a small reduction in the real number of specialists means that 
available capacity is significantly reduced. This is further reinforced by the fact the two 
respondents whose primary work is PPP consultancy have been directly affected by 
restructuring in their companies due to operational requirements, i.e. downsizing 
relevant departments or relocation/redeployment to other geographic areas. 
Despite the above, the private sector respondents surveyed indicate a strong advocacy 
for the PPP mode that goes beyond their need to ensure stability within their field of 
work. Across the board is a strong belief that PPPs offer a win-win scenario whereby 
the public sector is provided with the resource base and value required which is 
leveraged off a private partner who is encouraged to explore innovative contracting and 
finance solutions, and structure themselves to the needs of the project or programme at 
hand. The underlying perception amongst private sector respondents is that in the 
current paradigm the public sector sets such rigid parameters for traditional 
infrastructure procurement that private consultants and contractors alike are given 
limited space to propose alternative strategies or leverage their knowledge, experience 
and available expertise (or ability to quickly attract required expertise) to structure the 
kind of financial, technical or procurement solution that may suit the deliverable. 
This aspect essentially raises the following paradox which is key to balancing effective 
service delivery and value for money: how can the public sector transfer risk effectively 
without losing control of the arrangement? As the client, the public sector is accountable 
for every cent of taxpayers’ money spent, and the primary risk for initiating a public 
infrastructure project is therefore the responsibility of the public sector implementation 
agency. However, in an environment where the private sector is not incentivised to use 
their resource capacity to optimise the achievement of the end goal, how is the public 




many private sector respondents who note that resource capacity (not just delivery 
capacity, but expertise in planning and optimising delivery) is the primary reason for 
contracting in the private sector in the first place. This leads to the responses around 
risk transfer, a fundamental aspect of achieving value for money. 
 
6.3.8 Risk Transfer 
It is noted in the literature review that the common theme around risk transfer is to 
transfer it to the party best able to manage that risk. As such, risk transfer is such an 
integral part of any PPP that, as noted in the chapter on the regulatory framework, the 
National Treasury include it as a fundamental requirement for approval forming part of 
Treasury Approval 1. 
It is well documented that the public sector is predominantly risk averse and this 
remains a prevailing sentiment amongst public sector officials. The literature review 
highlights the spectre of corruption that haunts any transaction involving large sums, 
with the Gautrain falling prey to this as noted in the case studies. Public officials are, 
therefore, uneasy about transferring risks to the private partner as this involves a certain 
loss of control, as mentioned in the previous section on private sector capacity.  
However, control and risk transfer are two ends of a spectrum within which the public 
and private sectors have to find each other in order to form meaningful transactions to 
deliver services. In traditional infrastructure procurement, risk sits first and foremost 
with the public sector client. The client sets the brief, arranges the funding, sets the 
performance specification, as well as every aspect of the transaction arrangements 
(selects the contract, often with special amendments or stipulations), mode of 
transacting, timeframes for delivery and payment terms before initiating the project and 
monitoring the achievement thereof. The private partner simply agrees to the terms and 
delivers according to this rigid framework. 
In an environment where the public sector partner is well structured and capacitated, 
this arrangement has merit. However, as noted, this is not the case. The public sector is 
often criticised for setting poor briefs which are then subject to change during the course 
of the project introducing abortive work, frustration and confusion; interim payments 




with subcontractors or suppliers; contract documents are often poorly described or, if 
standard industry contracts are used, substantially amended with clauses that create 
contradiction or introduce ambiguity; the ability of the public sector to actively 
administer the contract and monitor the achievement of interim milestones is 
constrained by a lack of suitably qualified or experienced officials. 
The above scenario does not bode well for effective implementation of TIP and yet this 
is regularly cited as the ‘least-risk’ option for public sector infrastructure delivery. 
Sentiment in the industry is therefore that attempts to strengthen TIP by introducing a 
more rigid infrastructure system such as the IDMS without addressing the human 
capacity issue may do more harm than good. 
So what solutions are offered by respondents? The primary driver for effective delivery 
for any private institution is cashflow. For this reason step one may be reviewing the 
available funding mechanisms. 
 
6.3.9 Funding Arrangements 
In a PPP there is the option of permitting the private partner to make their own financing 
arrangements. The private sector’s ability to borrow money means that they control the 
flow of cash to their subcontractors during the course of the capital investment and 
afterwards during the operational phase. This is a fundamental aspect of risk transfer in 
a public-private transaction and mitigates the major risk currently influencing many 
infrastructure projects in the local environment – that of late payments. As noted in the 
chapter on the regulatory framework, the Public Finance Management Act or PFMA 
creates the framework for effective management of state funds. Respondents, public 
officials and private specialists alike all note that risk transfer should start with shifting 
at least a significant portion of the funding provision for a PPP project to the private 
partner. However, this aspect must consider access to finance versus cost of borrowing. 
It is established that the public sector’s ability to access funding is set by the annual 
budget vote and subsequent apportionment by various levels of government down to 
the level of services, programmes or projects contemplated. Without going into a 
detailed account of public funding, it suffices to say that the cost of borrowing from 




institutions (commercial banks) expect a rate of return in excess of the rate at which 
they are able to borrow from the reserve bank. This cost is inserted into any transaction 
involving borrowing from a commercial lender and as such means that private lending 
is more expensive than direct capital injection by a public institution. 
That said, it is well agreed amongst the public and private sector PPP specialists 
interviewed that when the private partner is responsible for providing funding, their 
ability to access funds and manage their own cashflow, which is fundamental to any 
commercial operation, is greatly enhanced. This aspect of risk transfer mitigates 
arguably the single greatest risk from which private sector companies in this country 
suffer when doing business with the various spheres of government: the well-
documented scourge of late payments. One commentator notes that the figure of late 
payments owed to private construction firms features in the billions Invalid source 
specified.. 
One respondent notes an aspect of funding fundamental to risk transfer, namely the mix 
of public and private funding in a PPP. Much of this has to do with the scale and 
complexity of the project at hand. In small- to medium-scale projects, access to private 
capital is readily available and financial institutions appear keen to lend. In large 
megaprojects it is prohibitively expensive to borrow from commercial banks on the 
scale required. The R30bn Gautrain is a prime example, where 88% of funding was 
provided by the state. 
An aspect raised by some respondents regards the provision of private equity in the 
project. The Chapman’s Peak Drive case study saw the private sector construction 
companies involved take a stake in the capital project. As shareholders, private sector 
construction companies were incentivised to ensure timeous and effective delivery. 
In summary, risk transfer in terms of funding requires a consideration of the following: 
1. State capital injection to make projects bankable (affordable); 
2. Remainder provided by private finance to ensure sufficient availability to cash 
and provide smooth cashflow to the private sector partner; 
3. Cost of borrowing from commercial banks properly factored in to ensure the 




4. The inclusion of a degree of private equity in the project to incentivise the 
private partner to manage costs effectively and focus on delivery. 
 
6.3.10 Effectiveness During the Operational Period 
It is the opinion of at least one respondent that the effectiveness of the private sector 
partner in consistently managing the contract during the operational period is critical to 
the ongoing success of the project. This opinion is rooted in the evidence that as long 
as the private sector is incentivised to extract value from an ongoing transaction to meet 
the specification requirements, they will try and do this at least cost, and attempt to 
optimise the operational and maintenance regime. 
Note that it is the responsibility of the public sector to ensure that these performance 
criteria are well set and actively monitored with financial penalties for non-
achievement. The Gautrain case study provides the best example for this where the 
Gautrain Management Agency (GMA) constantly measures numerous data points to 
ensure optimum service by Bombela, the concessionaire. 
 
6.3.11 Regulatory Framework 
Despite the fact that there is a well-developed policy framework for PPPs in South 
Africa there is significant discussion amongst PPP specialists about whether this is an 
enabler or a constraint. Opinions among respondents favours the latter, noting that the 
policy framework is particularly onerous and requires a significant upfront investment 
in time and effort. The emergent property of this perception is that only large 
megaprojects are considered for PPPs where the economy of scale is justifiable given 
the investment in developing the feasibility study and going through the various stages 
of treasury approval. Participants note that this can sometimes take up to 18 months and 
cost anywhere in the order of hundreds of thousands of rands in consultant fees.  
Taking into consideration the concerns regarding the above, some respondents drew 
reference to the emergence of public-private arrangements (PPAs) as part of the 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Produce Programme or REIPPP. These ‘hybrid 




fact that no infrastructure is transferred to the public sector and the private partner is 
wholly responsible for the capital cost (private equity and commercial debt) (Nel, 
2018:40). The private partner simply sells energy directly to the energy distributor, 
Eskom (Nel, 2018:40). Because of this these arrangements are made outside the 
traditional policy framework for PPPs. However, that is not to say that this is conducted 
without input from the relevant authorities. Officials from the PPP unit within the 
National Treasury developed procurement procedures to produce an “approach [that] 






Table 15: Building blocks of public-private partnership vs. independent power producers 
 
Building blocks of PPPs Prevalence in IPPs 
1 Value for money No transfer of facility takes place, the only asset 
transferred is Renewable Energy (RE) 
2 Affordability Yes, RE prices are set by government 
3 Risk transfer Yes, private sector carries all the risk; however, the 
Department of Energy carries the risk if Eskom 
defaults on payment 
4 Private sector commercial gain 
and capacity 
Yes 
5 Preparation and planning for 
improved feasibility 
Yes 
6 Financing of the PPP process 
available 
Private Sector finances the entire process 
7 Positive local impact Yes 
8 Citizen engagement Yes 
9 PPP framework available Yes 
 
Source: Nel (2018) 
 
One respondent notes that a prime consequence of the deviation from the classic PPP 
paradigm is the creation of a replicable procurement framework for subsequent projects. 
The IPP example therefore unlocks the procurement possibilities for a programme of 
similar infrastructure projects, such as the delivery of public schools. 
 
6.3.12 Public Schools as a Delivery Objective 
The applicability of public schools as a delivery objective for PPPs is reinforced by the 
quantitative data, whereby survey respondents identified that semi-complex 
infrastructure is most applicable to the PPP mode. Aided by a repetitive procurement 
framework for delivery, as discussed above, most respondents agree that, due to their 
reasonably uncomplicated and modular nature, public schools are a strong candidate 
for delivery via a PPP. Respondents reinforced this by noting that there is sufficient 
competition in the industry to deliver this infrastructure type as it does not require 
specialised technical know-how and the risk is therefore low enough to mitigate most 
of the potential delivery complications. 
However, one respondent cautioned that a benefit of making use of a PPP, namely 




typology. Delivering public schools in the current context via a PPP where all emphasis 
is on providing classrooms to meet the demand may overlook the opportunity to 
rethinking the paradigm of this particular infrastructure typology. The reason this is a 
concern is contextual. The pressure to provide public schools in the current context is 
rooted in provision, not innovation or a paradigm shift. In the denser parts of the 
province sites are being swallowed up by informal settlements as people flock into the 
metro. In the current paradigm a typical school requires a large site of approximately 
2.5 hectares with the buildings constructed as a series of single-storey wings separated 
by courtyards for play areas and a 100 by 60 metre sports field. This aspect is not 
conducive to servicing the needs of a rapidly urbanising population and needs to be 
urgently reconsidered in the face of the diminishing availability of suitable sites for new 
schools. Innovation could also take another turn as schools are currently run as single-
serving facilities. Public schools in the province are generally constructed to only 
further the ends of education and do not permit usage outside this purpose. The potential 
for schools as catalysts for urban social integration, adult learning, community 
facilities, and so forth. is completely overlooked. Reconsideration could not only solve 
the issue of optimising diminishing sites in the metro but also address issues of 
vandalism as schools spend most of their time vacant and largely unattended from the 
early afternoon, over weekends and during school holidays. 
Alternate revenue streams could also be considered should a mixed-use infrastructure 
typology be considered. This would open up the possibility for schools as PPPs in order 
to leverage the ability of the infrastructure to generate income for a potential private 
partner beyond simply attracting school fees. At present there are over 200 no-fee 
schools in the Western Cape who rely solely on government grants, corporate social 
investment initiatives and meagre fund-raising opportunities (Shelver, 2018). If these 
schools become able to generate an alternate source of income through alternate uses 
of their infrastructure they could become viable and reinforce their status in the 
communities which they serve. 
A further concern raised by a respondent who has been tracking demographic shifts and 
the effects on the demand for community facilities as suburbs or townships mature is 
that entering into long-term contractual arrangements, as in the PPP mode, could be 
dire if demands change. The only solution is to allow flexibility in the contract in order 





6.3.13 Unintended Consequences of PPP Arrangements 
When asked an open-ended question regarding the unintended consequences of PPPs 
respondents had a wide range of comments and concerns. Key themes regard 
contracting and control, which is a particular concern in the current context where the 
Department of Transport and Public Works plays the role of implementing agent on 
behalf of client departments, such as the Western Cape Education Department. A 
summary of the responses is listed below: 
1. Having contracted with the private sector in a PPP the public partner may 
think that they can deliver the same service completely themselves, cancelling 
potential future projects or finding other ways to implement them. 
2. Client departments that use implementing agents to deliver infrastructure may 
consider contracting directly with private partners, shifting the custodial roles 
away from the specialist departments mandated to perform this function. 
3. Losing control by the public sector due to unbundling contracts leading to 
increasing costs. 
4. Trying to insert too many secondary objectives into PPP transactions, such as 
developmental objectives (community empowerment through job creation). 
5. Transaction advisors who put together the original specification for the project 
may also want to bid on the project creating a potential conflict of interest, for 
example during the Chapman’s Peak Drive case study. 
6. Successfully implemented PPP projects could show up departments delivering 
infrastructure via TIP, leading these departments to refrain from contracting in 
this mode to avoid potential reputational damage. 
7. Lack of flexibility in the arrangements could lead to long-term projects that are 
not sustainable. 
8. Due to extended procurement timelines value for money could be impacted as 
it becomes difficult to keep both parties engaged and focussed on achieving 





6.3.14 Suggestions to Improve the Environment for PPPs 
When asked a similarly open-ended question about what could be done to create more 
favourable conditions for PPPs respondents highlighted a few key themes, namely 
addressing and streamlining the PPP procurement process, reviewing financing 
arrangements and ensuring an appropriate level of skill by both parties. The key 
findings are listed as follows: 
1. A good business plan and model for the transaction and delivery objective. 
2. Streamlined procurement to avoid often prohibitively complex and time-
consuming approval processes. 
3. Capacity-building amongst public sector implementation agencies to ensure 
officials are appropriately skilled to implement PPPs. 
4. Clear output specifications upfront with realistic expectations on the level of 
service, i.e. public partner client to set the expectations appropriate to the 
available budget or affordability ceiling. 
5. Continuity of key role-players from inception through approval and financial 
close into the operational period. 
6. Financing arrangements to be carefully balanced appropriate to the project at 
hand in terms of a mix of public and private finance. 
7. Revenue stream for the private partner to be carefully thought through in terms 
of user-pays (school fees, government subsidy). 
8. For repetitive infrastructure such as public schools it would be advantageous 
to create a long-term procurement pipeline, taking a programmatic approach to 
the delivery of similar projects such as that used for the IPP model. 
 
6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The measurable aspects of the factors listed indicate that public sector capacity is a 
major concern that needs to be addressed in order to permit an environment conducive 
to effective delivery through PPPs. The major issues with public sector capacity involve 
a lack of suitably qualified and experienced officials to implement the complex projects 
contemplated, as well as the attitude to administration and compliance-thinking where 




public sector bureaucrat. Reinforcing this finding is the view that officials that 
participate in a PPP are not exposed to subsequent similar projects, either through poor 
experience or lack of subsequent opportunities. This presents a barrier to gaining much-
needed further experience within the public sector. While the foundational aspects of 
PPPs, namely affordability, value for money and risk transfer rate highly as expected, 
so too does private sector capacity, having been significantly eroded by the brain drain 
and lack of infrastructure megaprojects to sustain the private sector in recent years. 
On the financing side respondents note that PPPs would be best financed if the private 
partner arranges the majority of the finance through borrowing or equity. This is 
considered preferable due to the private partner’s ability to manage their cashflow more 
effectively, concern being drawn to the public sector’s inefficiency in paying suppliers 
timeously. In terms of the type of infrastructure contemplated for PPPs, respondents 
indicate a preference for semi-complex infrastructure (such as public schools). 
Respondents also note that the level of service should not be pitched at such a level that 
value for money is adversely affected, the preference here being for a level of quality 
that achieves slightly higher than the basic minimum set by the public sector in order 
to ensure a trade-off between quality and cost. 
Respondents note that the regulatory framework is more than adequate for its purpose. 
In fact, it may be considered restrictive and unwieldy, leaving procurement processes 
lengthy and uncertain. A general preference indicates that PPP procurement should be 
reviewed to allow for more streamlined and agile processes that work to engage 
programmes of similar projects in lieu of complex standalone projects. 
Key findings in terms of unintended consequences of PPPs include public sector 
departments which may consider that they are able to deliver similar projects 
themselves without the same assistance of a private partner in a partnership 
arrangement. There is also a concern around the potential loss of control of the 
arrangement as well as the danger of inserting too many secondary objectives into the 
arrangement which may adversely affect the delivery of the primary objective. Lastly, 
the dangers of PPPs are identified in terms of a lack of flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances during a long-term off-take period and the extended timelines for 
approval which could, again, erode value for money as the parties lose patience in 




7: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS – WHAT 
ARE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PPP FOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS? 
6.1 THE WAY FORWARD AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Having established the factors to be addressed to create conditions for a public school 
PPP in the Western Cape, the question is now how this could be turned into action. 
Firstly, the critical factors identified in this research project need to be addressed, most 
notably public sector capacity and creating a platform for streamlined procurement. 
Next, an investigation is needed into the resources available to take on a project of this 
nature through a review of who is currently providing schools from the private sector 
and whether they would even consider entering into a long-term contractual relationship 
with the public sector to expand their offering. 
 
6.2 ADDRESSING THE LIMITING FACTORS: CAPACITY AND 
POLITICAL WILL 
In a dissertation on corporate governance in PPPs, Brink (2006:135-146) identifies the 
following characteristics that public sector managers should seek to improve or promote 
in order to create an environment for successful PPPs: improved risk management, 
innovation and entrepreneurial thinking in the development public sector culture, 
involvement of civil society in the broader PPP scenario, public sector manager 
accountability, and a quest for stronger leadership. The above points to the need for a 
culture shift in the way public managers approach their work and how they plan, lead 
and organise the delivery of services to the South African public. In an environment 
plagued by corruption and poor governance, the local public service is under pressure 
to transform itself into a state where ethical and transparent civil servants are driven to 
seek out new ways of scaling up delivery in a country beset with massive socio-
economic inequalities. 
Brink (2006) also refers to the required shift being more than just the superficial (and 




shift whereby public sector actors are not just permitted, but actively encouraged to take 
calculated risks in seeking out solutions to contemporary and future problems. One 
aspect that was touched on in Chapter 2 regarding critical success factors is leadership. 
Senior managers in executive positions are critical to promote innovation, initiative and 
creative solutions to the challenges of service delivery. At the other end of the spectrum 
is the ever-present bane of compliance, often seen as a necessary evil or a barrier to 
creating conditions for effective implementation. The Red Tape Reduction unit in the 
Western Cape government identifies the following perceptions from interactions with 
the private sector: “bureaucratic officials, a lack of coordination between agencies and 
departments, a lack of clarity about government’s objectives, processes and timeframes, 
not enough transparent decision-making, the inconsistent interpretation of rules, no 
connection between the regulator and business [and] a lack of accountability regarding 
decision-making.” (DEDAT, 2015). Unfortunately, results of the unit’s efforts so far 
appear to be limited to the sphere of encouraging the development of small, medium 
and micro-enterprises (SMMEs), which is on the complete opposite side of the 
spectrum to where PPPs are intended to operate. This is no surprise as the risks around 
the implementation of megaprojects are very different to those of SMMEs, as the lure 
of large gains have left a trail of suspicious public and private actors in the wake of the 
recent Zondo commission (SA State Capture, n.d.). 
 
“And so, the narrative is gradually changing in South Africa. With new leaders 
in government and many state-owned enterprises, there are signs that the right 
‘tone at the top’ is being set, indicating that the very long journey towards 
building an ethical society has a greater chance of gaining momentum …” 
(TEI, 2018:12) 
 
Taking the above into consideration it is worth noting the character of many of the 
public sector PPP specialists, which, while being interviewed, displayed both an 
appreciation of the scale of the task at hand as well as a compulsion to engage with the 
challenges. This may partly be due to the reasonable seniority of the individuals 




who hold them individually accountable and, perhaps, a reasonably stable work 
environment (job security) and lucrative remuneration and benefits package. However, 
what also needs to be taken into consideration is that there is an inward locus at play. 
Due to their level of skill and experience, these officials have the option of plying their 
trade in numerous spheres outside the public sector; however, they choose to work 
within its bounds. The reason often cited is one of impact. From the outside, specialists 
and contractors have to wait until the public sector initiates a PPP. Internally, however, 
public sector officials are in a unique position to lobby their political masters and 
advocate for the PPP mode. This requires a need to ensure that their political seniors 
are open to the idea, as well as an assurance that this mode is deemed appropriate based 
on proven ability and knowledge. 
With the public sector is currently desperately trying to optimise traditional 
infrastructure procurement, it is essential that there is a viable alternative to alleviate 
the pressure in selected and appropriate areas. Further, it appears that the days of TIP 
as a primary mode for public infrastructure delivery are running out as the local public 
sector is put under increasing pressure to deliver the infrastructure needs of a 
developmental state with fewer resources year-on-year. The Industrial Development 
Corporation’s review of the 2019 National Budget (refer to the figures below) indicates 
that the public sector needs to continue the upward trend in providing education 
infrastructure in the face of a declining public sector wage bill: in essence, civil servants 





Figure 29: Changes in government expenditure for 2019/20 - 2020/21 




Table 16: Public-sector infrastructure expenditure and estimates, dotted rectangle by researcher 
 
 
Source: IDC (2019:14) 
 
While the officials interviewed appreciate that compliance is a vital element of any 
public action, they are also well aware that this requirement tends to detract from 




producing regulations which are, arguably, often beyond the ability or capacity of the 
public institutions meant to implement them, it is an essential skill to be able to utilise 
current policy frameworks to optimise rather than constrain achievement of objectives. 
What does this mean for the public sector? In order to unlock public sector capacity and 
not just for PPPs, officials need to be trained to look to the enabling aspect of policies 
in order to unlock the needs of their immediate environment and ensure that an 
appropriate level of compliance is undertaken balanced against the need to scale up 
delivery. In terms of quantum, public sector implementing agencies will also benefit 
from a strategic shift in terms of organisational design and behaviour to create the 
resources necessary to implement alternative procurement options. This is nowhere 
more apparent than within the DTPW where the PPP unit, which exists as a satellite 
unit adjacent to Education Infrastructure (EI) is permitted to employ 16 officials, in 
terms of the approved establishment, alongside EI’s 113. 
 
6.3 VOLATILITY FOR PPPS IN THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT 
A further concern that warrants discussion is the current volatility in the PPP arena 
which has a direct influence on public and political perception, both of which 
significantly influence initial adoption and ongoing use of this procurement mode. An 
example of this is the recent and as-yet unsubstantiated removal of the head of the 
Independent Power Producers (IPP) programme (Engineering News, 2019; 
Politicsweb, 2019). The official in question spearheaded significant investment in the 
renewable energy sector with a little over R200 billion being committed by private 
partners to the various renewable energy projects. The removal of the official from her 
post, however, casts aspersion on the underlying intentions of the current 
administration. This volatility is also manifested in structural changes to the PPP 
consulting sector, with one participant citing significant downsizing of their unit within 
a large consulting firm to suit operational needs due to a lack of PPP projects, while 
another participant immigrated for the same reason. 
An insight into the geographic spread of respondents / participants warrants discussion. 
Although the set was initially limited to the Western Cape it became apparent that is 




wherever their expertise is needed. Many PPP specialists reside in Gauteng as they were 
at some point involved with the National Treasury’s PPP unit based in Pretoria before 
taking up positions elsewhere as their careers developed, or as needs of the projects 
they may have been working on arose. What is striking is that the geographic spread of 
specialists was not influenced by their particular sector. PPP specialists employed by 
the public sector appear to have experienced a similar degree of geographic relocation 
to their private sector counterparts. 
 
6.4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
In terms of the applicability of public schools for PPPs, a common cry is becoming 
apparent – that the current public-school paradigm be overhauled. This roots of this are 
two-fold: there is a lack of alternate revenue streams available to schools in order to 
fully subsidise their operations, and a lack of available sites in the metro where the need 
is greatest. For PPPs, the former is self-evident as creating an environment for 
alternative revenue streams could allow private sector operators to unlock other value 
aspects not currently considered. The latter concern is rooted in addressing the current 
paradigm where sprawling single-storey schools are placed on marginalised fringe sites 
where they are at risk of illegal occupation by the very communities which they intend 
to serve. The solution could be unlocked through one of the benefits of PPPs: 
innovation. Harnessing the additional resource base offered by the private sector could 
lead to innovative solutions to this problem. 
Many commentators, including participants in this research project, refer to the 
complex and time-consuming nature of the PPP regulations forming a hurdle to 
effective procurement. It is worth noting, however, that the regulations were drafted to 
address all forms of delivery via this mode and were therefore substantially 
comprehensive in addressing the primary aspect of PPP delivery. In the Independent 
Power Producers procurement mentioned previously, the intention was to implement a 
programmatic approach to delivery where a replicable formula was used to create a 
pipeline for the procurement of similar projects. While this is touched on in the section 




the IPPs, it is worth exploring this as a mode to further unlock the delivery of public 
schools by PPPs or a similar mode. The procurement lessons learnt through the IPPs 
involved a thorough evaluation of the prevailing PPP regulations and what could be 
done to unlock the public-private paradigm to improve and streamline procurement. 
The intention was to create a pipeline via a replicable formula. Shifting to a programme 
approach, as the IPPs did, involved streamlining certain barriers to procurement, one of 
which was to systematise risk transfer. In the IPP model, the private partner carries the 
full risk of the infrastructure, providing all the funding. This allows the public sector to 
limit their exposure to just the off-take agreement where the product (electricity) is the 
only deliverable. Further, the infrastructure is never transferred to the public sector. 
With the risk of redundant infrastructure wholly with the private partner, there is no 
concern for future repurposing or shifting demands transferred to the public sector. 
With the IPP model considered a form of ‘supplier agreement’, how could this be 
transferred as a model for public schools? 
The first part of the solution involves standardising output specifications. For schooling, 
this includes ensuring that the private sector complies with the norms and standards for 
school infrastructure and ensuring that education outcomes are comparable with that of 
the prevailing public sector in terms of curriculum via the grade system. 
The second major hurdle requiring addressing opportunities is the demand risk. In an 
environment characterised by rapid urbanisation and shifts in community needs it is 
essential to create a flexible platform for any public-school PPP. This will need to allow 
the public partner the room to respond to demographic shifts during the lengthy time 
periods contemplated by this procurement mode. 
Next is affordability. At present the various private school operators levy significant 
fees in order to pay educator’s salaries and build and maintain the infrastructure, while 
these two items are fully subsidised by government in public schools. In many public 
schools the School Governing Body posts (paid for by school fees) and infrastructure 
are constructed from fundraising or donations. 
Under a user-pays model, this means that any schools contemplated for a PPP would 
need to have some form of income generation either through school fees or other forms 
of revenue. There are many schools which are fully privately funded; however, these 




self-sustaining. These schools fall outside the scope of those contemplated in this 
project. At the other end of the spectrum are no-fee schools. Unless provincial 
government is amenable to entering into a long-term off-take agreement (a kind of 
rental agreement to an operator), the no-fee schools, where there is little to no revenue 
stream from the schools itself, would similarly fall outside the scope of public schools 
contemplated for a PPP. What is left is many fee-paying schools which, although a 
revenue stream exists, remain firmly entrenched in the public-school paradigm. 
 
6.5 POTENTIAL PRIVATE PARTNERS 
The real question to be asked in further research is: are there potential public partners 
who can demonstrate a willingness and capability to enter into this domain? While there 
are private education providers such as ADvTECH and Curro it is untested whether 
these or similar groups would consider partnering with the public sector. The major risk 
items that would need to be considered are a viable business case through a bankable 
financial model (i.e. user-pays model and/or government guarantee), the ownership of 
the school sites, agreement of the specifications of the required standards expected by 
the public sector (i.e. educator-learner ratios and choice of curriculum) and flexibility 
in terms of how the offerings may need to be adapted to respond to the changing needs 
of the communities they may serve during any long-term period. 
The key to the ADvTECH and Curro operations is their scale. While these groups 
initially began with high-end tailored offerings to meet the specific needs of the 
education spectrum which were not being met by the public education system, in recent 
years they have each commenced with campaigns to narrow the socio-economic gap 
through more cost-effective versions of the fee-paying public-school model. As they 
grow in scale, so too does their economy and fees are indeed falling, making them a 
viable alternative to upper-middle class South Africans looking for schools with a focus 
on quality education through lower educator-learner ratios. 
ADvTECH claims to have over 45 000 students in their 103 schools across South 
Africa, Botswana and Kenya (ADvTECH, 2019). School fees for the Pinnacle College 
range of schools, which represents their mid-fee offering, are in the range from R3 000 




reported having 57 276 learners at 68 campuses (Curro, 2019:3) at an average school 
fee of R3 500 per month (Business Insider, 2019). There are already 16 Curro schools 
in the Western Cape with 12 located in the Cape Town metro. 
 
 




Both groups are focussed on growth, and stories of the number of new schools on offer 
are constantly in the media. With the lack of sites available and government being a 
major landowner, at some point the opportunity may arise where the needs of the public 
and private sectors may be aligned in the interests of increasing the roll out of public 
education to a rapidly increasing population in the province. 
 
6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter took the quantitative and qualitive research findings and placed them into 




partnership with the private sector using as a case study of the Independent Power 
Producers (IPP) programme and the implementation of a unique procurement facility, 
a “hybrid” version of the traditional PPP mode. For modular or repetitive procurement 
this mode takes a programmatic approach, a sort of procurement production line which, 
arguably, lends itself to implementation of modular, repetitive infrastructure, such as 
public schools. 
Taking into context South Africa as a developing nation constrained by specialist 
resources and high economic volatility it is a relief to know that there remain 
opportunities and willingness for private sector involvement in public services, closer 
to the topic of this research project: public schools. The introduction of cost-effective 
models from the private sector bridges the gap between public and private education 
offerings. It is therefore logical to consider a situation to where, with minimal input 
from the public sector, the private sector may enter this arena on a large scale. The real 
question that becomes evident from the research is whether the public sector is willing 
and ready to consider this option. Given the evidence that the major constraints are a 
lack of public sector capacity, insufficient political will and a restrictive policy 
framework it is unlikely that the public sector will entertain this anytime soon. 
However, should these three factors be addressed as outlined in this research project, 
the potential for harnessing the private sector to unlock the provision of public 




8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM SUMMARY AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
This research project was initiated in order to investigate options available to the public 
sector to mitigate the shortage of public schools in the Western Cape brought on by 
significant population growth and rapid urbanisation in the region. The report began 
with an investigation into the context, quantifying the impacts these two factors are 
having on service delivery, focussing specifically on the provision of public schools in 
the province. The above was covered in Chapter 1 where the basis for the research 
problem was established in terms of pressures on the delivery of public schools, as well 
as the context in terms of the state of current public sector infrastructure delivery. 
Finally, the public-private partnership paradigm was introduced as the only remaining 
avenue left untested for the delivery of public-school infrastructure in South Africa, let 
alone the province. 
In Chapter 2 the conceptual framework underpinning the research problem was 
investigated in its various dimensions through a review of available literature. Public 
sector infrastructure delivery in the local context was reviewed with specific reference 
to the relative merits and, more specifically, the constraints of Traditional Infrastructure 
Delivery (TIP), the current bastion of public sector delivery favoured by public 
infrastructure delivery agencies in SA. Specific credence was given to the factors 
critical to the success of this paradigm through a review of the available literature, 
mostly international. 
Critical success factors such as affordability, value for money (VFM) and risk transfer 
were specifically reviewed as these form the very reason the public sector contemplates 
entering into this form of procurement mode. In addition, factors pertinent to the local 
context were also reviewed, including leadership and political will, goal alignment and 
governance. It was noted, however, that despite some parallels the local context does 
not reflect the international context of the texts reviewed. For this reason conditions in 
the local environment were given a specific focus where more peripheral factors were 
reviewed such as leadership and political will, goal alignment and governance. These 




the public sector to advocate for and implement projects effectively via this mode as 
well as the spectre of corruption and state capture which haunts the megaprojects often 
contemplated with this mode of procurement. 
Chapter 3 addressed the legislative and regulatory framework in terms of two aspects: 
the delivery and management of public infrastructure and procurement opportunities in 
terms of the Public Finance Management Act and the various frameworks for PPP 
budgeting and procurement. It was established that the regulatory framework for 
infrastructure delivery and PPP procurement is well developed. This last fact becomes 
constrictive when considering that one of the factors critical to the success of PPPs is a 
degree of flexibility. To this end, the procurement framework for PPPs in SA is 
considered by critics to be too well developed to the point where it constrains more than 
it enables. With timelines in the order of 18 months on average from inception to 
financial close (concluding the procurement process) it is difficult to keep partners 
engaged on achieving value – one of the most critical factors in ensuring that PPPs are 
effective. These timeframes also open up the potential for loss of critical personnel, 
critical to ensuring continuity in terms of engagement with the process. 
 
8.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 4 covered the research design and methodology. The research problem, namely 
‘Are PPPs a feasible delivery option for public schools in the Western Cape?’ was 
proposed with three secondary questions intended to aid the research process in 
achieving a solution: 
1. What factors are critical to the success of an infrastructure PPPs in the local 
and current context? 
2. Are these factors sufficiently present in the current context to provide a 
suitable environment for the effective delivery of public schools in the 
Western Cape? 
3. What can be done to improve the appetite or address any constraints this mode 






The above three questions set the framework for a triangulated research approach; the 
process being split into three sections to answer each of the three questions above. The 
research design therefore involved three distinct processes to collect and analyse data. 
The first question was addressed by identifying factors critical to the success of a local 
PPP via a review of a series of local case studies (secondary data analysis). The second 
question measured these factors via a quantitative survey issued to local role-players in 
the PPP space. The third question was addressed through a series of depth interviews 
with local PPP specialists to uncover root causes and propose solutions to addressing 
adverse findings in the quantitative phase should a PPP for public schools be 
considered. 
Chapter 4 also provided a discussion on the validity of the findings, which is important 
given the relatively small data set, but is justified by the narrow field of engagement on 
the topic. Ethical considerations were covered and, finally, the scope and exclusions of 
the research were discussed: this project being limited to infrastructure solutions only, 
and not being a more comprehensive approach to both the delivery and operations of 
public schools despite the possibility of this in the present environment. 
 
8.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
8.3.1 Case Study Findings 
The case studies were reviewed in Chapter 5 and uncovered the following factors 
critical to the success of PPPs in the local context: 
1. Affordability 
2. Value for money 
3. Risk transfer 
4. Regulatory framework 
5. Clear performance specifications and monitoring 
6. Political will and leadership/advocacy 
7. Innovation 
8. PPP specialist input and oversight 
9. Goal alignment 






In addition, a distinction was drawn between factors that form the foundation for PPPs, 
namely the first four listed above, with the remainder forming factors that enhance or 
otherwise optimise the arrangement. The factors were then rationalised to represent a 
set of measurable factors that could be used to represent ten factors considered critical 
to the success of a public schools PPP in the Western Cape: 
1. Affordability 
2. Value for money 
3. Risk transfer 
4. Regulatory framework 
5. Political will and advocacy 
6. Transparency 
7. Public sector capability/capacity (skills and resources) 
8. Private sector capability/capacity (skills and resources) 
9. Market competition (in the local construction industry) 
10. Economic stability 
 
8.3.2 Survey and Interview Findings 
Chapter 6 constituted the empirical data analysis stage conducted in two phases: a 
quantitative phase to measure the above factors collected via an online survey, and a 
qualitative phase to identify underlying causes and solutions conducted via a series of 
depth interviews. The first phase measured the factors in terms of two dimensions: (1) 
their perceived importance; and (2) their perceived presence or potential for 
achievement in the present environment. While the founding PPP elements of risk 
transfer, affordability and value for money were seen as highly important, so too was 
the capacity of the public and private sector alike to deliver, as well as allied factors 
such as transparency and political will. In terms of presence in the current environment, 
risk transfer, private sector capacity and regulatory framework formed were found to 




However, public sector capacity dropped to last while its allied factor, political will, 
came in only two places above, with economic stability separating the two. 
The next step in the quantitative analysis involved overlaying the two data sets to gauge 
differences between the perceived importance of the ten factors against their apparent 
presence in the current environment. The results provided a very different picture of the 
situation. Firstly, it was notable that nine out of the ten factors were found to be slightly 
deficient in terms of their presence against their relative measurements of importance. 
This could be an indication of a general sense of pessimism of the possibility for PPPs 
to achieve fruition at present. At the top of the list was public sector capacity/capability, 
which had a high degree of importance, but was lowest in terms of presence. Second 
was political will, which is interesting as it is arguably allied with public sector 
capacity: capable implementing departments linked to a perception of confidence by 
political heads. Economic stability and affordability were also notably deficient in 
terms of their presence versus their high importance. The remaining factors, while 
notably closer in terms of their presence versus importance, were still slightly in arrears. 
Regulatory framework was the only factor that reversed this trend. The implication of 
this is that the current regulatory framework for PPPs may perhaps be too present in the 
current environment, indicating a possible constraint or limiting factor. 
Other aspects included in the quantitative survey of the PPP mode considered relevant 
to the delivery of public schools include whether the infrastructure typology was 
considered favourable for PPPs, financing arrangements in terms of the split between 
government and private capital injection and the level of quality considered preferable 
for effective delivery by PPP. The results indicate that, as a modular and reasonably 
uncomplicated infrastructure type, public schools lend themselves to delivery by PPPs. 
Financial arrangements favour majority private finance (debt and equity) in terms of 
the major contributors to the arrangement, which has a positive effect on the willingness 
of the private partner to accept risk. Finally, PPPs should be seen to provide a quality 
of service that is above minimum standards, i.e. exceeding the quality of standard public 
sector infrastructure, or local best practice. It is notable that survey respondents, public 
and private sector alike, stated a categoric “no” to the option of using PPPs to deliver 
top level or ‘world class’ infrastructure. This finding is consistent with the concern that 




The second phase, the qualitative analysis, elicited a series of findings that underpinned 
the results of the quantitative analysis. Firstly, the lack of public sector capacity is 
linked to two dimensions: a scarcity in the number of public sector specialists employed 
in PPP implementation units and the lack of officials skilled in the PPP mode to promote 
and administer this procurement mode. Lack of political will was found to be linked to 
a general sense of risk aversion on the part of political heads who have little to gain but 
much to lose by using the PPP mode. The low conversion rate of PPPs from inception 
to financial close over the last 20 years is also cited as having contributed to this 
sentiment. While on the theme of capability, private sector capacity, while still 
considered present, has been significantly eroded by the ongoing brain drain as 
specialists flee the country for less turbulent political and economic environments in 
the developed world where their skills are highly prized. The result is that while we 
currently have capacity to implement PPPs by private sector specialists, the lack of 
competition means the cost of procuring transaction advisors is considerable. When 
taking into account the amount of time and effort in entering into the PPP paradigm and 
going through the tedious procurement stages, the costs become prohibitive if the scale 
of the project does not justify the risk. 
Moving into the founding factors for PPPs, affordability is a major barrier to large 
public infrastructure projects. The impact of committing funding to a single, large, long-
term project means taking away from the delivery of other projects for the foreseeable 
future, leaving public sector agencies at odds with public sentiment when needs change. 
The other dimension of the affordability debate revolves around innovative uses of 
private finance, with PPP specialists noting a lack of consideration of alternate revenue 
streams to fund projects. Lastly, the level of service appears to be of critical concern 
when considering PPPs and public sector agencies expect a level well in excess of what 
is deemed adequate, negatively affecting any affordability calculation. 
Among PPP specialists, value for money (VFM) was noted to be of particular concern 
when it comes to the off-take or operational period. This finding is reinforced by the 
fact that most texts refer to the need to ensure VFM is tested during procurement only 
and do not mention anything further on the factor during the implementation phase of 
any PPP project. Participants note the need for ongoing monitoring and evaluation 
during the whole life of the project to ensure that the private partner consistently 




Risk transfer was found to be related to the need to transfer risk out of the public sector 
implementing agent, the issue being that this comes with a concern around the cost of 
doing so, affecting value for money, and the concern that this may only be achieved by 
handing over control to the private partner. It is ironic then that this latter point is often 
cited as the very reason why many public sector infrastructure delivery components 
hang on to traditional infrastructure procurement, where all the risks are retained. In the 
end this appears to be related to a lack of understanding by public sector officials around 
the principles of risk transfer with the result that the preferred methodology is to retain 
all risks associated with delivery. 
Critical to risk transfer is how the financing arrangements are structured. Consistent 
with the findings in the literature review, it was noted that while access to private 
borrowing may be preferable in terms of ensuring consistent cashflow to the private 
partner as private financiers are more efficient at releasing interim payments, this has 
to be balanced against the cost of private borrowing as private financial institutions 
expect a return on their investment. It was noted that an injection of government funding 
often has a vital impact on the bankability of the project at hand. The following 
suggestions were made: 
1. State capital injection to make projects bankable (affordable); 
2. Remainder provided by private finance to ensure sufficient availability to cash 
and provide smooth cashflow to the private sector partner; 
3. Cost of borrowing from commercial banks must be properly factored in to 
ensure that the affordability ceiling for the private sector partner is not 
adversely affected; and 
4. The inclusion of a degree of private equity in the project to incentivise the 
private partner to manage costs effectively and focus on delivery. 
 
Transparency is currently part of a much broader concern due to the lack of information 
available in state procurement processes, in spite of which large procurement processes 
appear to proceed regardless. The current economic volatility is also a contributing 
factor to a sense that PPPs are considered too high risk at present. With many local 
contractors struggling to stay afloat in turbulent economic times the present may not be 




The regulatory framework for PPP procurement is considered a barrier to effective 
procurement due to the complex approval processes. The solutions proposed include 
taking a streamlined procurement approach and implementing projects via a 
programmatic process. This approach is taken whereby the procurement process is 
slimmed down to allow to for repeat procurement of similar projects, such as public 
schools. To this end, respondents note that public schools are considered a good fit for 
the PPP mode due to their simplicity and repetitive or modular nature. For this reason 
implementing a programmatic procurement approach for the delivery of public schools 
is considered a good fit. This approach has already borne fruit in SA through the 
Independent Power Producers (IPP) programme where a hybrid PPP approach has been 
taken to procure a series of similar energy projects. 
It is noted that PPPs can elicit the following unintended consequences: 
1. Having contracted with the private sector in a PPP the public partner may 
think that they can deliver the same service completely themselves, cancelling 
potential future projects or finding other ways to implement them; 
2. Client departments who use implementing agents to deliver infrastructure may 
consider contracting directly with private partners, shifting the custodial roles 
away from the specialist departments mandated to perform this function; 
3. Losing control by the public sector due to unbundling contracts leading to 
increasing costs; 
4. Trying to insert too many secondary objectives into PPP transactions such as 
developmental objectives (community empowerment through job creation); 
5. Transaction advisors who put together the original specification for the project 
may also want to bid on the project creating a potential conflict of interest – 
e.g. in the Chapman’s Peak Drive case study; 
6. Successfully implemented PPP projects could show up departments delivering 
infrastructure via TIP, leading these departments to refrain from contracting in 
this mode to avoid potential reputational damage; 
7. Lack of flexibility in the arrangements could lead to long-term projects that are 
not sustainable; and 
8. Due to extended procurement timelines value for money could be impacted as 
it becomes difficult to keep both parties engaged and focussed on achieving 





Suggestions to improve the environment for PPPs include the following: 
1. A good business plan and model for the transaction and delivery objective; 
2. Streamlined procurement to avoid the often prohibitively complex and time-
consuming approval processes; 
3. Capacity-building amongst public sector implementation agencies to ensure 
officials are appropriately skilled to implement PPPs; 
4. Clear output specifications upfront with realistic expectations on the level of 
service, i.e. public partner client to set the expectations appropriate to the 
available budget or affordability ceiling; 
5. Continuity of key role-players from inception through approval and financial 
close into the operational period; 
6. Financing arrangements to be carefully balanced, appropriate to the project at 
hand in terms of mix of public and private finance; 
7. Revenue stream for private partner to be carefully thought through in terms of 
user-pays (school fees, government subsidy); and 
8. For repetitive infrastructure such as public schools it would be advantageous 
to create a long-term procurement pipeline taking a programmatic approach to 
the delivery of similar projects such as that used for the IPP model. 
 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
From the findings it is evident that, while public schools may lend themselves to 
procurement and delivery via public-private partnership if a repeatable, programmatic 
procurement process is involved and/or a hybrid PPP approach is undertaken similar to 
that of the local Independent Power Producers programme, barriers do exist. These are 
a distinct lack of public sector PPP competency and political will brought on by a lack 
of skilled PPP proponents and specialists in the Western Cape and the considerable 
volatility in the local economic environment which casts aspersion, placing entering 
into long-term agreements at risk. 
That said, if a business case is made that unlocks the affordability of the provision of 




a factor that is already being exploited by at least two private sector education providers 
in their more affordable education offerings, then a PPP may be a suitable vehicle to 
provide much-needed public education facilities in the Western Cape while 
simultaneously lessening the burden on the public purse. In this instance two factors 
need to be addressed. Firstly, the public sector needs to attract and recruit PPP 
specialists to join the service or undertake a concerted training effort to upskill existing 
incumbents involved in infrastructure delivery to become proficient in this mode. This 
will ensure that projects and programmes are delivered competently and that value is 
achieved at all points in the delivery chain. Secondly, the current PPP procurement 
framework must be reviewed by the relevant treasury departments (both national and 
provincial) in the interests of streamlining the delivery of schools, something that is 
arguably entirely achievable given that public schools in our environment are generally 
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ANNEXURE A: SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS 
Note: The results of the quantitative survey are a combination of an online survey 
circulated via the online Survey Monkey platform, www.surveymonkey.com, (n = 10) 
and individual responses from interview respondents (n = 6) who were asked the same 
questions. 
Section 1: Background and Experience 
Question 1 
Please select your role. 
Response table (n = 16) 
RESPONDENT CATEGORY RESPONSES % 
Public Sector Client or Client Department Representative 0 0% 
Public Sector Implementing Agent 4 25% 
Public Sector Finance and/or Budgeting 2 12.5% 
Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation 0 0% 
Private Sector Transaction Advisor 2 12.5% 
Private Sector Built Environment Professional Consultant 0 0% 
Private Sector Contractor 5 31.25% 
Private Sector Financier or Insurer 1 6.25% 
Private Sector PPP Managing Agent 1 6.25% 
Other (please specify) (Note: one respondent in this category identified 
themselves as ‘research and academia’) 
1 6.25% 






Please select specific experience to date (in years). 
Response table (n = 16) 
Field of Experience 
0 - 2 
years 
3 - 5 
years 
6 – 10 
years 






Experience in Infrastructure 
































Section 2: Critical Success Factors in Public-Private Partnerships 
Question 3 
Please rate how important you consider the following factors in the implementation of 
PPPs. 
(Select: 1 = not at all important; 2 = minimally important; 3 = somewhat important; 4 
= very important; 5 = critically important) 
Response table 
Factor 



















































































































































































Please rate how achievable/prevalent you consider the following factors in the current 
political and economic environment. 
(Select: 1 = not at all achievable/prevalent; 2 = minimally achievable/prevalent; 3 = 





































































































































































































Section 3: PPP Financing 
 
Question 5 
What would you consider public finance in the current environment to be geared 
towards (you may select more than one option). 
 
Response table 
Answer choices Responses % 
Strategic long-term megaprojects 3 21% 
Medium- to large-scale medium-term projects 4 29% 
Medium scale short-term projects 3 21% 
Small scale short-term projects 4 29% 
Total Respondents: 9 14 100% 
 
Question 6 




Answer choices Responses % 
Private partner provides most of the capital finance (with small contribution by 
government) and recoups this during the operational period (either by user charges or 
government user contribution). 
4 45% 
Equal share of capital finance provision by private partner and government with 
private partner able to recoup investment during the operational period (either by 
user charges or government user contribution). 
2 22% 
Government provides most of the capital finance (with small contribution by private 
partner) with private partner able to recoup investment during the operational period 
(either by user charges or government user contribution). 
1 11% 
Not possible to provide a definitive answer as it depends on the scale and complexity 
of the project. 
2 22% 
Other (please specify) 0 0% 





Section 4: PPP suitability 
 
Question 7 
What infrastructure type would you consider the most appropriate for a PPP in the 
current environment? (you may select more than one option) 
 
Response table: 
Answer choices Responses % 
Complex infrastructure with sophisticated technical needs and bespoke (unique) 
elements (large hospitals, complex engineering projects) 
4 33% 
Semi-complex infrastructure with fairly modular elements (clinics, schools) 6 50% 
Simple infrastructure types with mostly repetitive elements (housing, roads) 2 17% 
Total Respondents: 9 12 100% 
 
Question 8 




Answer choices Responses % 
State of the art facility (world class) 0 0% 
Exceeding the standards set by the public sector (local best practice) 7 78% 
Meeting the minimum standards as set by the public sector (standard practice) 2 22% 






How confident are you that the following actors are currently willing and able to enter 
into a PPP to successfully deliver public schools in the Western Cape? 
(Select: 1 = not at all confident; 2 = minimally confident; 3 = somewhat confident; 4 = 


































































































Would you be willing to actively initiate, promote or otherwise participate in a PPP to 
deliver public schools in the Western Cape if the opportunity presented itself? 
 
Response table: 
Answer Choices Responses % 
Absolutely yes 5 56% 
Absolutely not 0 0% 
Not sure (maybe/maybe not) 2 22% 
Not applicable due to my present position, role or location 2 22% 






ANNEXURE B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Note: the below set of questions were used to structure the depth interviews in order to 
group responses into the themes identified in the quantitative phase. Some of the same 
quantitative questions used in the online survey were repeated in this phase and 
respondents were asked to substantiate their answers during the interviews. In all, ten 
interviews were conducted for this project. 
 
A. Personal Info 
 
1. Current employer, position and length of service in current position 
 
2. Highest qualification achieved and when 
 
B. PPP Experience 
 
1. When did you first engage in a PPP? 
 
2. What PPPs have you been involved with? 
 
3. What is your particular experience with PPPs? 
 
4. How familiar are you with the various stages in PPPs? I.e. the stages 
pertaining to Design, Finance, Build, Operate, Transfer, etc? 
 
5. How many staff or officials in your immediate environment have PPP 
experience? 
 





In your view:  
 
1. Please rate the following critical success factors in terms of importance (1 = 
not at all important to 5 = critically important). Please substantiate your 
answers in each case. 
1. Value for Money 
2. Affordability 
3. Political Will 
4. Risk Transfer 
5. Transparency 
6. Economic Stability 
7. Regulatory Framework 
8. Public Sector Capacity and Skills 
9. Private Sector Capacity and Skills 
10. Private Sector Competition 
 
 
2. In your opinion, what is the current level of prevalence of the critical success 
factors listed above in the current environment (1 = non-existent and needs to 
be addressed, 5 = fully present and does not need to be addressed). Please 
substantiate your answers in each case.  
 
1. Value for Money 
2. Affordability 
3. Political Will 
4. Risk Transfer 
5. Transparency 
6. Economic Stability 
7. Regulatory Framework 
8. Public Sector Capacity and Skills 
9. Private Sector Capacity and Skills 
10. Private Sector Competition 
 
3. What are the constraints in the current environment (Western Cape) for a 
successful PPP? 
 
4. Which of these CSFs are you (or your office/firm) able to provide strategic 
direction or otherwise influence? 
 
D. PPP Typology 
 





1. What have been the most successful PPP formats for infrastructure delivery in 
the Western Cape? (DFBOT, Design-Build, etc.) 
 
2. What have been the least successful, if any? 
 
E. Comparisons with Traditional Infrastructure Procurement  
 
In your view:  
 
1. Is traditional infrastructure procurement in the Western Cape more or less 
effective than a PPP and why? 
 
2. What factors favour TIP over PPPs and vice versa? 
 
F. PPP Finance  
 
In your view:  
 
1. How should PPPs be financed, i.e. direct government funding (capital 
injection, concession or combination of both?), private finance, private partner 
equity in projects or combination of any three or others? 
 
2. How long is the optimal period for a PPP (or does it depend on the nature of 
the PPP) and why?  
  
G. General questions  
 
In your view: 
 
1. Is the current environment conducive to the effective delivery of public 
services through a PPP and why? 
 





3. Going forward, what are the current threats or opportunities for PPPs in the 
future? 
 
4. How successful are the PPPs you have been involved with in delivering on 
their planned objectives? 
 
5. What are the unintended consequences of PPPs? 
 
6. What would you consider should be addressed or improved in order to 





ANNEXURE C: SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
Note: the below table is a summary of the responses from the depth interviews grouped 
under the following headings which correlate with the critical success factors identified 
(ranked alphabetically): affordability, current environment, improvements (suggestions 
for PPPs), market competition, political will, PPP finance, PPP period (duration of off-
take period), private sector capacity, public schools as end product (i.e. suitability to 
deliver public schools via PPP), public sector capacity, regulatory framework, risk 
transfer, threats for PPPs, TIP vs. PPP (traditional infrastructure procurement vs. 
public-private partnerships), transparency, unintended consequences, value for money. 
 
Affordability 
Must be considered against temptation to deliver world-class products which government 
can't afford or are deemed excessive. 
PPP’s are sometimes seen by public sector officials as a panacea for affordability issues – 
“the private sector will pay”. Innovative funding ideas can be developed to improve 
affordability but innovative projects ideas which drive VfM will have bigger impact on 
affordability e.g. Inner city schools from refurbished buildings. 
there has been a lot of media attention recently on the Gautrain and its affordability. 
Current Environment 
Current construction industry instability could be a risk for entering into long-term projects. 
Current government seems to be conducive to economic development (lower risk than 
previous administration). 
Currently perception is an issue, people are hesitant to engage or pursue PPPs due to 
concern that this is a form of privatisation – concern about state capture. 
Currently the affordability ceiling is too low for government to be able to fund large projects 
upfront. 
Framework in place. 
Growing need for infrastructure investment in SA. 
if the economy is constrained, there is less budgetary allocation to government entities so 
the less urgent aspects are often put to the side. However, implementing a PPP could help 
stimulate the local economy, which would be helpful particularly when the economic is 
under strain. 
In a rand-based project environment stability sufficient although deteriorating in terms of tax 
collections which will bring long term affordability into question. Projects with a large 




PPP preference possible if private sector brings flexibility of how they delivery services, 
more efficient, can source items more affordably than public sector. 
Improvements 
A possible user-pays revenue stream. Difficult for Government to justify collecting 
infrastructure fees in addition to taxes. 
Approval processes need to be reviewed to make them less onerous in terms of time to 
financial close (shorter). 
Bankability of the idea is very important. 
Business plan and business model. 
Can be repeated to leverage skills on public and private sector sides, hence toll roads as a 
sector undertaken by SANRAL was successful (but then terminated politically). 
Clear output specifications and don't set the standards or expectation too high (try a Rolls 
Royce on a VW budget). 
Create realistic expectations using existing PPPs as case studies. 
For schools – use existing body of knowledge on school typologies to achieve VFM through 
standardisation. 
Government capital contributions to keep cost of borrowing down. 
government support for municipal PPPs. 
Higher skill or operational input from private sector (for example building a large water 
storage dam as a PPP makes little sense other than raising funds as little future 
management; contrast a hospital with or without provision of medical services). 
improve the communication flow between government, its transaction advisors and the 
private party. 
Increase Public Sector's capacity to implement PPPs (recruit more in-house specialists). 
Involvement of key specialists from the start and continuity. 
Leverage available funding. 
Long-term programme of projects (such as IPPs). 
more active government involvement in the process to minimise delays. 
Political stability in the administrative sphere - must be continuity of project ownership (e.g. 
project leader had to present a project multiple times to political decision makers due to lack 
of continuity of stakeholders). 
Political will, delivery focus and speed to market. 
practicality of implementation for the government entity. 
Provincial departments must have a clear brief - must limit scope creep. 
Ready provision of seed capital at feasibility stage. 




Streamline procurement process (treasury approvals). 
Systematic approach to project selection to ensure a sustained pipeline of appropriate PPP 
projects. 
timelines may not meet the requirements of the client department especially based on 
current need. 
Using programme approach with a pipeline of similar projects. 
Market Competition 
Competition is high (many bidders). 
Probably declining due to low deal flow and lack of general public sector infrastructure 
spend, with similar declines in mining and large industry capacity. 
there doesn’t seem to be much procurement of PPPs at this stage, but hopefully it will pick 
up. 
very concerning to the lenders if this has not been conducted correctly. Competition is 
important but it is important to note that a holistic view needs to be taken of all required 
aspects. 
Political Will 
Important not to underestimate the power of executive officials who are able to influence 
political heads and advocate for a particular stratagem - if a department or component has a 
proven track record then it has an advantage in generating the political will to move in a 
certain direction. 
lack of appetite, innovation, novelty: "it's been done like this for so long, why change it 
now?" 
Lack of confidence in PPPs due to many failed starts. 
political support generally lacking, poor risk appetite among politicians. 
PPP process been well run with good transparency and controls, but projects cancelled 
because did not offer sufficient opportunities for “participation”. 
Western Cape perceived as most likely to adopt innovative approaches. Need to overcome 
profit-motive and union criticism and focus on delivery. 
without this projects stall, as can be seen with the DRDLR office accommodation project + 
this better than under the previous administration when projects stalled.  
PPP Finance 
Capital grant may lower costs, but may adversely affect risk transfer. 
Combination of public and private. 
Combination of public and private - important to link to risk transfer (private partner should 
take on majority of risk). 
Depending on the size of the project, a capital contribution will make it more affordable and 
bankable but this should be in combination with a concession. This should then be 




General concern about off-book debt. 
No best approach, depends on project. 
On projects which do not involve a user charge (e.g. Prisons or schools) maximum benefit 
would be obtained by letting projects be fully funded by private sector with government 
paying a user fee. Properly structure this can lead to a high level of private sector debt 
funding (which has tax benefits to project and a provincial project). 
Private companies prefer government borrowing due to costs to service debt and less risk in 
repaying debt during off-take period. 
Upfront government contribution seems to work best on user-pay projects to make the tariff 
“affordable” (whether that is defined in economic or political terms), for example Chapman’s 
Peak and Gautrain. This can be supplemented with a future contribution to alleviate user 
volume risk as in Gautrain. 
Upfront government contribution will reduce future commitments improving long term 
affordability but may limit current affordability to leverage as many projects as possible. 
PPP Period 
Depends on nature of the project - e.g. FM was 12 year contract, DFBO 20-30 years, 
tourism PPP is 30 years, landfill site PPP 20 years. 
In South Africa with relatively high interest rates (both real and nominal) extending beyond 
15 years has little real impact on affordability. Term has traditionally been about 20-22 years 
based on what is available in market. PPP Project term has closely matched funding term to 
leave some tail for dealing with difficulties but not so long as to make shareholder returns 
too high. Project term should also include physical factors such as timing of major 
refreshments (e.g. 7 years on road project), major capex (such as lifts/generators), costs of 
retendering projects too frequently and government aims as to what to do at end of term (a 
research topic in itself). 
The longer the better but banks are becoming less able to fund for tenors much beyond 15 
years so this should start to guide PPP periods. 
Private Sector Capacity 
An inexperienced private party could negotiate a position that is not lender friendly and so 
may need to go back for changes. Further, the process is likely to take longer if the private 
party is inexperienced. It is thus important for the private party to have experienced 
transaction advisors (particularly financial, legal and technical) to navigate the complexities 
of PPPs and project finance. 
Given that there has been a lull in PPPs recently, there are not that many skilled private 
party participants. The lenders and advisors still have the skills and experience. 
Good capacity, but poor deal flow over last decade means skills have been refocussed 
elsewhere. 
Skills exist but may be deployed in other areas due to lack of project flow. Could be 
worthwhile to survey financial and construction institutions to assess who has PPP / Project 
Finance teams and sizes. 
Transaction Advisors are expensive - feasibility costs are significant, economy of scale 
required to make it worthwhile. 




A PPP education programme could definitely be successful and could be led by the 
Western Cape. The need is probably far greater in other provinces and the political criticism 
in the Western Cape will probably be far higher but if a focus on service delivery is 
maintained this can be overcome. (As an aside, this should probably be compared to 
Gauteng school delivery where a school a month has been promised. I am not sure ow true 
this has been, especially over longer term rather than just around the elections. But a 
school a month is an easily digestible target to motivate a programme). 
Alternative revenue streams for schools could be unlocked through this arrangement - i.e. 
how could schools sites be used otherwise in some form of revenue-generation scheme? 
Favourable due to low risk infrastructure type. 
Need to consider innovation in terms of site usage (standard school typology needs to be 
revisited given lack of available land, especially in the metro. 
Needs stable environment - concern about demographic shifts as communities mature. 
Not sure if this is a good idea as schools are social infrastructure and there is limited 
opportunity to recover costs through user charges, schools seem to lend themselves to TIP 
for this reason. 
Potential for repetitive PPP framework to be developed due to modular and uncomplicated 
infrastructure type - this should reduce procurement time and provide efficiencies. 
Private sector schools working due to fee-paying structure, public schools at risk due to 
mostly being no-fee schools so pressure on private partner to recover investment is 
strained. 
Schools are uncomplicated so lend themselves to implementation + environment is 
competitive (many potential bidders). 
Schools could be a good vehicle, but premise is on getting the correct balance based on 
norms and standards (financial model). 
This could be tricky as there needs to be careful consideration of what the elements will be: 
will it just be infrastructure and infrastructure maintenance (this could work, if the budgetary 
allocation is confirmed); if it includes teaching staff this will need to be managed carefully. I 
am not sure if an education PPP has been conducted previously so if one has been done it 
would be helpful to understand the pros and cons of how this was procured and any 
lessons to take away. 
Public Sector Capacity 
Although strongly assisted by a programme approach, in many projects undertaken public 
officials were first time PPP participants and would never do another. 
given that the government entity appoints and relies on transaction advisors, this is less 
important but it is helpful. 
important for ongoing project management. 
It is also necessary to have project managers able to deliver in this flexible environment and 
know where their role starts and ends and the private party’s begins. 
Lack of experienced officials with PPP specialist knowledge or experience. 
Lack of in-house capacity to implement PPPs by government departments limits their 




most officials involved in PPP’s only do one project. Need to develop project skills and post-
closing management skills. Possibly even consider outsourcing as develop depth. 
Need internal specialists to oversee private sector transaction advisors and private partner. 
Processes are not conducive (too complex and lengthy onerous). 
Specialists in contract management required to ensure VFM is maximised during initial 
construction and operational period alike. 
Regulatory Framework 
Lenders want regulatory certainty from a framework to provide them with comfort that their 
debt will be repaid + this always remains important as it governs the relationships going 
forward for the life of the transaction. In SA the framework is in place. 
PPP environment well developed if under-used. Have not seen any examples where 
framework creates a risk environment. 
Regulatory framework is onerous / time-consuming. 
Risk Transfer 
private sector ability to borrow money and have capital in their coffers means easier to fund 
building, incentivised to reduce costs, completion risk transferred to private partner, 
maintenance and operation of infrastructure better than public sector (facilities 
management). 
Public Sector appetite low - risk averse. 
shift budget and capacity over to private partner. 
this is important as the party best able to manage the risk should be responsible for it + this 
continues to be important and is a concern even during operations. 
Too much government investment can limit risk transfer. 
Threats for PPPs 
Affordability (budget constraints). 
Affordability (lack thereof). 
Affordability to undertake a large scale roll-out which creates sufficient mass to generate 
economies of scale and VfM. 
Bankable projects, i.e. projects with high probability of success due to sufficient collateral, 
forecast cashflow. Important for institutional lenders. 
Complexity of process means people don’t have the appetite for PPPs (political will). 
Development of public sector skills to manage 3rd party service providers rather than own 
and manage in house projects. 
Funding (capital injection) strained due to need to ensure as many projects get delivered as 
possible at the expense of one or two major projects. 
Government support for PPPs and for financial underpin. 




Lack of patience - PPPs take time to put together. 
Lack of proper screening process to identify high-profile PPP projects. 
Lack of public sector capacity to implement PPPs. 
Perception is an extensive approval process and costly (transaction advisor fees). 
Political will present, but not at municipal level. 
Political will to decide building of school infrastructure is not a Public Works responsibility 
and is a “consumable” which can be provided by private sector on similar basis to full 
maintenance car leases. 
PPP understanding and buy-in (political will and advocacy). 
PPPs that are put together in a limited competitive market (can't ensure VFM). 
Public sector capacity - lack thereof and skill sets. 
Public sector capacity - lack thereof, experience in producing meaningful output 
specifications. 
Public sector experience (or lack thereof). 
Revenue certainty, especially for municipal PPPs given no national treasury involvement in 
the financing arrangements. 
Strong business cases - putting together a financial model that actually works. 
TIP vs. PPP 
 Level the playing field between the PPP and TIP mode - mush easier to get a TIP project 
initiated (budget allocation) than a PPP (many phases of treasury approval). 
At initiation phase TIP favoured due to ease of budget allocation vs. PPP approval (not a 
level playing field). 
Because we haven't engaged in enough PPPs it's difficult to assess. 
Expectations of level of service from private sector tends towards "Rolls Royce" offering, 
leaving PPPs incomparable with TIP. 
PPP becomes more efficient over time. 
PPP finance becomes ring-fenced for duration of PPP period. 
PPP procurement is more complex, costly (especially upfront) and time-consuming. 
The TIP model is already well set - officials at all points in the value chain. 
The volume of historical PPP projects in the Western Cape (and in South Africa generally) 
makes it hard to say which is more successful. Albeit PPP’s have been around for a long 
time in many ways they are in their infancy due to small numbers. The Renewable Energy 
project is probably the best case study for efficiencies and market roll-out. Having said that I 
would suggest it’s a project-specific answer. The majority of basic infrastructure can still be 
TIB and PPP’s should be considered where meet qualifying criteria. Bear in mind this is also 
within a South African context, contrast to some French towns where all services are 





PPP process to date has been largely fair and honest but will depend on perceived integrity 
of implementing authority. 
there are often processes in government that are not transparent, yet the transaction still 
proceeds. 
Unintended Consequences 
Be aware of trying to achieve too many development objectives as reduces competitor 
numbers. 
Bid Evaluation processes are too long – hard to hold onto private partner during this period 
without adverse effects (VFM may be affected). 
changes to the PPP can be difficult once the structure has been finalised and the project is 
operational. 
Government departments may start thinking that they can do the service better. 
If it's not correctly managed, such as scope creep from the private sector's side, if roles and 
responsibilities not correctly defined this may create the platform for a dispute. 
If PPP procurement processes are not properly followed, project completion adversely 
affected and projects stall or fail. 
Investment in PPPs leaves less discretionary capital for other projects (long-term 
commitments). 
Lack of flexibility leaves potential for projects that do not have a long-term sustainable 
outlook. 
loss of control by public sector due to unbundling contracts (subcontracting) leading to 
increasing costs. 
Public sector tries to bake in too many secondary objectives (CPG targets, EPWP 
requirements, community involvement, training). 
The success of PPP projects may have led to them embarrassing traditional departments 
on their delivery leading to PPP’s being shunned. 
Transaction advisor bidding complications: need TA's to put bid together, but they also want 
to bid on the project. 
While we are the custodians of the properties, the client department becomes the owner of 
the PPP and the authority of the custodianship may be seen to shift from the DTPW to the 
client department. 
Value for Money 
Private sector projects can generally deliver VfM but cognisance needs to be taken of their 
key factors – pipeline of projects warranting investment in time and people and certainty of 
process. 
Public Sector Comparator cost exercise not fully understood, unfair expectations on private 
sector level of service (Rolls Royce expected by public sector when all that should be 




Review of private prisons showing value undermined by unrealistic standards enforced on 
private sector. 
this is important only during procurement and becomes less important once the project has 
been procured. 
VfM is an important factor but not most important if real issues are lack of capacity and lack 
of funding. 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
